‹ Dragoman · Edition 18
Translated from Turkish · 8 June 2026
translated from Turkish

Kılıçdaroğlu and the Reason of State

The essay argues that Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s return to the CHP leadership reveals not a democratic restoration but a voluntary alignment with an antagonistic “reason of state” that seeks legitimacy by fortifying the home front against a constructed outside.

Kılıçdaroğlu’nun Antagonistik Devlet Aklı
Birikim · Ali Cebe · 8 June 2026 · read the original in Turkish →

Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the seventh chairman of the Republican People’s Party and the former, unsuccessful presidential candidate of the Table of Six, was appointed once again to the head of the CHP after the court deemed the party convention held after the May 2023 elections “absolutely null.” Many were surprised by this. Until the 2023 elections, whose defeat caused him to vanish from the political stage, an image had been fashioned for Kılıçdaroğlu as a calm, dignified, and wise leader. That image-making was a communications operation preparing Kılıçdaroğlu for his presidential candidacy. Yet watching Kılıçdaroğlu answer reporters’ questions on the occasion of the recent holiday, it was impossible not to see how tense and angry he was. His stressed demeanor, especially as he avoided answering the question about the convention, was plainly visible.

Clearly, someone is still continuing to run a communications operation on Kılıçdaroğlu’s behalf. A few days after people forced their way into the CHP headquarters by breaking down its doors, his sitting on a bench bearing the words Çankaya Municipality and answering questions was probably another “strategic” stroke by this ingenious communications mind, intended to create the image of “one of us.” Another PR exercise from this same mind consists of Kılıçdaroğlu’s opinion pieces on the “new world order,” published in the online newspaper T24 after his defeat at the convention. As a regular reader of the paper, I would come across these pieces from time to time and glance through them. The essays contain a Tuesday-market-style bombardment of concepts, an everything-you-could-possibly-look-for assortment ranging from Rivieras to Gramsci quotations, from the age of techno-feudal lords to debates over vassalage[1]. But the basic frame is this: the old world order is collapsing; a new world order is being established.

According to him, as we move toward a new multipolar world order in which global uncertainties have reached the heavens, Turkey’s strategy should rest on two basic points: strengthening the home front and pursuing a multidimensional foreign policy[2]. Does that sound familiar? The “reason of state” that entered our lives in practice on October 1, 2024, when MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli walked over to the DEM Party benches and shook hands at the opening of parliament, and that has been designing politics for nearly two years, was built precisely on these two main axes. In an environment of geopolitical turmoil, Turkey first had to be strong at home and then cautious abroad. When I first looked at these writings, I kept thinking that the deliriums organized around the theme that a new world order was being established were a perfect litmus test for grasping the political positions of the period. Looking at his essays, it was possible to see that Kılıçdaroğlu had already aligned himself mentally with the hegemonic “reason of state.” In other words, these writings were in fact a harbinger of what was to follow.

Bülent Kuşoğlu, a former deputy chairman from the old team that returned to CHP headquarters with the absolute-nullity ruling and one of Kılıçdaroğlu’s confidants, reinforced this thought in a recent interview[3] when he said that “the reason of state is devising something.” So what is the substance of this reason of state repeatedly invoked by the absolute-nullity team? First, if we return to the two strategic points mentioned in Kılıçdaroğlu’s article, there is a complementary dialectical relationship between fortifying the home front (he says strengthening it) and making multidimensional openings abroad. Although Kılıçdaroğlu defines the outside as multi-actor, discursively he constructs the inside and the outside through an opposed duality. Thus, in fact, he singularizes the diversity and plurality of the outside at the cost of abolishing the plurality of the inside as well. That is, he reveals an intention to render the inside, too, unitary in a holistic way. Discursively, this is a basic ontological premise. The outside, quite simply, comprises what lies geographically beyond Turkey’s borders, while the inside, as the word itself indicates, comprises what lies within this geography. Kılıçdaroğlu defines Turkey’s security through the inevitable opposition of this superficial geographical binary, stripped of the social, the cultural, and the political. While aligning himself with a fictive reason of state, the political-ontological plane on which he is operating remains beyond even his own horizon. Such, I suppose, is something like the natural consequence of worshiping the unquestionable rational imagination of the reason of state.

Yet at a deeper level, the form of perception and imagination called the reason of state, which he too endorses, points to the radical antagonistic premise of the political developed by the famous German jurist Carl Schmitt[4]. In this respect, by speaking of inside and outside, he emphasizes, in essentialist fashion, the immutability and ontological founding force of the political through the friend-enemy distinction. It is not entirely meaningless that such views are being shared by reference to this antagonistic premise of the political precisely at a moment when a political crisis inherent in liberal democracies has become pronounced. If he were offering this observation analytically and articulating a more pluralist and transformative political imagination, it would then be possible to say something different about him. But just as it is impossible to find any pluralist or transformative discursive element in his writings, all the implicit critical elements in them become meaningless within the framework of this founding political premise. Therefore, exactly as Schmitt claimed, this shows his intention to align with the sovereign: that is, his intention to join the ranks of those fortifying the home front. Thus Kılıçdaroğlu, as a defeated leader, crosses voluntarily from the enemy side of power to the friend side, and seeks to acquire legitimacy, with the sovereign’s approval, as a friend of an antagonistic reason of state.

[1] https://t24.com.tr/yazarlar/kemal-kilicdaroglu/6 - All of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s writings can be accessed through this link.

[2] https://t24.com.tr/yazarlar/kemal-kilicdaroglu/yeni-dunya-duzenine-dogru,51580?_t=1780560010453

[3] https://t24.com.tr/yazarlar/cansu-camlibel/kilicdaroglunun-45-yillik-yol-arkadasi-kusoglu-devlet-akli-bir-seyler-kurguluyor-adayimiz-mansur-bey-de-ozgur-bey-de-olabilir,55478?_t=1780571718626

[4] Carl Schmitt’s discussions of the concept of the political, sovereignty, and political crisis can be examined in such books as Political Theology (1922), The Concept of the Political (1932), and The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1923).

Birikim · read in Turkish