U.S.-Iran Ceasefire Talks: The Four-Sided Calculus Disturbing the Peace, Protracted Stalemate or Preparation for Decisive War?

4月7日最后通牒倒数前夕，中东战火突然峰回路转：美国伊朗宣布接受巴基斯坦斡旋，开始为期两周的暂时停火。

On the eve of the countdown to the April 7 ultimatum, the fires of war in the Middle East suddenly took an unexpected turn: the United States and Iran announced that they had accepted Pakistan's mediation and would begin a two-week temporary ceasefire.

平心而论，这种转折虽然出人意料，却也不是完全无迹可寻。因为早在3月中旬，伊朗就已提出各种版本的停战条件，特朗普更是反复强调双方“存在对话”，即便这种说法曾被伊朗嘲笑是“美国自己与自己谈判”，但从当下最新发展来看，特朗普的放话也不全是空穴来风。

To be fair, this turn of events, though surprising, was not entirely without trace. As early as mid-March, Iran had already put forward various versions of ceasefire conditions, while Trump repeatedly stressed that the two sides were "in dialogue." Even though that claim had once been mocked by Iran as "America negotiating with itself," judging from the latest developments, Trump's remarks were not wholly baseless.

Clearly, against the backdrop of widening destruction, the repeated fermentation of the Hormuz crisis, and Trump's impending visit to China, both the United States and Iran have a practical need for an "intermission." It is precisely for this reason that Pakistan was able to shuttle back and forth in mediation: first issuing a five-point initiative jointly with China on March 31, then putting forward a 45-day, two-stage ceasefire framework on April 5, and finally, on the 7th, securing assent from both Washington and Tehran before hosting ceasefire talks on the 11th.

显然，在破坏规模持续扩大、霍尔木兹危机反复发酵、特朗普即将访华的背景下，美国与伊朗都有“中场休息”的现实需求。正因如此，巴基斯坦才能穿梭其间反覆斡旋，先是在3月31日与中国共同发表五点倡议，又在4月5日提出45天的两阶段停火框架，最后也终于在7日促成美伊点头，并在11日主持停火谈判。

Yet judging from the principal negotiators, who revolve around U.S. Vice President Vance, Trump's envoy Witkoff, Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi, and Speaker Qalibaf, the current ceasefire is in fact more a reluctant point of overlap among the MAGA faction's desire to extricate itself, Trump's attempt at political damage control, and Iran's moderates' hope for respite, rather than a shared consensus among all parties to the war.

只是，从谈判主力围绕美国副总统万斯、特朗普特使威特科夫、伊朗外长阿拉格奇、议长卡利巴夫来看，当前停火其实更多是美国MAGA派有意抽身、特朗普企图政治止损、伊朗温和派希望休养的勉强交集，而非交战各方的一致共识。

Under Pakistani mediation, U.S.-Iran talks were held in Islamabad. IC photo在巴基斯坦斡旋下，美伊谈判在伊斯兰堡举行。 IC photo

This may explain why, even as U.S.-Iran ceasefire talks are under way, Israeli airstrikes on Lebanon continue, Iran has not halted its drone attacks on the Gulf, and the negotiating process itself is filled with various monologues and tests of bottom lines. These include the fact that the so-called Iranian "10-point plan" exists in numerous versions; the signals are inconsistent over whether Iran's overseas assets will be unfrozen; Saudi Arabia has already asked Pakistan to prepare for an escalation of the war; and the United States, on the 12th, directly announced a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and mine-clearing operations, then began blockading Iranian ports from the 13th, trying to regain battlefield initiative outside the negotiating table.

这或许就解释了，为何美伊停火谈判当下，以色列对黎巴嫩的空袭仍在继续、伊朗也没有停止对海湾的无人机袭击，甚至谈判过程中还充斥着各种自说自话与底线试探，包括所谓伊朗“10点方案”其实版本众多、伊朗海外资产是否解冻风向不一、沙特已经要求巴基斯坦为战争升级做准备，美国更是在12日直接宣布封锁霍尔木兹海峡、清除水雷，并从13日开始封锁伊朗港口，尝试在谈判桌外夺回战场主动。

In the final analysis, from the prewar standoff to the present "intermission," the dangerous tug-of-war among the four parties to the conflict has never ended; it has only become relatively veiled after the ceasefire. The United States is still preparing on two tracks, diplomatic negotiation and military escalation; Israel still wants to continue the war while coordinating with Washington; Iran is likewise staging a strategic split between moderation and hard-line resistance; and the Gulf keeps drifting back and forth between de-escalation and pressure.

归根结底，从战前对峙到当下“中场休息”，冲突四方的危险拉扯其实从未终结，只是停火之后变得相对隐晦：美国依旧持续外交谈判与军事升级的两手准备、以色列还是想在配合美国之余继续战争、伊朗同样上演温和与强硬的战略撕裂、海湾则在降温与加压的身份间反复游移。

This four-way pattern of interaction is in fact a "repeated game" of the "prisoner's dilemma": an equilibrium short of decisive battle may be able to form, yet because all four parties to the conflict have incentives not to cooperate, and because each has already "violated the rules" multiple times, the prospects for the ceasefire remain murky, especially in the context of the April 11 U.S.-Iran talks failing to reach an agreement and Washington beginning to turn toward military pressure.

而这种四方互动模式，其实就是“囚徒困境”的“重复博弈”，也就是不决战的均衡虽可能成形，却因冲突四方都有不合作诱因、且已各自“犯规”多次，所以导致停火前景的晦暗不明，尤其是在11日美伊谈判没有达成协议，美国开始转向军事施压的背景下。

Therefore, what determines whether the current ceasefire can last, and in what form it lasts, may not be whether the problems have been solved or whether the conflict structure has collapsed, but how many bargaining chips and how much room for maneuver the four parties in the war actually possess, enough to let the situation form a new equilibrium of low intensity, or even no conflict, rather than move toward endless escalation and wartime turbulence.

因此，决定眼下停火能否持续、以及用什么方式持续的，或许不是问题有无解决、冲突结构是否瓦解，而是身处其中的战争四方，究竟拥有多少谈判筹码与回旋空间，能让局势形成低烈度，甚至是无冲突的新均衡，而不是走向战争动荡的无尽升级。

Israel: Can continuing the war bring about peace?

以色列：继续战争就能实现和平？

First comes Israel, the most war-minded of the four parties.

首先是四方之中战意最强的以色列。

There is no doubt that, compared with the United States, the Gulf states, and Iran locking horns over the strait, Israel's war agenda is plainly one of its own: even if its territory is being struck repeatedly by missiles, it will spare no cost to eradicate the Iranian threat; even if regime change is for the moment a road that leads nowhere, it will use war as far as possible to delay Iran's nuclear development, destroy its missile program, weaken the "Axis of Resistance," and at the same time intensify the confrontation between the Gulf Arab states and Iran.

毫无疑问，相较美国、海湾国家、伊朗围绕海峡针锋相对，以色列的战争议程明显自成一格，那就是即便国土被导弹不断袭击，也要不计成本根除伊朗威胁；就算政权更迭暂时“此路不通”，也要尽可能通过战争推迟伊朗核发展、摧毁导弹计划、削弱“抵抗轴心”，同时激化海湾阿拉伯国家与伊朗的对立。

This overwhelming, all-direction pressure arises from Israel's earlier logic, only now escalated in degree. Weakening the "Axis of Resistance," for example, echoes Israel's long-standing "mowing the grass" strategy in Gaza, its targeted killings of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and its low-intensity conflict with Lebanese Hezbollah. Other examples include assassinating Iranian nuclear scientists, blocking a nuclear agreement between the United States and Iran, and using the Abraham Accords to strengthen itself while squeezing Iran's regional influence.

而这种铺天盖地的全方位压制，源自以色列的过往逻辑，只是程度更加升级。例如削弱“抵抗轴心”，就与以色列长期对加沙的“割草”策略、对伊朗革命卫队的狙杀、与黎巴嫩真主党的低烈度冲突相呼应；其他还包括暗杀伊朗核科学家、阻止美国与伊朗达成核协议，以及利用《亚伯拉罕协议》壮大自己、挤压伊朗的区域影响力。

If one were to compare this to a chess strategy, the operation resembles the Ruy Lopez, or Spanish Opening: using geopolitical positioning, preemption, and positional warfare to ensure that Israel can maintain a long-term first-mover advantage while forming strategic pressure against Iran.

如果用西洋棋策略来比拟，这种操作其实就像“西班牙开局”（Ruy Lopez、Spanish Opening），也就是运用地缘布局、先发制人与阵地战，确保自己能够维持长期的先手优势，同时对伊朗形成战略压制。

Yet subsequent developments show that although Israel's "Spanish Opening" helped lengthen the rounds of its game with Iran and led the two sides repeatedly into a low-intensity "prisoner's dilemma," it did not eradicate risk. That risk was the "Al-Aqsa Flood" operation of October 2023: with Iranian coordination, large numbers of Hamas fighters infiltrated Israel, killed civilians, and abducted hostages, triggering the subsequent Gaza war of appalling cruelty.

不过从后续发展来看，以色列的“西班牙开局”虽然有助拉长与伊朗的博弈回合，导致双方反复上演低烈度的“囚徒困境”，却没有彻底根除风险，也就是2023年10月的“阿克萨洪水行动”：在伊朗策应下，大量哈马斯渗入以色列杀害平民、掳走人质，触发后续惨绝人寰的加沙战争。

From Hamas's perspective, this was a geopolitical gamble to pursue Palestinian national liberation and seize energy from the Palestinian government in the West Bank. Deduced from Iran's strategic thinking, it was a key step in preventing Israel and Saudi Arabia from establishing diplomatic relations. From Tel Aviv's standpoint, however, this was beyond question a grave "violation of the rules" by Iran and Hamas, a direct betrayal of the long-standing equilibrium.

从哈马斯的视角出发，这是争取巴勒斯坦民族解放、袭夺西岸巴勒斯坦政府能量的地缘豪赌。由伊朗的战略思路推演，这是阻止以色列与沙特建交的关键一步。不过，从特拉维夫的立场来看，这毫无疑问是伊朗与哈马斯的严重“犯规”，是对长期均衡的直接背叛。

As a result, beginning with the Gaza war, Israel triggered the "Grim Trigger" strategy of repeated games: in order to punish Iran for its 2023 breach of martial norms, Israel likewise refused cooperation in all subsequent rounds and repeatedly crossed red lines, including turning Gaza into a hell on earth, invading Lebanon and Syria in succession, fighting the "Twelve-Day War" with Iran in June 2025, then the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran in February 2026, followed by Israel's renewed war on Lebanon in March.

结果，以色列也从加沙战争开始，触发重覆博弈的“冷酷战略”（Grim Trigger），也就是为了惩罚伊朗在2023年“不讲武德”，以色列同样在后续所有博弈拒绝合作、反复跨越红线，包括化加沙为人间炼狱、先后入侵黎巴嫩与叙利亚，以及在2025年6月与伊朗爆发“十二日战争”，再来就是2026年2月的美以对伊朗战争，以及3月以色列对黎巴嫩再度开战。

On April 9, in Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, houses destroyed by Israeli airstrikes. Xinhua, photo by Bilal Jawich4月9日，黎巴嫩首都贝鲁特，遭以色列空袭摧毁的房屋。 新华社发（比拉尔·贾维希摄）

Simply put, because Iran once "violated the rules," Israel has directly chosen punishment in every round that followed. To return to the chess analogy, no matter how long the two sides play, Israel refuses a draw in every game. Of course, the challenge this mad approach must inevitably face is the strategic retreat of its ally, the United States.

简单来说，以色列因为伊朗一次“犯规”，已经直接在后续所有回合选择惩罚。如果用西洋棋来比拟，就是不论双方对弈多久，以色列在每盘棋都拒绝和棋。当然，这种疯狂做法必然面临的挑战，就是盟友美国的战略撤退。

After all, Iran may be Israel's most direct national security threat, but this is not necessarily true for the United States, especially against the backdrop of America having once been mired in Afghanistan and Iraq and Washington's current intention to focus on the Indo-Pacific. Returning to the Middle Eastern battlefield would not only disperse strategic attention, but also inevitably face a challenge from public opinion. This can be seen consistently in America's continued mediation of a Gaza ceasefire, its forceful control of the situation in the late stages of the "Twelve-Day War," and its present hope for a "quick battle and quick decision" against Iran.

毕竟，伊朗或许是以色列最直接的国家安全威胁，但对美国来说未必如此，尤其是在美国曾经深陷阿富汗与伊拉克泥淖、华盛顿目前有意聚焦印太的背景下，重返中东战场不只分散战略重心，也必然面临民意挑战。这点从美国持续斡旋加沙停火、在“十二日战争”后期强硬控场，到当下希望能对伊朗“速战速决”，基本都是一以贯之的。

Clearly, although Israel can tie the United States to the war chariot, it must also face America's struggle to jump off it. Yet this is still very unlikely to force Israel to stop the war. Beyond Netanyahu's political need to continue the war because of electoral and judicial considerations, the reason also lies in the strategic inertia that has taken shape in Israel after the Gaza war: no matter how other players behave, Israel only wants to seize as many chips from Iran's hand as possible; that is, to use an even fiercer "Spanish Opening" to strangle any possibility of Iran's future recovery.

显然，以色列虽然能把美国绑上战车，却也必然面临美国的跳车挣扎。但这依旧很难迫使以色列停下战争，原因除了内塔尼亚胡出于选举与司法案件考量、有继续战争的政治需求外，也是因为以色列经历加沙战争后已成形的战略惯性：不论其他玩家如何表现，以色列只想竭力夺取伊朗手中筹码，也就是用更加激烈的“西班牙开局”，来扼杀伊朗未来的复苏可能。

Thus, as the United States gradually goes "TACO," Israel has increasingly crossed red lines, including continuing to decapitate Iran's military and political leadership, striking Iranian oil tanks and gas fields, and insisting on not stopping its war against Lebanon. The purpose is to drive the war into continued escalation and force the ceasefire talks into deadlock.

因此面对美国逐渐“TACO”，以色列便也愈发跨越红线，包括持续斩首伊朗军政高层、打击伊朗油槽与气田，以及坚持不肯停下对黎巴嫩的战争，目的就是驱动战争持续升级，迫使停火谈判陷入僵局。

Still, as the strategic divergence between the United States and Israel continues to widen, America jumping off the chariot is probably still the more likely trend; the only difference is how much time it will require. Even so, Israel has not come away from the war empty-handed. Since the geopolitical turmoil that began in 2023, Israel has already been gradually advancing its strategic objective of weakening Iran, including delaying the nuclear program and weakening sections of the "Axis of Resistance" such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Even though the Iranian threat has never been eradicated, Israel has already acquired enormous privilege to violate the rules through repeated escalation of the war. One might say that even if this war ultimately achieves a ceasefire, Israel's "mowing the grass" in Gaza, and perhaps even in Lebanon and Syria, will probably continue.

只是，随着美以战略分歧持续扩大，美国跳车恐怕还是机率较高的发展趋势，差别只是所需时间长短。不过即便如此，以色列面对战争也不是毫无收获。因为从2023年地缘乱局开始，以色列就已逐渐推进削弱伊朗的战略目标，包括推迟核计划、弱化真主党与哈马斯等“抵抗轴心”板块，即便伊朗威胁始终没有根除，以色列都已经在反复升级战争的过程中，取得极大的犯规特权。可以这么说，即便这场战争最后实现停火，以色列对于加沙、甚至黎巴嫩与叙利亚的“割草”，恐怕仍会持续进行。

Of course, this approach may help short-term security, but it does not guarantee the consolidation of long-term peace. Yet within Israel's consistent understanding, continuing war can bring about peace: this was true in the past with the Arab states, and it is also true now in dealing with the Iranian threat. This is perhaps the most direct motive behind Tel Aviv's choice of the "Spanish Opening," its adoption of the "Grim Trigger" strategy, and its persistent resistance to ceasefire talks.

当然，这种做法或许有助短期安全，却不保证巩固长远和平。不过在以色列的一贯认知内，继续战争就能实现和平，过去对阿拉伯国家如此，眼下应对伊朗威胁亦然，这或许就是特拉维夫何以选择“西班牙开局”、采取“冷酷战略”、并始终抗拒停火谈判的最直接动机。

Gulf states: Is maintaining neutrality no longer enough to ensure security?

海湾国家：维持中立已不足以确保安全？

Next come the Gulf Arab states, whose stance is turning tougher.

再来是立场转趋强硬的海湾阿拉伯国家。

In essence, the game between the six Gulf states and Iran began after the outbreak of the Arab Spring, when the Iranian "Axis of Resistance" kept penetrating the battlefields of Syria and Yemen, provoking an external counteroffensive and internal purge led by Saudi Arabia. In 2015, Saudi Arabia led the Gulf states in sending troops into Yemen in an attempt to weaken the Iran-backed Houthis. In 2017, Saudi Arabia joined Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and other allies in collectively imposing a diplomatic blockade on Qatar, the member of the Gulf six most friendly to Iran.

基本上，海湾六国与伊朗的博弈始于“阿拉伯之春”爆发后，伊朗“抵抗轴心”对叙利亚、也门战场的持续渗透，引发以沙特为首的对外反扑与对内整肃：2015年沙特率领海湾各国发兵也门，企图削弱伊朗支持的胡塞武装；2017年，沙特联合巴林、阿联酋、埃及等盟国，集体对海湾六国中最亲伊朗的卡塔尔进行外交封锁。

Clearly, Saudi Arabia regarded the expansion of Iran's "Axis of Resistance" as tantamount to a "violation of the rules," and therefore resorted to military and diplomatic punishment.

显然，沙特认为伊朗“抵抗轴心”扩张等同“犯规”，并也因此诉诸军事与外交惩罚。

Yet as the intervention in Yemen produced limited results and Qatar's stance remained as before, this game ultimately ended in Saudi strategic frustration. Forced to swallow the insult, Riyadh accepted the fait accompli of Iranian expansion and began a series of diplomatic efforts at damage control, including restoring relations with Qatar in 2021, restoring relations with Iran in March 2023, and resuming interaction with Syria's Assad regime in April. The purpose was to break away from geopolitical confrontation and concentrate on the industrial reform process of Vision 2030.

只是随着介入也门战果有限、卡塔尔立场依旧故我，这场博弈终究以沙特的战略受挫告终，后者也在勉为其难的唾面自干下，接受伊朗扩张的既成事实，并且开始一系列外交止损，包括在2021年与卡塔尔复交、在2023年3月与伊朗复交、在4月与叙利亚阿萨德政权恢复互动，目的就是脱离地缘对峙情境，专心聚焦“2030愿景”的产业改革进程。

By the time the game had developed to this point, the six Gulf states, under Saudi leadership, had formed an opening akin to the "London System" in chess: a low-risk neutrality strategy focused on maintaining internal stability and avoiding being drawn into positional melee. From this, the Gulf and Iran ushered in a "spring of reconciliation" of smiles that did not reach the eyes.

基本上博弈发展到这个节点，海湾六国已在沙特主导之下，形成西洋棋策略中的“伦敦系统”（London System）开局，也就是主打低风险的中立策略，竭力维持内部稳定、避免卷入阵地混战，海湾与伊朗也由此迎来皮笑肉不笑的“和解春天”。

Judging from subsequent developments, however, this strategy and peace did not last long, because the "Al-Aqsa Flood" operation of October 2023 once again catalyzed change. The proxy conflicts running through the "Axis of Resistance" not only burned back onto Iranian soil, but also gradually spread to Gulf states near Iran; Qatar, which had mediated the ceasefire, was even struck successively by Iran and Israel.

可是从后续发展来看，这一策略和并没有持续太久，因为2023年10月的“阿克萨洪水行动”再度催化变局：贯穿“抵抗轴心”的代理人冲突不只烧回伊朗本土，也逐渐波及邻近伊朗的海湾国家，斡旋停火的卡塔尔更是遭到伊朗、以色列的先后打击。

This exposed the awkward predicament of the six Gulf states: as the United States continues to withdraw from the Middle East, each country faces the Iranian threat alone and with insufficient strength, and can only choose diplomatic easing or active rapprochement. But when the conflict among the United States, Israel, and Iran heats up, these countries cannot truly avoid being harmed as bystanders, and so they confront the problem of choosing sides.

这就暴露出海湾六国的尴尬处境：伴随美国持续撤出中东，各国面对伊朗威胁独木难支，只能选择外交缓和或积极修好；但当美国以色列与伊朗冲突升温，各国无法真正免于池鱼之殃，于是就会面临选边难题。

It was precisely amid this shift in circumstances that Saudi Arabia, already reconciled with Iran, chose secretly to "violate the rules": on the surface, it urged the United States not to use force; in private, it actively lobbied that "if you are going to strike, strike now." Clearly, this was the first crack in the six Gulf states' posture in the "post-Gaza war" context. Later, as the Iran war broke out and Iran began sweeping fire across U.S. military bases, hotels, airports, energy facilities, and even desalination plants in the Gulf, the foundations of the "London System" gradually began to shake.

而也正是在这种情境变化下，已与伊朗和解的沙特选择偷偷“犯规”：表面劝说美国不要动武，私下却积极游说“要打趁现在”。显然，这是海湾六国面对“后加沙战争”情境的第一道裂缝；之后随着伊朗战争爆发，伊朗开始扫射海湾美军基地、饭店机场、能源设施乃至海水淡化厂，“伦敦系统”的根基便也逐渐动摇。

For example, Saudi Arabia, which lobbied the United States to use force before the war, is now essentially preparing for escalation. In addition to agreeing to U.S. use of King Fahd Air Base, it has also, under the joint defense treaty, requested Pakistani troops and fighter jets to deploy. The United Arab Emirates, which has endured the most Iranian missile and drone attacks, was the first Gulf state to call for "opening the strait" and said it was willing to join U.S.-led military operations. Bahrain, representing the Gulf states, submitted to the United Nations a draft resolution on "restoring navigational security in the Strait of Hormuz," seeking to exert maximum international pressure on Iran. Qatar, meanwhile, has essentially abandoned its long-standing policy of neutrality and shot down Iranian military aircraft during the war.

例如战前游说美国动武的沙特，当下基本已经在为战争升级做准备，除了同意美军使用法赫德国王空军基地外，也依据联合防御条约要求巴基斯坦军队与战机前来部署；承受伊朗最多导弹与无人机攻击的阿联酋，更是最早喊出“打通海峡”的海湾国家，并称自己愿意加入美国领导的军事行动；巴林则代表海湾国家在联合国提出“恢复霍尔木兹海峡航行安全决议草案”，要最大程度对伊朗进行国际施压；卡塔尔则基本放弃持续多年的中立政策，在战争期间击落伊朗军机。

Clearly, from the perspective of the Gulf states, regardless of why this war broke out, Iran's large-scale retaliation has violently shaken the Gulf status quo and constitutes a grave "violation of the rules" far exceeding past pressure. Tehran has therefore become, in the eyes of these countries, the greatest security threat, and the old "London System" naturally no longer needs to be maintained.

显然，从海湾国家的视角出发，不论这场战争爆发的原因是什么，伊朗采取的大规模报复都已剧烈冲击海湾现状、是远超过往压迫的严重“犯规”，德黑兰也因此成为各国眼中的最大安全威胁，曾经的“伦敦系统”也就自然没有维系必要。

This tendency will inevitably affect the current ceasefire talks. Oman, for instance, which once mediated the U.S.-Iran nuclear issue, now basically does not dare respond to Iran's so-called proposal for "joint management of the strait." Kuwait and Qatar have even called on Iran to stop mobilizing the "Axis of Resistance" and have put forward claims for compensation. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates have adopted the toughest posture: Saudi Arabia is already coordinating joint military action with Pakistan; Bahrain argues that any ceasefire agreement must include Iranian denuclearization and an end to mobilizing the "Axis of Resistance"; and the UAE likewise says that a plan to restrict Iran's missile and nuclear programs brooks no delay.

而这种倾向必然影响当前的停火谈判。例如曾经斡旋美伊核问题的阿曼，当下基本不敢回应伊朗所谓“共管海峡”提案；科威特与卡塔尔更是呼吁伊朗停止动员“抵抗轴心”，并提出索赔；沙特、巴林与阿联酋则采取最强硬姿态，沙特已在协调与巴基斯坦的联合军事行动，巴林主张停战协议必须包括伊朗去核、停止动员“抵抗轴心”，阿联酋同样表示限制伊朗导弹与核计划的方案刻不容缓。

One might say that as the war drags on and the scale of destruction expands, the Gulf's overall position has gradually moved away from its former "London System" and toward Israel's "Spanish Opening." It has not yet reached the level of repeated punishment that would trigger a "Grim Trigger" strategy, and still retains space for cooperation and negotiation.

可以这么说，随着战争时间拉长、破坏规模扩大，海湾整体立场已从曾经的“伦敦系统”逐渐靠向以色列的“西班牙开局”，只是还不到触发“冷酷战略”的反复惩罚程度，而是依旧保有合作与谈判空间。

In other words, the Gulf is in fact the key swing actor in the current negotiations. If these countries choose to stop at the level of air-defense coordination, energy resilience, insurance coordination, convoy support, and diplomatic pressure, the conflict may remain within a high-risk but manageable framework. But if any Gulf state turns to active strikes, whether by participating in operations against Iran or fully opening forward operational support, the conflict could burst from a limited war into a Gulf-wide war. Apart from Israel, which would be extremely pleased to see such an outcome, this would probably be a dangerous development of high risk and high cost for both the United States and Iran.

换句话说，海湾其实是当下谈判的关键摆动主体。如果各国选择停在防空协同、能源韧性、保险协调、护航支撑与外交施压层面，冲突就可能留在高风险但可管理的冲突框架内；但如果海湾当中有任何一国转为主动打击，不论是参与对伊作战或全面开放前沿作战支援，冲突就可能从有限战争炸裂为海湾大战。而这种结果除了以色列极度乐见外，恐怕对美伊双方来说，都是高风险、高成本的危险发展。

Therefore, whatever bottom lines the United States and Iran may each hold, the Gulf states' gradually rising deterrence, and even their inclination to join U.S.-Israeli military action, will inevitably be incorporated into the calculations of the current negotiating parties. Iran, for instance, should probably understand that if a major war breaks out with the United States, the Gulf states will not only refrain from standing on its side, but may also become springboards for military attacks.

因此，不论美伊各自底线如何，海湾国家逐渐升高的吓阻、甚至加入美以军事行动倾向，都必然会被当前的谈判双方纳入考量，例如伊朗恐怕就要心里有数，一旦与美国爆发大战，海湾国家不仅不会站在自己这边，还有可能成为军事进攻跳板。

Finally, even if a decisive Gulf battle does not break out and the conflict ends in a ceasefire stalemate, the Gulf states' stance will probably find it difficult to return to the "London System." It may instead move toward tougher defensive coordination, because Iran's "violation of the rules" this time has given these countries a new understanding: regardless of why the war broke out, maintaining neutrality is not enough to ensure security. Of course, the Gulf is not about to become the next Israel, but in the collective security perception currently held by these countries, Iran is probably a more serious security threat than Israel.

最后，就算海湾决战没有爆发、冲突也以停火僵持收场，海湾国家的立场也恐怕很难重回“伦敦系统”，而是可能走向更加强硬的防御协同，因为伊朗这次“犯规”已让各国形成新认知：不论战争为何爆发，维持中立都不足以确保安全。当然，海湾还不至于成为下一个以色列，但在各国目前的集体安全认知上，伊朗恐怕是比以色列更严重的安全威胁。

On April 11, during Saudi Finance Minister Mohammed al-Jadaan's visit to Islamabad, he held important meetings with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Field Marshal Munir, and Foreign Minister Dar. Pakistani government's X account4月11日，沙特财长贾丹访问伊斯兰堡期间，与巴基斯坦总理谢里夫、陆军元帅穆尼尔及外长达尔举行重要会晤。巴基斯坦政府X

Original headline: U.S.-Iran Ceasefire Talks: The Four-Sided Calculus Disturbing the Peace, Protracted Stalemate or Preparation for Decisive War? This article represents only the author's personal views.

- 原标题：美国伊朗停火谈判：搅动和平的四方盘算，长久僵持或准备决战？ 本文仅代表作者个人观点。

Editor in charge: Zhu Minjie - The U.S. Treasury secretary threatens again: if China has financial dealings with Iran, there will be secondary sanctions 2026-04-16 08:31 Guancha Headlines - Iran's foreign minister briefs China on the latest developments in Iran-U.S. talks and Iran's next considerations 2026-04-15 23:34 Iran Situation - Reinforcing troops and making threats on one side, painting promises of lower oil prices on the other: Trump is fighting for votes 2026-04-15 22:46 Iran Situation - Former head of Brazilian intelligence who fled to the United States arrested by ICE 2026-04-15 21:56 - "The U.S. military will send about 6,000 more soldiers, with another 4,200 on the way"

- 责任编辑: 朱敏洁 - 美财长又威胁：若中方有伊朗资金往来，就二级制裁 2026-04-16 08:31 观察者头条 - 伊外长向中方通报了伊美谈判最新情况及伊方下步考虑 2026-04-15 23:34 伊朗局势 - 一边增兵放狠话，一边画饼降油价，特朗普为选票拼了 2026-04-15 22:46 伊朗局势 - 逃亡美国的巴西情报局前局长，被ICE抓了 2026-04-15 21:56 - “美军将增派约6000名士兵，还有4200名在路上”

2026-04-15 21:06 Iran Situation - A falling-out? "Starmer made a tragic mistake and ruined Britain"

2026-04-15 21:06 伊朗局势 - 翻脸？“斯塔默犯了悲剧性的错误，毁了英国”

2026-04-15 20:24 Responding to the Trump shock wave - In response to the U.S. blockade, the Iranian military mentions "the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and the Red Sea"

2026-04-15 20:24 应对特朗普冲击波 - 回应美方封锁，伊朗军方提及“波斯湾、阿曼湾和红海”

2026-04-15 20:18 Iran Situation - "China is considering restricting exports to the United States"

2026-04-15 20:18 伊朗局势 - “中方考虑限制对美出口”

2026-04-15 19:32 China-U.S. Relations - Throwing $10 billion at Southeast Asia, can Japan really "contain China" this way?

2026-04-15 19:32 中美关系 - 砸100亿美元给东南亚，日本这样真能“遏制中国”？

2026-04-15 19:07 Japan - Is the United States hyping things up in order to fight Cuba?

2026-04-15 19:07 日本 - 美国在为打古巴炒作？

2026-04-15 17:48 The Tang Luo Doctrine Has Arrived - U.S. streamer Somali sentenced in South Korea after provoking public anger by desecrating a comfort-women statue 2026-04-15 17:18 South of the 38th Parallel - When will an agreement be reached? Trump reveals this time frame to British media 2026-04-15 17:00 Iran Situation - How do Americans view China? This Pew survey is rather interesting 2026-04-15 16:23 China-U.S. Relations - "China demands that two major shipping companies immediately stop operating Panama ports"

2026-04-15 17:48 唐罗主义来了 - 亵渎慰安妇铜像引众怒，美国网红索马里在韩国被判刑 2026-04-15 17:18 三八线之南 - 何时达成协议？特朗普给英媒透露了这个时间点 2026-04-15 17:00 伊朗局势 - 美国人怎么看中国？皮尤这份调查挺有意思 2026-04-15 16:23 中美关系 - “中方要求两大航运公司立即停止巴拿马港口运营”

2026-04-15 16:20 - Even his "backer" Aso is puzzled: does Takaichi have no friends?

2026-04-15 16:20 - “靠山”麻生都纳闷：高市这人没朋友么？

2026-04-15 15:59 Japan - "Japan is in fact building a forward fortress for military confrontation"

2026-04-15 15:59 日本 - “日方实际上是打造军事对抗的前沿要塞”

2026-04-15 15:54 - Russian foreign minister proposes helping China make up for energy shortages caused by the Middle East situation; China responds 2026-04-15 15:54 China-Russia Relations - U.S. Treasury secretary says China's "unreliability" will affect Trump's visit to China? Foreign Ministry responds 2026-04-15 15:40 China-U.S. Relations Related Recommendations - Latest News Hot - Carney "markets" Chinese electric cars to Trump: I thought you liked them - Taiwan representative detained for 20 hours; Kenya: whoever carries a Taiwan passport is breaking the law - Mongolia: China and Russia come first, but Japan is also important - "U.S. government temporarily holds off blacklisting DeepSeek and more than a hundred other Chinese firms"

2026-04-15 15:54 - 俄外长提出帮助中国弥补因中东局势造成的能源短缺，中方回应 2026-04-15 15:54 中俄关系 - 美财长称中国“不可靠”会影响特朗普访华吗？外交部回应 2026-04-15 15:40 中美关系 相关推荐 - 最新闻 Hot - 卡尼向特朗普“推销”中国电车：以为你喜欢呢 - 台代表遭扣押20小时，肯尼亚：谁拿台湾护照谁违法 - 蒙古：中俄优先，但日本也重要 - “美政府暂缓拉黑DeepSeek等百余家中企”

On the South China Sea, Germany butts in again - Final text of U.S.-Iran agreement still not released; Vance discloses the reason - U.S. Indo-Pacific Command changes its name back to "Pacific Command"

涉南海，德国又插嘴 - 美伊协议最终文本迟迟未公布，万斯披露原因 - 美军印太司令部又改回原名“太平洋司令部”

Maritime intelligence company says Iran has exported crude oil for the first time in nearly two months - A Singaporean tour guide wearing Chinese AI glasses said to me, "China, keep going"

海事情报公司称伊朗近两月来首次出口原油 - 戴中国AI眼镜的新加坡导游，对我说了句“中国，加油”

Stern warning! "Europe's rate of decline is three times that of the Qing dynasty"

严厉警告！“欧洲衰落速度是清朝三倍”

Trump: What does it have to do with us? We're just selling weapons - "Afraid of becoming China's live target, the U.S. military deliberately picked this place in Australia"

特朗普：关我们啥事？就是卖卖武器 - “怕成中国的活靶子，美军特意在澳挑了这个地方”

Another Chinese "trump card"?

中国又一张“王牌”？

Thirty-four fetal remains were buried by her in the garden; she is "suspected of using them for experiments"

34具胎儿遗体被她埋在花园里，“涉嫌用此开展实验”

"Israel requested access, but the United States refused"

“以色列请求查阅，被美国拒了”

Listed by the EU for sanctions, Ruifeng New Material responds -被欧盟列入制裁名单，瑞丰新材回应 -