learning · Russian — bilingual opening

How and Why Russians Have Made Their Peace with War

Russia’s wartime stability rests less on fervent support or fear alone than on collectively maintained social synchronization, through which citizens keep the war emotionally and socially at a manageable distance.

Российское общество и война: стратегия коллективного избегания и иллюзия нормальности
Re: Russia · By Сэм Грин · 1 January 2014 · read the original in Russian →

Подпишитесь на Re: Russia в Telegram, чтобы не пропускать новые материалы!

Subscribe to Re: Russia on Telegram so you don’t miss new articles!

Подпишитесь на Re: Russia в Telegram!

Subscribe to Re: Russia on Telegram!

The political stability of Russia at war, and Russian society’s ability to remain unperturbed in the face of mounting material and human losses, are usually explained by the pro-war convictions of the Russian “majority” and by factors of “vertical” influence: a combination of propaganda and repression. The heightened loyalty registered in surveys is explained as the effect of “rallying round the flag.”

Yet from the very beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the public atmosphere in Russia was far removed from the surge of political enthusiasm produced in 2014 by the annexation of Crimea. Only a quarter of respondents in a recent survey express distinctly positive emotions about the current political moment and firm support for the regime, while for two thirds their declarative support remains emotionally colorless.

Wartime Russia is characterized by a collectively sustained equilibrium in which citizens simultaneously adapt to the war, distance themselves from its most destructive consequences, and reproduce the conditions that allow it to continue.

Explaining this equilibrium requires closer attention to horizontal social relations, through which citizens manage uncertainty, emotions, and the practices of coexistence. Its key instrument is the drive toward social “synchronization”: the need to find consensus with an imagined majority, behind which lies not superficial conformism but a deep-seated disposition toward preserving social order and preventing public ruptures.

The displacement of war from the everyday emotional routine ceases to be an individual psychological defense mechanism and becomes a collectively sustained social practice, shielding the ordinariness of daily life from the extraordinary reality in which Russians in fact live.

This condition of collective avoidance, however, is not fixed and immutable. The equilibrium of Russian public opinion resembles not a mobilized authoritarian consensus, as in the case of the annexation of Crimea, but a collectively reproduced state of deferred destabilization. This balance may prove vulnerable to shocks capable of disrupting social routines or shifting expectations about dominant public opinion.

If Russians begin to feel that opinions around them are changing, or that the consequences of dissent are becoming less severe, the observed consensus of non-conflict may dissipate, and public opinion may coalesce around another set of beliefs shared by the majority.

How and why did Russians make their peace with war? The political stability of Russia at war, its ability to maintain steady public calm in the face of mounting material and human losses, is most often explained by factors of “vertical” influence. It is assumed that many Russians have internalized imperial ideology, chauvinism, and a sense of civilizational exceptionalism that make it possible to justify the war, or even to argue for its necessity. It is also assumed that ubiquitous propaganda sustains a martial spirit among those for whom such ideology is not sufficiently persuasive, while at the margins of this public accord order is imposed through ever harsher repression.

Of course, all of these things — the ideology of exceptionalism, propaganda, and repression — are entirely real factors in Russian political life today. Nevertheless, they are plainly insufficient to explain why Russian public opinion, insofar as it can be measured and observed at all, has remained so astonishingly unperturbed in the face of the destruction of Ukrainian cities where Russians have friends and relatives, the return of hundreds of thousands of those friends and relatives in zinc coffins, the transfer of the war onto Russian territory, sanctions, mutiny, and other manifestations of abnormality and discomfort. Preserving such a degree of composure requires effort, and the nature of that effort needs to be explained if we wish to understand, among other things, how and when Russians may ultimately lose the desire to keep making it.

Russian society has already experienced a state of “rally around the flag,” to Vladimir Putin’s considerable advantage. In 2014, after the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Donbas, his ratings rose sharply. And that surge was fed not only by gratitude for a territorial acquisition. As our research at the time showed, increased public attention to the news intensified conversations about it among friends and loved ones, which in turn generated a wave of positive emotion (→ Green, Robertson: Affect and Autocracy). People did not merely support Putin; they felt love and gratitude toward him, and with these came an acute sense of pride in Russia as a whole and heightened optimism. Russians were swept up in a wave of genuine political enthusiasm, what Kirill Rogov called the “Crimean syndrome” (→ Rogov: Crimean syndrome). The Kremlin did not need to construct the “Crimea is ours” moment; it only had to capitalize on it.

Nothing of the kind is visible now, nor has it been visible since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. On the contrary, wartime Russia is characterized by a collectively sustained equilibrium in which citizens simultaneously adapt to the war, distance themselves from its most destructive consequences, and reproduce the conditions that allow it to continue. The war is politically ubiquitous but socially pushed into the background: it is pervasive enough to shape everyday life, yet its consequences are limited enough, materially and emotionally, not to provoke a break in attitudes and a broad social split.

Explaining this equilibrium requires moving beyond notions of authoritarian control as an exclusively vertical mechanism and paying closer attention to horizontal social relations, through which citizens manage uncertainty, emotions, and the practices of coexistence.

It would be wrong to say that Russians have simply withdrawn emotionally from politics. Survey data recently collected in Russia by the authors of this article (July 2025, online CAWI survey using a quota sample, N = 2,000) show that slightly more than a quarter of respondents feel strong positive emotions about the current political situation, including pride and trust in the Russian authorities. They also demonstrate a high level of support for Putin, his policies, and his governing style, as well as a paternalistic attachment to the state as a provider of material goods. At the same time, a much smaller group, about 5 percent, feels sharply negative emotions toward the Kremlin and its policies, up to and including “anger” and “contempt.” These citizens, unsurprisingly, support Putin very weakly, are not inclined to justify his policies, and are not attached to paternalistic attitudes.

The greatest interest, however, lies in the roughly two thirds of respondents situated between them. While showing no significant emotional attachment to the regime, they nevertheless support the Kremlin and its policies. The question is why.

The answer is certainly not that these less emotional respondents are satisfied with the state of affairs in Russia. Fewer than a quarter of them are optimistic about the country’s economic future, and only 18 percent assess their own financial prospects positively. Only slightly more than half said they were satisfied with the state of democracy in Russia, compared with 77 percent in the group of respondents with positive emotions, and fewer than half expressed satisfaction with the way the Kremlin is conducting the war in Ukraine, compared with 71 percent satisfaction among those experiencing “positive emotions.” At the same time, the dominant cluster of “non-emotional” respondents is also somewhat worse off materially than the group with positive emotions: 8 percent reported difficulties paying bills and 11 percent difficulties buying medicine, compared with 5 percent facing such problems in the positively disposed group.

Of course, we cannot know what people’s real emotions are. All we know is what respondents report about themselves. In this respect, a sociological survey resembles ordinary situations in life, in which people make choices about how to translate their inner emotions into reactions visible to outside observers. And the authenticity of the emotion is not the only criterion for that choice. Another criterion is the desire to ensure that the emotions shown to others do not make their lives more difficult, cause discomfort, or provoke conflict.

The specific features of this process — deciding how to regulate inner discomfort connected with politics, the economy, and the war within the space of varied social communications — are, in our view, the key to understanding why people in Russia who are dissatisfied with the consequences of the regime’s actions nevertheless support it.

A more detailed analysis of our survey data points to the following picture. Although the “non-emotional” core of respondents holds political views far from positive ones, and is somewhat less inclined to support Putin himself or to believe that most Russians share their political views, they are just as willing as respondents with a positive emotional background to justify the regime’s retention of power, do not seek its replacement, and are tolerant of its repressive practices and even of corruption. We call this “system justification”: a tendency to accept an unfavorable political reality not only as inevitable, but as worthy of approval. What is crucial here is that they share similar views about the importance of what we call “synchronization”: a disposition toward finding consensus with an “imagined majority.” We believe it is precisely the striving for such synchronization that keeps potentially dissatisfied Russians from moving toward the expression of negative emotional reactions to what is happening, or open disagreement with the regime and its policies.

“Synchronization” should not be understood as conformism, obedience, or passive submission. Rather, the attitudes underlying this mechanism, as captured by the survey, reflect a broader orientation toward preventing a social rupture with those around them. This orientation determines their desire not to stand out from the crowd, their reluctance to go beyond collectively recognized norms, their acceptance of generally acknowledged structures of authority, and their need to preserve forms of coexistence perceived as orderly and morally intelligible. These attitudes are rooted not merely in political convictions, but in deeper habits of socialization in a collective environment under conditions of high uncertainty.

This distinction matters because it changes our understanding of the phenomenon of “wartime compliance” observed in Russian society: loyalty to the war and to the regime waging it. A common interpretation of authoritarian depoliticization assumes that citizens “retreat into themselves”: they become emotionally detached, politically apathetic, and socially atomized. Wartime Russian society, however, is experiencing something different: a collectively sustained regime of emotional and social self-moderation. The dominant “middle” cohort of the sample is not emotionally passive. Its members are actively engaged in regulating their emotions in a way that helps contain the destructive consequences of their own participation in the routine social practices of wartime. Political emotions remain, but their social consequences are minimized through patterns of adaptation, synchronization, and routine interactions that preserve the emphatic “ordinariness” of everyday life under extraordinary conditions.

The skills of social synchronization play a key role in this process. Under conditions of prolonged war, conformity functions less as obedience than as a mechanism of social coordination. In a situation of uncertainty, individuals rely to a considerable extent on socially legible signals about acceptable norms of behavior, emotional expression, and political position. The imperatives of “not standing out,” preserving collective normality, and avoiding socially destructive differentiation themselves become stabilizing instruments. Citizens do not need to approve of the war enthusiastically in order to reproduce the social arrangements that allow it to continue. It is enough simply to go on participating in forms of collective coordination that prioritize predictability, coexistence, and managed social connectedness over rupture and confrontation.

This helps explain one of the most striking features of contemporary Russian public opinion: the coexistence of visible tension with durable political adaptation. Many Russians, it seems, are neither fully convinced of the justice of the war nor fully insulated from its consequences. As a result, troubling questions may arise for them about whether the benefits of the war, whatever they may be, outweigh its costs. Allowing these questions to produce cognitive dissonance within one’s own mind is one thing. Allowing them to produce social dissonance, threatening to destroy relations of trust and solidarity on which many Russians depend for peace of mind and security, is quite another. Collective avoidance becomes a socially rational solution.

Russians seeking to avoid social dissonance appear to resort to what Jeremy Morris has called “defensive consolidation”: the preservation of workable forms of social order through evasion of forms of behavior, discussion, and commitment capable of producing destabilizing consequences for themselves or those around them (→ Morris: Russians in Wartime and Defensive Consolidation). The war is normalized not because it is universally accepted, but because ordinary social life increasingly depends on maintaining shared routines capable of coexisting with it.

The broader conclusion is that authoritarian stability in wartime may depend less on eliminating emotional tension than on regulating its social manifestations. Citizens do not need to amputate their political emotions for the political order to hold. Moreover, the Russian case suggests that emotional involvement and political stability can coexist precisely because social practices emerge that prevent emotional tension from crystallizing and being transformed into social rupture. Stability is maintained here not through emotional ambivalence, but through the unceasing social moderation of the emotionally destructive potential of the surrounding reality.

This also helps explain the peculiar character of the public sphere in wartime Russia. The war is everywhere and nowhere at once: it is institutionally and symbolically ubiquitous, yet it is displaced from immediate everyday experience. Citizens encounter the war continually, but chiefly through routinized, mediated, or socially regulated forms that limit its impact on daily life. Conversations about the war remain superficial: demonstrated loyalty is enough to ensure that subsequent questions about costs and benefits are not asked, while evasion of these questions makes it possible to preserve the appearance of collective support for the war. Avoidance thus ceases to be an individual psychological defense mechanism and becomes a collectively sustained social practice, shielding the ordinariness of daily life from the extraordinariness of the reality in which Russians in fact live.

Such equilibria are stable precisely because they are socially distributed. They do not rest on universal conviction, unanimous support, or fear of total repression, but require only that enough people value continuity and predictability more than confrontation and rupture. In this sense, the equilibrium of Russian wartime public opinion resembles not a mobilized authoritarian consensus, as in the case of the annexation of Crimea, but a collectively reproduced state of deferred destabilization.

The condition of “avoidance” characteristic of Russian society, however, does not mean immutability. This balance may prove vulnerable to shocks capable of disrupting social routines or shifting expectations about dominant public opinion. If Russians begin to feel that opinions around them are changing, or that the consequences of dissent are becoming less severe, the consensus observed today may quickly dissipate, and public opinion may coalesce around another set of beliefs shared by the majority. Moreover, as Russians’ perception of the state of affairs in the country has steadily worsened since late 2025 (→ Re: Russia: How Much Has the Bubble of Super-Support Deflated?), it is possible that this is already happening in part.

Whatever happens next, the main conclusion of our analysis is that, at this stage, the loyalty of Russian public opinion, which has so far allowed the Kremlin to wage war in Ukraine, depends not so much on the regime’s repressive capacity or propagandistic skill as on the social and psychological efforts ordinary Russians make to keep the war at a distance.

How Much Has the Bubble of Super-Support Deflated? The period of optimism and loyalty in public attitudes is receding into the past.

As after the annexation of Crimea, the period of extremely high Putin ratings and political loyalty that began after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine lasted four years and has now entered a phase of decline. This dynamic threatens greater political turbulence against the backdrop of the war’s deadlock and the structural imbalance of the economy.

The Bonds Are Bending: Surveys Show the Russian Authorities Are Suffering a Fatal Failure in Promoting Traditional Values among Russians.

The Kremlin’s resources in the sphere of ideological indoctrination now appear limited: television’s influence is declining, while attempts to dominate the internet provoke rejection. As a result, ideological pressure “from above” tends either to foster a neo-Soviet “doublethink” or to provoke a backlash of resistance.

Between the Inevitable and the Unreliable: Why Ukrainian Society Considers Territorial Concessions Useless but Is Ready to Discuss Them.

The corruption scandal of late 2025 did not undermine the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and Volodymyr Zelensky, nor did the bombardment of Ukrainian cities undermine Ukrainians’ spirit of resistance. Although about 80 percent of Ukrainians believe that Putin will attack their country again and that a territorial compromise would prove useless, about 40 percent are prepared to accept a formula of “territory in exchange for security guarantees.”

Y done · S save · G great · B bad · N not for me