translated from Turkish

For Gaza, Not Lasting Peace but a New Uncertainty

The plans now being discussed for Gaza freeze the conflict under the language of security and humanitarian management while pushing Palestinian political rights, representation, and sovereignty further out of view.

Gazze İşgali Sonrası: Yönetilen Kriz, Ertelenen Adalet
Perspektif Online · By ADNAN BOYNUKARA · 14 February 2026 · read the original in Turkish →

The plans now being placed on the agenda for Gaza, rather than establishing a lasting peace, are dragging the region into a new period of uncertainty. For they push the political rights of Palestinians even further into the background, place Gaza under international supervision through a technocratic administration, and define the will of the Palestinians as an exceedingly restricted domain.

The “second stage” plans being discussed in Gaza after occupation and genocide resemble not peace so much as an exercise in administrative engineering. In these debates, which do not go beyond the ceasefire, Palestinians are treated not as a political subject but as a humanitarian problem to be controlled. The agenda that has emerged after Gaza discusses not the demands of the Palestinians, but how they are to be administered.

U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff announced that the “second stage” of the ceasefire process had begun. While the statements referred to a 20-point plan, the headings brought to the fore were disarmament, technocratic governance, and reconstruction. Yet this step is closely connected not only to developments on the ground but also to Washington’s domestic political balances. The Trump administration aims to reduce the pressure that the occupation of Gaza has generated in American domestic politics and to place the mounting criticism in Congress and public opinion within a manageable framework. For this reason, the process is advancing less with a comprehensive vision of peace than with a calculation of keeping the crisis under control and reducing its political costs.

This approach removes the Palestinian question from the realm of rights and justice and turns it into a security file that must be “managed” technically. What is placed at the center is not the problem itself, but the costs and risks it produces. Thus peace becomes a goal measured not by the establishment of justice, but by the containment of instability. This is an approach that empties the very concept of peace of its meaning.

A Clash of Expectations: The Structural Tension Beyond the CeasefireBeklentiler Çatışması: Ateşkesin Ötesindeki Yapısal Gerilim

In fact, the second stage is not, in itself, a technical and security-based negotiation process; it represents a field in which the parties’ mutually incompatible expectations confront one another. For the United States and Israel, the priority is a controllable stability in Gaza and Israel’s long-term security. By contrast, Palestinians and the countries of the region believe that any scenario in which the ceasefire is not tied to a political horizon will fail to produce a lasting solution. This picture also explains why the process is struggling to move forward. The U.S. position often resembles less that of a mediator balancing the parties than that of an administrator deciding within what limits the conflict will be contained. This was precisely the posture maintained throughout the occupation of Gaza.

Palestinian expectations can be gathered under three main headings. The first is the question of sovereignty. If any order to be established in Gaza after the war does not recognize Palestinians’ genuine political authority over their own land, the ceasefire will mean nothing more than the transformation of the situation into a new mechanism of control. International trusteeship or interim governance models determined by outside actors evoke, for Palestinians, not sovereignty but supervision.

The second heading is the problem of representation. This lies at the center of their expectations. If, in planning Gaza’s future, Palestinian actors are not represented in a legitimate and inclusive manner, whatever the structure may be, there is a danger that Palestinian politics will become still more fragmented. In this context, for Palestinians the issue is not only what the new order will be, but in whose name and on what basis of legitimacy that order will be established.

The third and complementary element is security. For Palestinians, security does not mean only the end of armed clashes. Security is understood together with the protection of civilian life, the removal of military pressure that has become permanent, and the ending of practices of collective punishment. Any model in which security is defined solely around Israel does not amount, in Palestinian eyes, to lasting stability.

The expectations in question also intersect with the positions of countries in the region. While Egypt and Qatar prioritize the continuation of the ceasefire and the uninterrupted flow of humanitarian aid, Jordan is concerned about the effects on its own internal balances of the political dimension of the Palestinian question being entirely disabled. Turkey, meanwhile, emphasizes that arrangements concerning Gaza must not turn into a structure that strips Palestinians of their status as subjects and produces permanent uncertainty.

At the same time, the question of Hamas’s political future stands out as one of the most critical and uncertain headings in the process. For the United States and Israel, the elimination of Hamas’s military capacity takes priority; yet pushing Hamas entirely outside the political sphere will deepen the Palestinians’ problem of representation even further. The distinction between removing Hamas as an armed actor and completely disregarding the political will of a certain segment of Palestinian society constitutes one of the most delicate points of balance in the “second stage” debates.

Palestine and Gaza: An Uncertainty Beyond the CeasefireFilistin ve Gazze: Ateşkesin Ötesinde Bir Belirsizlik

For Palestinians, the most striking consequence of the second stage is that the Palestinian question is once again being removed from the terrain of politics and confined within the narrow frame of “security” and “humanitarian crisis.” The ceasefire becoming permanent is, of course, of vital importance. Yet so long as the ceasefire does not meet the Palestinians’ basic political demands, it will be no more than a temporary pause that freezes the conflict. For now, what is being discussed indicates that Palestinians’ right to determine their own future will be restricted still further.

International trusteeship, technocratic administrations, and security models determined by outside actors effectively turn Gaza into a “managed space.” This means that the demand for self-determination, which forms the essence of the Palestinian question, is pushed entirely into the background. More importantly, it carries the risk of rendering Palestinian politics fragmented and weak. Even a limited return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza may signify a symbolic role rather than genuine sovereignty. For Palestinians, this picture strengthens the possibility not of peace, but of a prolonged uncertainty and political vacuum.

In this context, the frequently voiced scenario of the “Palestinian Authority’s return to Gaza” also faces a serious problem of legitimacy. It is not realistic for the Palestinian Authority, which has not held elections for a long time, whose capacity for social representation has been gravely weakened, and which has only limited political influence even in the West Bank, to establish a lasting and inclusive order in Gaza. This situation reinforces fears that Gaza’s future will be shaped not on behalf of Palestinians, but over Palestinians.

At this point, it is worth noting the fundamental difference between the approaches of the United States and Israel to the process. For the United States, the goal is not comprehensive peace, but an environment of instability kept at a manageable level and prevented from turning into a regional war. For Israel, the principal aim is to establish an understanding of absolute security and to avoid any arrangement that would limit its freedom of military movement, even at the cost of short- and medium-term diplomatic expenses. These differing priorities also explain why the ceasefire is struggling to evolve into a political solution.

The fact that Palestinians are not directly included in the talks suggests that Palestinian society is being treated not as a political subject, but as a humanitarian problem to be managed. This approach reflects a tendency to sever the Palestinian question from debates over rights, representation, and sovereignty, and to reduce it to a framework limited to humanitarian aid and security arrangements. Thus, while the talks being conducted aim to freeze the conflict, they deliberately leave Palestinians’ political demands off the agenda. An order that disregards Palestinians as political subjects will inevitably produce, in the long term, not stability but a fragile equilibrium that merely postpones new tensions.

Not a New Order, but a New Uncertainty or Permanent Crisis Management

While limiting its military engagement in the region, the United States continues to position Israel as the guarantor of regional security. The Trump-Netanyahu duo reflects an understanding focused less on building a new architecture of peace in the Middle East than on how existing crises are to be “managed.” This preference points not to regional peace, but to a low-cost yet continuous management of instability. The Arab and Islamic world, meanwhile, presents in this process a largely passive, divided, and ineffectual image. This silence is not only a weakness; it is also an indication that the Palestinian question has been deliberately lowered on the list of regional priorities, and even that this demotion has been accepted.

The emerging picture is also closely connected to the processes of normalization in the region. The attitudes of actors such as the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Egypt, which make the Palestinian question a secondary heading, enable Israel to act with less diplomatic pressure in the post-Gaza period. The fragmented and hesitant approach of the Arab world shows that the Palestinian question is moving away from being a regional priority. A period is beginning in which open conflicts are being replaced by low-intensity but increasingly continuous tensions. Open conflicts may give way to low-intensity tensions, proxy struggles, and crises that can be kept under control.

The plans now being placed on the agenda, rather than establishing a lasting peace in Gaza, are dragging the region into a new period of uncertainty. For they push the political rights of Palestinians even further into the background, place Gaza under international supervision through a technocratic administration, and define the will of the Palestinians as an exceedingly restricted domain. This situation may offer the countries of the region a new room for maneuver in which they could use their diplomatic and moral weight. Although the likelihood of such a will developing appears weak, it is useful to underline the point.

Even if the present picture is seen as inevitable, it cannot be said that this process has no alternative. Returning the Palestinian question to a political footing is possible only if the countries of the region develop a common diplomatic will that goes beyond the headings of humanitarian aid and security. Otherwise, Gaza will remain a space in which not the conflict, but uncertainty, becomes permanent.

In fact, this negative picture is also strengthened by the covert relationships and balances of interest that some leaderships in the region have established with the United States and Israel. These relationships produce outcomes that push Palestine’s rights into the background and defer still further its right to political sovereignty. As a result, it is plainly visible that the future of the Middle East is still being shaped less by the peoples of the region than by the security priorities of global and regional powers. At this point, the issue is no longer merely one of diplomatic preferences, but of whether a clear moral threshold has been crossed. So long as this approach continues, lasting peace and a free Palestine will remain not a goal to be reached, but a promise perpetually deferred.

Y done · S save · G great · B bad · N not for me