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Израиль после 7 октября: от принципа сдерживания к «миру через силу»

Israel’s post-October 7 reliance on proactive military force has restored some deterrence but has not converted battlefield gains into durable political settlements, while raising the costs of regional integration and long-term stability.

Russian International Affairs Council · By Людмила Самарская · 4 June 2026 · read the original in Russian →

С момента атаки ХАМАС на Израиль 7 октября 2023 г. прошло более двух лет, но ее последствия остро ощущаются до сих пор. Начатая еврейским государством ответная кампания в секторе Газа постепенно превратилась в «войну на семи фронтах», в октябре 2025 г. официально названную «Войной возрождения». Военные достижения Израиля за этот период действительно существенны: потенциалы ХАМАС и «Хезболлы» значительно сокращены, режим в Сирии сменился на относительно нейтральный по отношению к Израилю (хотя это скорее косвенный результат общей перебалансировки сил в регионе), иранской ядерной и ракетной программе нанесен определенный ущерб. Вместе с тем о решающих победах, вопреки многочисленным заявлениям израильского премьер-министра, говорить все же не приходится: палестинская группировка сохранилась и продолжает восстанавливать свой контроль над Газой между Средиземным морем и «желтой линией», ливанская организация осуществляет регулярные запуски дронов против израильских сил, а Ближний Восток в целом по-прежнему существует в ожидании очередной американо-израильско-иранской эскалации.

More than two years have passed since Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, yet its consequences are still acutely felt. The retaliatory campaign launched by the Jewish state in the Gaza Strip gradually turned into a “war on seven fronts,” officially named the “War of Revival” in October 2025. Israel’s military achievements over this period are indeed considerable: the capabilities of Hamas and Hezbollah have been significantly reduced; the regime in Syria has changed to one relatively neutral toward Israel, though this is rather an indirect result of the broader rebalancing of forces in the region; and a measure of damage has been inflicted on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. At the same time, despite the Israeli prime minister’s many declarations, it is still impossible to speak of decisive victories: the Palestinian group has survived and continues to restore its control over Gaza between the Mediterranean Sea and the “yellow line”; the Lebanese organization is regularly launching drones against Israeli forces; and the Middle East as a whole continues to live in expectation of another American-Israeli-Iranian escalation.

С осени 2023 г. произошло усиление акцента на секьюритизацию во внешней политике Израиля. Атака 7 октября привела к критическому изменению восприятия угроз и реагирования на них, что способствовало возведению военных методов обеспечения безопасности в абсолют. Жесткие и зачастую превентивные ответы на внешние вызовы стали всеобъемлющими и потенциально создающими риски для сохранения и усиления, а не прекращения конфликтов.

Since the autumn of 2023, the emphasis on securitization in Israel’s foreign policy has intensified. The October 7 attack produced a critical shift in the perception of threats and responses to them, helping to elevate military methods of ensuring security into an absolute. Harsh and often preventive responses to external challenges have become all-encompassing, and may create risks of preserving and intensifying conflicts rather than ending them.

Although Israelis broadly agree with the methods by which the country fights its adversaries, they are increasingly less prepared to see the ongoing campaigns as effective. Israelis’ fatigue with wars whose results are perceived as ever less tangible substantially raises the political risks accompanying decisions on any new operations.

The foreign-policy cost of such military activity is also growing: international pressure is only increasing, and the Arab countries of the region are unlikely to be able to fully appreciate Israel’s combat successes unless they are converted into political achievements. A constant demonstration of force may be effective in deterring adversaries, but it will not necessarily help create new partnerships. So long as the region exists in expectation of another escalation, integration processes risk remaining frozen indefinitely.

From Restoring Deterrence to “Total Victory”

It cannot be said that the primacy of security and the use of force to ensure it were not previously characteristic of Israel. Since its creation, the country, politically isolated in the region and existing in confrontation with its Arab neighbors, was compelled to rely on military instruments for its own survival. Israeli leaders often tended to distrust international institutions: in the words of the first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, “only Jewish courage created the state, not ‘U.M.-shmum’ [‘U.M.’ is the UN in Hebrew — author’s note].” Yet military achievements were usually combined with a political and diplomatic strategy aimed at creating conditions for regional integration and the conclusion of permanent peace agreements. This was especially evident in the signing of the treaty with Egypt in 1979 and during the Palestinian-Israeli Oslo negotiation process, which in the 1990s was considered successful and promising. The Abraham Accords, too, testified to Israel’s intention to embed itself in the regional system as a partner attractive not only for its military power but also for its technological achievements.

After October 7, 2023, the course of Israel’s military-political activity changed in many respects. The task of integration did not disappear, but the path to it came to be laid through the demonstration and use of combat potential, which began to be perceived not only as a significant element of security strategy but as the dominant component of the country’s entire regional activity. The principle of deterrence was replaced by a proactive strategy premised on the desire to neutralize threats preventively. Anti-Israeli rhetoric also came to be perceived differently: if earlier it was not always interpreted as evidence of an adversary’s practical intentions, now both stated and presumed threats began to be interpreted as entirely real.

There were, of course, serious reasons for such a turn. The harsh response to the October 7 terrorist attack is explained to a considerable degree by the deep trauma that the attack inflicted on Israelis. The loss of a sense of security produced a need to restore the principle of deterrence, one that would compensate for the vulnerability that had been exposed and prevent similar attacks by other hostile actors.

This approach, however, was transformed into the paradigm of “total victory” over Hamas, largely for political reasons. After the country’s leadership failed to prevent the Islamist group’s attack, the governmental establishment as a whole, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in particular, tried to reinterpret the events of recent years. Unwilling to acknowledge his responsibility for what had happened, Netanyahu created a “victory” narrative to counter broad criticism. Meanwhile, after the ceasefire concluded in the autumn of 2025, only one of the three tasks initially set within the framework of the “Swords of Iron” war had been fully accomplished: the return of all hostages, living and dead. The other two, the destruction of Hamas’s military and administrative capabilities and the elimination of the threat emanating from the Gaza Strip, were achieved only partially and tactically.

Methods of force, in general, proved only limitedly effective in attaining the stated goals. Even the release of most of the hostages, though it came as a result of constant military and humanitarian pressure on the Gaza Strip, was ultimately secured through negotiations. The highest level of security for residents of the country’s north, the fourth task of the “Swords of Iron” war, pursued through the operation against Hezbollah, “Northern Arrows,” was achieved during the ceasefire in effect from late November 2024 to early March 2025, despite its regular violations. That ceasefire was concluded following Israel’s operation on Lebanese territory and subsequent negotiations between Israel and Lebanon, with Hezbollah’s consent, mediated by the United States and France.

The large-scale tasks of anti-Iranian operations have likewise not yet been realized by military means. In June 2025, the official goals of the “Nation Like a Lion” campaign were declared to be “the neutralization of the existential and immediate threat posed by Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, as well as its other military activity directed against Israel.” Yet already in the winter of 2026, after statements that these goals had been successfully achieved, the joint operation with the United States, “Roaring Lion,” was launched and aimed at largely similar tasks: “to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles that would threaten Israel, the United States, and the entire world,” and also “to create conditions in which the Iranian people could remove the cruel regime of tyranny that has ruled them for almost half a century.” At this stage, there is a high degree of uncertainty about the strategic effectiveness of the second round of the Iranian-Israeli confrontation, though its tactical successes are acknowledged. The campaign, moreover, is perceived as interrupted rather than completed. Its resumption will again carry risks of destabilizing a significant part of the region. The use of exclusively military methods to halt Iran’s nuclear program may have largely the opposite effect.

The Risks of the “Peace Through Strength” Approach

The Israeli leadership interprets military successes as a way to secure the country’s integration into the region and achieve “peace through strength.” Benjamin Netanyahu also presents Israel as a regional power capable of exerting serious influence on processes unfolding in the Middle East and even of projecting influence beyond the region. Echoing David Ben-Gurion in some respects, the current prime minister declared in March 2026 that he and his team “are creating additional alliances with countries of the region thanks to the immense strength they have built, thanks to the mighty heroism of Israeli officers and soldiers, and thanks to the resilience of Israel’s citizens.”

This approach, however, contains substantial risks. Although the continuing wars do indeed testify to the very broad capabilities of Israel’s armed forces and intelligence services, battlefield successes are not, in practice, being converted into political achievements. Their humanitarian cost, moreover, is only rising. The occupation by Israeli troops of parts of southern Lebanon and Syria, explained by military objectives, may only contribute to antagonizing the populations of the Arab republics and reduce the chances of successful political dialogue. The pursuit of “permanent security” risks turning into an alternative way of managing conflicts rather than resolving them, and of creating a new status quo that is fundamentally unstable over the long term.

Israel is meanwhile beginning to be perceived in the region as a partly destabilizing factor. One of the most shocking events for the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf was probably the Israeli Air Force strike on Hamas headquarters in Qatar. Although the practice of political assassinations has traditionally been characteristic of the Jewish state, airstrikes on countries not involved in hostilities have nevertheless not been typical for it. Israel’s proactive approach to neutralizing external threats may be perceived by its partners and neighbors more as a risk than an advantage, since it does not promote long-term Middle Eastern stability and, accordingly, creates obstacles to sustainable economic growth and to projects of regional connectivity, which are priorities for the Gulf monarchies as well. “Normalization through strength,” therefore, may prove to be a less than fully effective strategy.

The perception of external threats is largely shared across the entire Israeli political spectrum, but the specificity of the current coalition, because of the presence within it of far-right parties, lies not only in ethically contentious rhetoric but also in an unwillingness to show diplomatic flexibility and accept unpopular decisions. As a result, the survival of the present government in power is already exacting a high political price from Israel. The radical rhetoric and activity of ministers in Netanyahu’s cabinet are provoking increasingly sharp international criticism.

The extreme positions of some members of the Israeli cabinet have so far prevented the country from formulating a clear and internationally acceptable strategy toward the Gaza Strip, since any functional plan would entail relinquishing control over the enclave’s territory. In the long term, however, Israel has no interest in bearing responsibility for governing the Palestinian territories. Fears about the inability of Lebanese forces to disarm Hezbollah, the preservation of Israeli control over a “buffer zone” in the south of the Arab republic, and here the same also applies to Syria, and the expansionist rhetoric of representatives of the right-wing camp may hinder the achievement of potentially productive agreements with the Lebanese authorities. Continued military pressure on Iran risks only convincing the Islamic Republic of the need to develop more effective mechanisms for deterring external attacks, rather than to make compromises.

Public OpinionОбщественное мнение

While most Israelis have no objection to using military instruments to ensure the country’s security, they do not always share the optimism of Israeli officials’ public statements. Only about a third of the country’s citizens expect the operation in Lebanon in 2026 to be able to guarantee many years of stability on the border. The operation against Iran in June 2025 was perceived by Israelis as much more effective than the 2026 campaign: whereas almost two-thirds of surveyed citizens of the country, 62 percent, were satisfied with the results of the first, fewer than half, 37 percent, were satisfied with the second. Only about a third, 34 percent, thought that the state’s security had improved after Operation “Roaring Lion.” At the same time, the level of support for the second campaign at its outset was even higher than in June 2025, 80 percent compared with 73 percent. High expectations, however, gave way to disappointment at a premature ceasefire.

The perception in Israel of the effectiveness of military force as the principal means of ensuring the state’s security is also changing: whereas in the spring of 2024 about 40 percent of respondents still considered it the best instrument in the short term, by April 2026 the share of supporters of that position was less than 30 percent of citizens. The share of those who consider diplomacy more productive rose over the same period from almost 20 percent to 30 percent. The view is also becoming increasingly widespread that, in the long term, it is precisely the combination of these two instruments, rather than military force by itself, that can yield the greatest results.

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Y done · S save · G great · B bad · N not for me