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Russia’s Air Crisis

Ukraine’s growing dominance in the low-altitude air domain is turning Russia’s rear infrastructure and logistics into a decisive battlefield, challenging Moscow’s territorial conception of victory and forcing the Kremlin to search for an effective response.

Under Attack From The Air: Can Russia find a response to Ukraine’s asymmetric counteroffensive?

Re: Russia · 26 May 2026 · read the original in Russian →

Russia now finds itself in its most difficult predicament since the autumn of 2022, when its forces in Ukraine were forced into retreat and abandoned approximately 17,000 square kilometres of occupied territory. Today, however, the challenge is not one of territorial withdrawal but of losing the advantage in the ‘lower air domain’. Ukraine has achieved growing superiority by conducting an asymmetric campaign against Russia's rear infrastructure. The scale of these operations has prompted some senior US officials to describe the situation as a turning point and to argue that Ukraine is currently winning the war.

Russia now finds itself in its most difficult position since the autumn of 2022, when its forces in Ukraine were compelled to retreat and abandon roughly 17,000 square kilometers of occupied territory. Today, however, the challenge is not territorial withdrawal, but the loss of advantage in the “lower air domain.” Ukraine has achieved growing superiority by waging an asymmetric campaign against Russia’s rear infrastructure. The scale of these operations has led some senior U.S. officials to describe the situation as a turning point and to argue that Ukraine is currently winning the war.

Thus far, the campaign has focused on Russia's oil refining industry and on disrupting fuel supplies to Crimea. Over time, however, it could paralyse logistics across the occupied territories and sever Russian frontline forces from their rear support infrastructure. Should this strategy succeed, it could trigger the collapse of sections of the Russian front, much as occurred in 2022.

So far, this campaign has concentrated on Russia’s oil-refining industry and on disrupting fuel supplies to Crimea. Over time, however, it could paralyze logistics throughout the occupied territories and cut Russian frontline forces off from the rear infrastructure that sustains them. If this strategy succeeds, it could precipitate the collapse of sections of the Russian front, much as happened in 2022.

In his public statements, Vladimir Putin has deliberately ignored the success of Ukraine’s asymmetric campaign and continues to insist that Russian forces are steadily advancing on the ground, despite evidence to the contrary. This kind of perception management can soften the political impact of setbacks only temporarily. The central question today is whether, and how quickly, Russia can devise an effective answer to Ukraine’s aerial advantage, protect its critical logistical infrastructure, or launch an asymmetric counterstrike capable of offsetting the reputational and structural losses it has already incurred.

Possible Russian responses include Belarus entering the war, a new “partial” mobilization, renewed nuclear escalation, or a hybrid attack on a European state. Russia may also pursue a military-technological response designed to neutralize or compensate for Ukraine’s advantage. Russian budget expenditures have increased by 1.5-2 trillion rubles, which may indicate additional investment in military programs.

The effectiveness of Russia’s response, however, will depend on whether it reflects the changing character of the war. The emerging military paradigm is eroding the advantages on which Russian military planning has traditionally relied, especially those connected with advances on the ground. The fate of the land corridor to Crimea, increasingly disrupted by Ukrainian drones, shows that territorial gains become far less significant when the adversary dominates the air.

These new realities demand, above all, technological solutions. They include the rapid development and large-scale deployment of counter-drone air-defense systems, or the expansion of medium-range strike capabilities able to impose symmetrical costs on the adversary. Equally important is the rapid adoption and scaling of innovation, an area in which Ukraine’s drone coalition and its European partners currently enjoy a significant advantage.

Vladimir Putin, and Russia with him, are facing their most difficult situation since the autumn of 2022, when Russian forces in Ukraine were forced to retreat and abandon previously occupied territory. Total losses then amounted to roughly 17,000 square kilometers, twice as much as Russia has managed to recapture since. Unlike the crisis of 2022, however, the current crisis of the “special military operation” is not yet a crisis of the front line, but a crisis in the air. Even so, its scale has already prompted senior U.S. State Department officials to speak of a “turning point” and to say that “at the moment... Ukraine is winning the war.”

Russia’s loss of air superiority and Ukraine’s growing drone advantage have enabled the Armed Forces of Ukraine to wage an asymmetric counteroffensive not along the front line, but against Russian rear infrastructure on several axes at once. The first target has been Russia’s oil-refining infrastructure deep inside the country. The second has been Russian logistics across the occupied territories of Ukraine. The first line of attack is producing a widening fuel crisis, while the second is leading to Russia’s gradual loss of control over the land corridor linking Russia with annexed Crimea and creating a broader crisis in the functioning of the peninsula. As a result, one of the principal aims of Russia’s full-scale invasion, breaking Crimea’s logistical isolation, remains unfulfilled after four and a half years of war that has cost Russia an estimated 1.5 million killed and wounded. Re: Russia anticipated this possibility as early as mid-May -> Re:Russia: Corridor of Opportunity).

At this stage, Ukraine’s asymmetric counteroffensive is not intended to change the balance of forces on the ground. Rather, it seeks to produce both symbolic and systemic effects by creating social and economic disruption inside Russia. Ukrainian planning envisages a further expansion of the aerial campaign across the occupied territories, with the aim of paralyzing Russian logistics as a whole, including the supply system that supports frontline troops; this objective has been stated explicitly by Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov.

If successful, this strategy could bring about the collapse of sections of the Russian front despite Ukraine’s limited capacity for a large-scale ground offensive. For now, this remains a possibility rather than an established outcome. There is still no conclusive evidence of a systemic breakdown in frontline logistics, although individual reports describe shortages of virtually everything, including personnel, ammunition, drones, and food. The prospect of a logistical blockade of the front is becoming increasingly credible. This is reflected in the narratives of prominent Russian pro-war Z-bloggers, who have often proved adept at detecting and communicating shifts in the military situation. According to some of them, such a turn of events will become inevitable unless Russia finds an effective response to Ukraine’s dominance in the “lower air domain,” particularly within the range of medium-range strike systems. Under such conditions, the scale of Ukraine’s campaign against Russian infrastructure would effectively nullify even the limited gains Russia hopes to achieve by capturing Kostiantynivka in the coming weeks.

The key question at present, therefore, is one of timing. How quickly can Russia respond to Ukraine’s aerial advantage, secure its critical logistical infrastructure, or launch an asymmetric strike capable of offsetting the reputational and structural losses it has suffered, even if those losses have not yet translated into territorial defeat?

Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin is playing a game of military poker. Throughout June, despite the sharp deterioration of the situation, he has projected deliberate calm and self-confidence, a characteristic feature of his behavior during certain crises when no immediate response is available, or when additional time and a regrouping of forces are required.

Putin has chaired meetings devoted to comparatively minor social and economic issues, intended to project an image of continued social and economic stability. He has also met with participants in the “special military operation” and rank-and-file servicemen, consistently claiming that Russian forces are advancing “on all fronts” and steadily approaching their objectives. These assertions are plainly at odds with reality.

This strategy of ignoring reality while managing its informational fallout is clearly deliberate. On 18 June, Putin completely ignored the largest Ukrainian air attack on Moscow and the Kapotnya oil refinery, an operation that exposed serious deficiencies in the capital’s integrated air-defense system. Instead, he confined himself to formal statements on the agenda of the ASEAN summit in Kazan. The following day, however, he chaired a restricted meeting of the Security Council, which may well have been devoted to the deteriorating military situation. Officially, the only information released was that Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had delivered “a report on one area of foreign policy.” On 23 June, Putin held a meeting with members of the government devoted to the launch of a mentoring program for medical graduates, the transition to electronic freight documentation, and graduate employment initiatives. Only after this carefully choreographed segment, designed to reinforce the image of an effective paternalistic welfare state, did participants move on to discussing Russia’s fuel situation and the supply of Crimea, a discussion that continued after the public broadcast had ended. It appears that during this closed session the government took the final decision to immediately expand gasoline imports in order to ease shortages on the domestic market.

At the start of the meeting, however, Putin did refer to the Ukrainian drone campaign in order to establish the official interpretive framework for it, a narrative he repeated later that same day during a meeting with “graduates of military academies.” According to Putin, “as the situation on the front rapidly deteriorates” for the “Kyiv regime,” it has “resorted to attacking our civilian infrastructure” in an attempt to “destabilize Russian society.” He argued that the consequences for the fuel market were limited and would soon be minimized, or even eliminated altogether, through government action.

Such management of reputational damage, however, can reduce its political impact only temporarily. It cannot change the military situation in the air. The central question, then, is what Russia can do to halt or offset Ukraine’s campaign against its infrastructure and regain the initiative in one domain or another, while restoring the image of a power moving steadily toward victory. Several possible forms of counterstrike are now being discussed, including Belarus entering the war, a new “partial” mobilization, and renewed nuclear escalation. Another possibility is a hybrid attack on a European state, pushing Europe to the brink of a large-scale missile and drone confrontation, with the prospect of subsequent nuclear escalation, in an effort to force negotiations over Ukraine and a broader discussion of “mutual security” as defined by the Kremlin.

All of these scenarios, as well as combinations of them, appear plausible to varying degrees. Although Russian media sources report discussions about the possibility of a new mobilization this autumn after the State Duma elections, Ukraine’s military leadership says it does not regard such a scenario as a decisive factor capable of changing the operational balance. According to this assessment, if Ukraine succeeds in creating a “wall of drones” capable of inflicting Russian losses of around 200 personnel per square kilometer, it will be able to grind down Russia’s mobilization reserve while losing no more than approximately 1,500 square kilometers of territory. At the same time, the political costs of another compulsory mobilization would be substantial for the Kremlin, especially if it still failed to produce a decisive breakthrough. Belarus’s entry into the war appears considerably less likely and would probably prove insufficiently effective even if it occurred. For the time being, according to Zelensky, Minsk has switched off the relay stations that had been helping guide Russian weapons toward Ukraine.

Escalating tensions with European countries and a hybrid conflict in the Baltic region remain a likely threat, and states bordering Russia are preparing for it with increasing seriousness (-> Re: Russia: A Fox in the Baltic). Such a confrontation could, to some extent, replicate Iran’s successful strategy in its confrontation with the United States. Exploiting Europe’s vulnerability to missile and drone attacks, Russia could seek to test Europe’s commitment to collective-defense obligations and compel negotiations under the threat of a broader military confrontation accompanied by economic and political destabilization. Such a scenario would pose a severe test of European political unity (-> Re: Russia: A Quasi-existential Threat).

Ukrainian Defense Minister Fedorov says Ukraine has a “window” of approximately six months during which it must exploit its newly achieved advantage to the fullest possible extent. By this he means that Russia will eventually adapt to the new circumstances, as it has repeatedly done over the course of the war, and develop effective countermeasures against Ukraine’s aerial campaign.

Indeed, the most logical and least risky response would be a purely technological one. It would involve either the development and large-scale deployment of effective counter-drone air-defense systems, or a significant expansion of Russia’s own medium-range strike capabilities, able to impose symmetrical costs on Ukraine. On 24 June, Russia launched a large-scale “mirror” strike using Shahed drones against Naftogaz facilities in four regions of Ukraine. Such a strategy, however, would require unconventional technological solutions, not least because the Russian military lacks a communications architecture comparable to Starlink. At present, there is little evidence that any coherent strategy of this kind has yet emerged.

At the same time, one feature of Russia’s fiscal policy stands out. After relatively restrained federal budget spending in January and February 2026, expenditures rose sharply in March by 1.5 trillion rubles, almost 50 percent higher than in March of the previous year. Such a sudden increase is unlikely to be explained by the inertia of rising military expenditure alone. A more plausible interpretation is that the government made emergency investments in new military programs, possibly related to the production of missiles, drones, or counter-drone systems. If so, the effects of these investments could begin to appear as early as the autumn.

At the same time, a new phase of the technological drone race may prove more difficult for Russia, given the coordinated operation of Ukraine’s “drone coalition” and its Western partners, which ensures the integration of technical innovation with investment and scaling capacity (-> Re: Russia: Offensive Lockdown).

In a broader sense, the success of Ukraine’s asymmetric offensive raises the question of how to rethink the prevailing “paradigm of war” and the conditions under which “military victory” can be achieved, a question to which Moscow is likely not yet adapted. Russian military doctrine continues to place territorial advance on the ground at the center of its conception of victory. Until recently, this understanding seemed unassailable, and Vladimir Putin’s recent public statements suggest that the Russian leadership remains committed to it. Ground advances, however illusory, are presented as the principal narrative of the war, while strikes against infrastructure are framed as secondary and diversionary. This conceptual hierarchy shapes the allocation of priorities and investments in military advantage: manpower, heavy equipment, especially in earlier phases of the war, artillery intensity, and the use of glide bombs, all intended to secure territorial gains.

Yet within the emerging drone-based paradigm of warfare, territorial advance becomes not only extremely costly in terms of casualties, but also increasingly ineffective in strategic terms, especially when, as one Russian military correspondent put it, “there is no longer a rear.” In other words, moving the front line forward no longer guarantees durable control over territory, as the fate of the land corridor to Crimea illustrates. Control over territory is now determined not only on the ground but also in the air. The saturation of airspace with drones turns physical occupation into something increasingly illusory. In this context, the central objective of Russia’s military campaign, the capture of the borders of Donetsk region as an isolated strategic goal, loses much of its coherence and strategic meaning.

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