How Should We View Ukraine’s Cutoff of Transit Gas?
Ukraine’s halt to Russian gas transit is not merely an energy dispute but a calculated use of pipelines as political leverage against Russia, Europe, and the United States.
近日，乌克兰掐断过境天然气成为热点问题，如何评价这一事件？先从乌克兰总统泽连斯基同斯洛伐克总理菲佐近日的口舌之争说起。
In recent days, Ukraine’s cutoff of transit natural gas has become a hot-button issue. How should this event be assessed? Let us begin with the recent war of words between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico.
先是菲佐称他与泽连斯基在布鲁塞尔会面期间，后者表示将向斯方提供来自俄罗斯被冻结资产收益中的5亿美元，以换取支持乌加入北约。菲佐对此断然拒绝。随后泽连斯基呼吁斯洛伐克安全部门调查菲佐与俄罗斯的关系。12月27日，菲佐再次发声，称自己不是泽连斯基的仆人，斯洛伐克可能停止向乌克兰供应电力。
First Fico said that, during his meeting with Zelensky in Brussels, the latter had offered Slovakia $500 million from the proceeds of frozen Russian assets in exchange for support for Ukraine’s accession to NATO. Fico flatly refused. Zelensky then called on Slovakia’s security services to investigate Fico’s ties with Russia. On December 27, Fico spoke out again, saying that he was not Zelensky’s servant, and that Slovakia might stop supplying electricity to Ukraine.
Behind the quarrel is the fact that each country has its hand on the other’s vital point. Ukraine’s refusal to allow Russian gas to be exported in transit will cause an energy crisis in Slovakia; Slovakia, meanwhile, has consistently opposed NATO’s acceptance of Ukraine and may become the greatest obstacle in Ukraine’s path toward joining the European Union.
双方争吵的背后是两国都按着对方的命门。乌克兰不允许俄罗斯过境出口天然气将导致斯洛伐克出现能源危机；斯洛伐克则一直拒绝北约接受乌克兰，而且可能成为乌克兰加入欧盟进程中的最大拦路虎。
The origin of the matter is Ukraine’s decision to stop transiting Russian natural gas to Europe through its gas transportation system beginning on January 1, 2025, while Slovakia depends on Russia for 90 percent of its energy supply.
事情的源起是乌克兰决定从2025年1月1日起停止通过其天然气运输系统向欧洲转运俄罗斯天然气，而斯洛伐克90%的能源供应依靠俄罗斯。
Judging from the relevant analyses, Ukraine’s refusal to transport Russian natural gas in transit rests chiefly on three considerations.
从相关分析看，乌克兰拒绝过境运输俄罗斯天然气主要有三方面考量。
First, to put pressure on Russia, further weakening the energy ties between Russia and Europe after the explosion of the Nord Stream gas pipelines.
第一，拿捏俄罗斯，继“北溪”天然气管道爆炸事件后进一步弱化俄欧之间的能源联系。
Ukraine’s closure of the transit route will reduce Russia’s natural-gas exports to European countries by roughly one-tenth. At present, the European market imports about 170 billion cubic meters of Russian gas each year. In 2023, Russia exported 15 billion cubic meters of gas to Europe via Ukraine, accounting for about 4.5 percent of the total demand of EU countries. In other words, Ukraine’s saying “no” to Russian gas transit will cause Russia’s gas supply to Europe to fall by at least 15 billion cubic meters, while sharply reducing Russia’s energy revenues on the European front. And in 2022, Ukraine’s halt to the export of Russian gas to Europe through the Sokhranovka metering station in the Luhansk region had already cut transit volumes by half.
乌克兰关闭过境通道将使俄罗斯对欧洲国家天然气出口量下降大约1/10。现阶段，欧洲市场每年进口大约1700亿立方米俄罗斯天然气。2023年俄罗斯经乌克兰对欧出口150亿立方米天然气，约占欧盟国家需求总量的4.5%。也就是说，乌克兰对俄罗斯天然气过境说“不”，这将导致俄对欧的天然气供应量起码减少150亿立方米，同时将造成俄罗斯在欧洲方向的能源收入大幅降低。而在2022年，乌克兰停止通过处于卢甘斯克地区的索赫拉诺夫卡计量站向欧洲出口俄罗斯天然气，已使过境输气量下降一半。
At the same time, closing the valve will cost Ukraine $700 million to $800 million a year in gas-transit revenue. More than that, it means the end of more than thirty years of cooperation between Russia and Ukraine in the natural-gas sector, while also causing a short-term gas shortage within Ukraine itself. In the words of Russian media, Ukraine is undergoing “de-gasification.”
同时，关闭阀门将使乌克兰每年损失7-8亿美元的天然气过境运输收入。这更意味着俄乌两国在天然气领域持续了30多年的合作宣告终结，同时将导致乌本国在短期内燃气短缺。用俄罗斯媒体的话说，乌克兰在“去天然气化”。
Second, to put pressure on Europe, using energy pipelines as a tool in exchange for support for Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO.
第二，拿捏欧洲，以能源管道为工具换取对其加入欧盟和北约的支持。
Russia exports gas via Ukraine mainly to Moldova, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria, Italy, and other countries. In 2023, Austria imported 6.5 billion cubic meters through Ukraine, Slovakia 3 billion cubic meters, and Moldova 1.9 billion cubic meters. Ukraine’s closure of the pipeline will tighten gas supplies in these countries and may in turn create national energy-security problems. Some Russian experts have said that Ukraine’s shutting of the transit valve could cause gas prices in EU countries to rise by around 30 percent.
俄罗斯经乌克兰主要向摩尔多瓦、捷克、斯洛伐克、奥地利、意大利等国出口天然气。2023年奥地利经乌克兰进口65亿立方米，斯洛伐克进口30亿立方米，摩尔多瓦进口19亿立方米。乌克兰关闭管道将导致这些国家天然气供应紧张，进而可能出现国家能源安全问题。有俄罗斯专家表示，乌克兰关闭过境运输阀门有可能造成欧盟国家天然气价格上涨30%左右。
In fact, Ukraine’s decision was not unexpected; many countries had already begun considering alternatives. Since 2021, for example, Hungary has been importing Russian gas via TurkStream; Italy in recent years has increased gas imports from Africa while also beginning to purchase Russian liquefied gas.
实际上，乌克兰的决定并非意外之举，多国早已开始考虑替代方案。例如，从2021年起，匈牙利开始通过“土耳其溪”进口俄罗斯天然气；意大利近年来加大从非洲进口天然气，同时开始购买俄罗斯的液化气。
On December 20, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal said that, if the European Commission made a request, and provided that legal and technical conditions were met, the possibility of continuing to transport Russian gas to Europe through Ukraine would not be ruled out.
12月20日，乌克兰总理什梅加尔表示，如果欧盟委员会提出请求，在符合法律和技术条件的情况下，也不排除继续经过乌克兰向欧洲输送俄罗斯天然气的可能性。
Reports say a similar practice has already been adopted for Russian oil exports to European countries via Ukraine. Specifically, once the oil reaches the Russia-Ukraine border, oil purchased by European countries is no longer counted as a Russian commodity but as a commodity of those European countries. The main change here is that the transit fee is paid not by Russia but by the importing country. As a result, the price of buying one ton of Russian crude oil transiting Ukraine has risen from $8.50 to $21.
有报道称，类似的做法在俄罗斯经乌克兰向欧洲国家出口石油方面已经采用。具体做法是，从俄乌边境开始，被欧洲国家购买的石油就不再算作是俄罗斯的商品，而是欧洲国家的商品。此间的主要变化是，支付过境费的不是俄罗斯，而是进口国。如此一来，过境乌克兰购买一吨俄罗斯原油的价格由8.5美元上涨至21美元。
If such an approach is adopted, the energy pipeline becomes a political instrument. So long as Russia still agrees to sell, whether European countries can buy will rest in the hands of the Kyiv authorities. For Ukraine, which hopes to join the European Union as soon as possible, this is a new bargaining chip in negotiations with Europe.
如果采取这样的做法，能源管道就成了政治工具。只要俄罗斯还同意卖，欧洲国家能不能买到的决定权就在基辅当局手中了。对于希望尽早加入欧盟的乌克兰来说，这是在对欧谈判中的新筹码。
For Slovakia, what is most needed now is support from the EU leadership. But help from the Brussels clique may not arrive in time, because this is a good opportunity to use the energy issue to “teach a lesson” to Fico, an “odd man out” within the EU, and thereby solve the political problem of internal disagreement. Thus the European Commission may put forward certain requests that meet legal and technical conditions, but not now.
对斯洛伐克来说，现在最需要的是欧盟领导层的支持。但布鲁塞尔小团体的援手未必会及时伸出，因为这是借助能源问题“教训”菲佐这一欧盟内“异类人物”的良机，以解决内部意见不合的政治问题。因此，欧盟委员会可能会提出某些符合法律和技术条件的请求，但不是现在。
Slovakia is not without options. It can buy liquefied gas, first ship it to Italy or other coastal countries, then regasify it and send it on to Slovakia through the European pipeline system. According to Fico’s calculations, Ukraine’s refusal to allow Russian gas transit will cause European gas prices to rise, and in 2025 and 2026 the EU will pay a price of 120 billion euros.
斯洛伐克也并非无计可施。该国可以购买液化气，先运输至意大利或其他沿海国家，解压成气体状态后再经欧洲管道系统输送至本国。按照菲佐的推算，乌克兰拒绝俄罗斯天然气过境将导致欧洲燃气价格上涨，2025和2026年欧盟将付出1200亿欧元的代价。
Third, to put pressure on the United States, in exchange for the support of the mercantile-minded Trump.
第三，拿捏美国，换取重商的特朗普的支持。
According to the Financial Times, on December 27 Ukraine received its first shipment of liquefied gas from the United States through Greece’s Revithoussa energy terminal, totaling about 100 million cubic meters. This means that Ukraine is continuing to use the transfer of economic interests in exchange for American military support.
据《金融时报》报道，12月27日，乌克兰通过希腊的Revitus能源终端接收了首批来自美国的液化气，总量约1亿立方米。这意味着，乌克兰持续利用经济利益输送换取美国的军事支持。
Of course, Trump’s so-called rapid settlement of the Ukraine problem does not mean dumping the burden, but changing Ukraine’s character as an instrument. A very probable fact is that Trump will not substantially reduce financial inputs into Ukraine; it is simply that the money will move from the military sphere to the sphere of reconstruction, yielding longer-term and richer profits. Put another way, the more Biden invests in Ukraine, the more generous the asymmetric return from the Kyiv authorities becomes, and the firmer the foundation laid for Trump. Biden and Trump are using the same pot of money; it is just that each carries his own ledger.
当然，特朗普所称的快速解决乌克兰问题并非甩包袱，而是更改乌克兰作为工具的属性。非常可能的事实是，特朗普不会大幅减少对乌克兰的资金投入，只是这些钱将从军事领域转到重建领域，赚取更长期和更丰厚的利润。换个角度讲，拜登在乌克兰投入的越多，基辅当局的非对称性回馈就越丰厚，给特朗普打的底子就越牢。拜登和特朗普用的都是同一笔钱，只不过两人各揣一个账本而已。