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Interim Results of the U.S. and Israeli War Against Iran

The article argues that the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz should be understood not as strategic incoherence, but as part of a U.S. energy-dominance strategy aimed at weakening OPEC, expanding American oil and gas exports, and increasing pressure on China.

Иранский конфликт: доминирование на глобальном рынке энергоресурсов и стратегическая доктрина Трампа
Russian International Affairs Council · By M. Kozlov · 10 July 2026 · read the original in Russian →

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К.т.н., специалист в области стратегического предпринимательства и типологии организационной адаптации

Candidate of Technical Sciences; specialist in strategic entrepreneurship and the typology of organizational adaptation.

Продолжительность и непоследовательность проведения военной операции против Ирана, блокады Ормузского пролива и последующего переговорного процесса зачастую объясняются допущенными США ошибками, включая отсутствие у Вашингтона глобальной стратегии. Однако эффективность и оптимальность ведения боевых действий, блокады и переговоров важны не столько сами по себе, сколько исходя из общего соответствия конечной цели и вклада в ее достижение. Упрекая администрацию США в отсутствии глобальной стратегии, многие игнорируют то обстоятельство, что в основу новой геополитики при втором сроке президента Трампа положена Программа доминирования в сфере энергоресурсов 2025 г., которая по своей сути представляет собой доктринальный документ и предусматривает осуществление такой стратегической инновации, которая позволит американским компаниям увеличивать объемы экспорта добываемой ими сланцевой нефти в условиях нейтрализации противодействия, оказываемого ранее странами ОПЕК.

The duration and inconsistency of the military operation against Iran, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and the subsequent negotiation process are often explained by mistakes made by the United States, including Washington’s lack of a global strategy. Yet the effectiveness and optimality of the fighting, the blockade, and the negotiations matter not so much in themselves as in terms of their overall correspondence to the ultimate goal and their contribution to achieving it. In reproaching the U.S. administration for lacking a global strategy, many ignore the fact that the new geopolitics of President Trump’s second term rests on the 2025 Energy Resources Dominance Program, which is in essence a doctrinal document and provides for the implementation of a strategic innovation that will allow American companies to increase exports of the shale oil they produce once the resistance previously mounted by OPEC countries has been neutralized.

The United States has become the world’s largest oil producer, with output in recent years exceeding 13 million barrels per day. This sharp growth has reduced U.S. dependence on imported oil and helped position America as a potentially major exporter directly competing with OPEC member states on global markets. In response to the development of shale-oil production technologies in the United States, OPEC+ was forced to keep global oil prices at a level that would prevent significant volumes of American oil, especially shale oil, from entering global markets. Once the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz had been set in motion, supplies from the Middle East contracted, and oil prices rose so high that OPEC’s price policy and preservation of market share became practically impossible. The undermining of OPEC’s market power and its seizure by the United States cleared the way for the proactive expansion of the American oil industry as part of the implementation of the U.S. strategy of global dominance in the energy market.

Most major exporters in the region that are members of OPEC depend on the Strait of Hormuz for their exports. As a result, Washington acquired the ability to influence both the volume of energy resources reaching importers on global markets and the very possibility of their arrival. This influence will be expressed not in the form of agreed production quotas, but through security and access to maritime transport channels, as well as the cost of insurance. Through these mechanisms, the United States intends to set the terms on which energy resources move through global markets and on which their prices are formed.

From the standpoint of the Energy Market Dominance Program, the aim of the regional conflict was not to inflict a military defeat on Iran, but rather to develop the economic and financial component of a global strategy of containing the chief geopolitical competitor and ultimate consumer of Iranian exports: the People’s Republic of China. The counter-blockade, aimed specifically at maritime shipping entering and leaving Iranian ports, was used as an instrument against Iran, with the operational objective of reducing its oil revenues, more than 80 percent of which came from supplies destined for China. The double blockade, meanwhile, also set in motion, already at the level of regional economic competition, a process of suspending the energy-supply routes of OPEC competitors while simultaneously destroying their price barriers to the expansion of American exports.

Thus the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is being used by the United States as an instrument not only for developing its own oil and gas industry, but also for increasing the competitiveness of the national economy amid confrontation with China. In this connection, it would be very useful to examine the influence of Trump’s renewed doctrine on the transformation of its model of competitiveness. Structuring the processes now being observed would make it possible to present more deeply the connection between their manifestations in the economic and foreign-policy dimensions.

The duration and inconsistency of the military operation against Iran, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and the subsequent negotiation process are often explained by mistakes made by the United States, including Washington’s lack of a global strategy. Yet the effectiveness and optimality of the fighting, the blockade, and the negotiations matter not so much in themselves as in terms of their overall correspondence to the ultimate goal and their contribution to achieving it. If there is no rational understanding of the overall picture of what is happening, when such goals prove far from unique and not entirely obvious, one should try to identify them by considering the situation in a broader context, taking into account Trump’s renewed doctrine as well as the economic interests of the United States and the American oil and gas sector.

At present, insufficient attention has been paid to the character of competition on the global oil market, the expansion of American oil exporters, and the provisions of the U.S.-adopted Global Energy Market Dominance Program (hereinafter, the Program). Attempts are almost entirely absent to build an integrated logical structure that would include the military, foreign-policy, and economic components, and within which the events that have occurred could be interpreted rationally, without subjective reproaches about the imperfection of their execution.

In attempting to feel out the elements of a rational approach and find an objective explanation of the essence of what is happening, it seems advisable to identify its possible economic logic in light of the factors noted above. This work examines the applicability of strategic-entrepreneurship approaches to structuring the observed processes. Could the neutralization of OPEC’s power on the global market represent a constituent element of a strategy to transform the model of the American oil and gas sector from the maintenance of neutral competitiveness to proactive expansion on the global energy market?

Interim Results of the U.S. and Israeli War Against Iran: The OPEC and Saudi Arabia Factor

Applying Michael Porter’s five forces model [1] to the global oil market shows that, by the beginning of the Iranian conflict, the industry was characterized above all by intense global competition between two main groups of exporters. The first group consisted of oil companies from OPEC member states; the second, of U.S. shale-oil exporters; and the confrontation between them took the form of a struggle for dominance. Since the shale revolution made it possible to increase American energy production and develop the export potential of this U.S. industry, the United States has been in direct structural competition with OPEC countries for global market share. It was the United States that often became one of the main objects of OPEC’s restrictive force, being the world’s largest oil producer. OPEC repeatedly demonstrated geopolitical superiority by effectively restraining attempts by American companies to increase exports of the shale oil they produced. The history of competition between OPEC member states and the United States reveals a conflict of interests and an objective American interest in neutralizing OPEC’s market power.

The United States has become the world’s largest oil producer, with output in recent years exceeding 13 million barrels per day. This sharp growth has reduced U.S. dependence on imported oil and helped position America as a potentially major exporter directly competing with OPEC member states on global markets. In response to the development of shale-oil production technologies in the United States, OPEC+ was forced to keep global oil prices at a level that would prevent significant volumes of American oil, especially shale oil, from entering global markets. Since the cost of producing shale oil is many times higher than the cost of producing oil by traditional technology in OPEC countries, it looked less attractive to importers when competitiveness was determined exclusively by price.

At the end of 2014, instead of cutting production to support prices, OPEC, led by Saudi Arabia, decided to maintain a high level of output even as prices fell. The goal was to force prices down far enough that high-cost shale-oil production would become unprofitable for American producers, leading them either to bankruptcy or to suspend field development. When shale-oil production in the United States reached record levels in 2024-2025, OPEC+ resumed this policy, advancing a strategy of increasing production in order to regain market share and pushing the price below $60 per barrel. This strategic competition reflected the changing balance of power on global energy markets, but by then the United States already possessed significant economic and military instruments for countering OPEC’s influence. In recent years Trump’s energy policy predetermined the use of these instruments for the redistribution of the market itself.

According to the theory of strategic entrepreneurship [2], if existing competitive conditions do not offer a market opportunity connected with expanding one’s export share of a given resource, it is recommended to consider whether there is an opportunity to change the competitive landscape in one’s favor. If such an opportunity is identified, one must determine what process might be capable of restructuring the market, and whether one possesses levers that would allow that process to be set in motion [3]. When the desired process has been identified, and the available levers take the form of the most powerful military and financial resources, they can be used to move toward implementing a model of proactive competition. In doing so, strategic innovation is carried out for such a restructuring of the market as would compel its participants to play according to new rules of the game, altered in one’s favor.

Here it is necessary to have at one’s disposal some process, perhaps in the form of a multi-move combination, which, once set in motion, can in some way reduce the market share and degree of influence of existing exporters, for example Saudi Arabia. Once the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz had been set in motion, supplies from the Middle East contracted, and oil prices rose so high that OPEC’s price policy and preservation of market share became practically impossible. The undermining of OPEC’s market power and its seizure by the United States cleared the way for the proactive expansion of the American oil industry as part of the implementation of the U.S. strategy of global dominance in the energy market.

The Persian Gulf: Another Seven LessonsПерсидский залив: очередные семь уроков

The Energy Resources Dominance Program: A Former Risk as a Present Opportunity

In reproaching the U.S. administration for lacking a global strategy, many ignore the fact that the new geopolitics of President Trump’s second term rests on the 2025 Energy Resources Dominance Program, which is in essence a doctrinal document. The Program provides for the implementation of a strategic innovation that will allow American companies to increase exports of the shale oil they produce once the resistance previously mounted by OPEC countries has been neutralized. Export development is based on the use of a new market opportunity that arose as a result of the development of shale oil and gas extraction technology. Possessing 310 billion barrels of technically recoverable oil, including Alaska and offshore areas, and nearly 3,000 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, the United States has resources that allow it both to satisfy demand on its domestic market and to develop exports in order to support allies abroad.

The stated goals of the Program go beyond achieving energy independence on the domestic market, in order to provide U.S. allies with reliable supplies of affordable energy resources and to influence global energy prices. These goals reflect an extremely ambitious approach to energy policy, one that serves as a justification for the expediency of using any resources and methods to seize market power at the global level in the national interest. Reliability in the provision of affordable energy resources is guaranteed not to all importers, but only to a selectively limited segment of consumers in the form of U.S. allies. Thus the obvious conclusion suggests itself: the U.S. Energy Resources Dominance Program serves as a state-level justification for transforming the model of the American oil and gas sector from the maintenance of neutral competitiveness to proactive expansion on the global energy market.

To what extent did the United States possess in advance the results of forecasts about the course of events, plan for a bottleneck scenario in the Strait of Hormuz, and understand the causal chain of events and actions by the parties that would trigger a three-move combination ending the transport of energy resources through the strait? Assertions that the possibility of Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz was overlooked by the Trump administration seem debatable, given the regular discussion of this scenario at various levels. Fatih Birol, executive director of the International Energy Agency, reported that in interviews at the IEA, after the question about why an applicant had applied for the job, the second question was: “What would you do if the Strait of Hormuz were closed?” Federica Mogherini, the former EU negotiator on the 2015 agreement, spoke of the existence of forecasts of the consequences of the supposed conflict as follows: “Analysts predicted that a war with Iran would strengthen the country’s most conservative hard-liners, spread the conflict throughout the region, and raise global energy prices to prohibitive levels.” Yet the fact that the analysts’ predictions proved correct more likely means that their conclusions were heard and taken into account at the operational planning stage in an entirely changed context: as an opportunity rather than a threat.

In the 2025 white paper “Strategic Implications of U.S. LNG Exports,” the scenario that came to pass, involving disruption of supplies in the Strait of Hormuz, was examined in detail as a potential risk of a trilateral armed conflict [4]. The document noted: “Approximately 24% of the world’s LNG supply comes from the Middle East, with 20% from Qatar and passing through the Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman. Against the background of growing tensions between Iran and Israel, Arab states and their LNG production depend on the United States for security to stabilize the region. The United States remains concerned that, if Israel attacks Iranian energy infrastructure, Iran will respond by striking energy facilities in the Persian Gulf, which in turn will require a U.S. military response against Iran. Such a conflict will disrupt LNG supplies from this region and create supply shocks on global energy markets. While Saudi Arabia and the UAE can reroute some of their oil and gas to avoid transport through the Strait of Hormuz, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain currently cannot do so. If Qatar and neighboring countries are unable to meet their supply obligations, this will be a catastrophe for Asian markets, which receive more than 70% of Qatar’s LNG supplies. Constrained supplies from Qatar will increase demand for alternative LNG suppliers, including the United States, and make spot LNG shipments prohibitively expensive for developing countries.” It follows from this fragment of a self-fulfilling prophecy that the American side fully possessed the information and understood the driving forces and causal links among the parties’ actions in the event of a blockade of the strait. For decades, American importers viewed the Strait of Hormuz primarily in terms of a threat to the security of maritime supplies. But if the United States now positions itself not as an importer but as an exporter, the blockade of the strait may have become not a risk, but an opportunity to create the instrument required by the U.S. strategy for undermining OPEC’s control over the global oil market. Given a detailed understanding of the mechanism by which the conflict would develop, why not now consider this process from the opposite angle and use it to redistribute the market by suspending historically established supply channels, creating a shortage of oil and LNG, and neutralizing OPEC’s market power?

Prospects for a Peaceful Settlement of the Iranian Crisis: Blockade as a Process in the Business Model

A crucial circumstance for understanding the essence of the armed conflict lies in the fact that both of its direct participants have an objective interest in partially weakening OPEC by establishing a blockade in the Strait of Hormuz. As Konstantin Simonov, general director of the National Energy Security Fund, noted in his book Global Energy War, control over shipping routes, processing capacity, or critical resources can be turned into a strategic advantage [5]. Most major exporters in the region that are members of OPEC depend on the Strait of Hormuz for their exports. Since the security of passage through this strait was determined by the continuation of the Iranian conflict and by the use of the blockade as an instrument for achieving strategic interests, Washington acquired the ability to influence both the volume of energy resources reaching importers on global markets and the very possibility of their arrival. This influence will be expressed not in the form of agreed production quotas, but through security and access to maritime transport channels, as well as the cost of insurance. Through these mechanisms, the United States intends to set the terms on which energy resources move through global markets and on which their prices are formed.

The criteria for the effectiveness of a strategic innovation include its results in physical terms and its profitability in monetary terms. The economic consequences of a full-scale war with Iran, because of its ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, were diametrically opposed: catastrophic for OPEC members and oil-importing countries on the one hand, and highly positive for the United States on the other. It is unlikely to have been the result of happy coincidence that the United States became the principal beneficiary of this war. By the end of March 2026, American companies were exporting far more oil and other fuels than before the conflict. U.S. crude-oil exports reached an all-time high, exceeding 10 million barrels per day. As of mid-May 2026, additional revenues from crude-oil exports were estimated at roughly $45 billion. These results most likely followed from replacement supplies against the background of the unhurried and inconsistent conduct and suspension of the armed conflict. “The longer the strait remains closed, the more those who have benefited from it will benefit,” said Jim Burkhard, head of global oil research at S&P Global Energy.

“Energy can be an instrument of foreign policy, but it can also be an objective,” says Dr. O’Sullivan, a professor at Harvard University’s Kennedy School. “The energy weapon has not disappeared, but a whole range of global factors, as well as individual decisions by the Trump administration and others, have brought it back to the fore.” Such individual decisions, whose significance O’Sullivan notes, were reflected in the Trump doctrine from the positions of the renewed national security strategy and the Program.

The doctrines of U.S. presidents are defined as unilateral statements of strategic and/or defensive goals that represent the codification of grand strategy in a particular historical period and warn allies and adversaries of America’s intentions, specifying the conditions for the use of force, strategically important geographic regions and the reasons for their importance, as well as the priority values of its diplomacy. With the completed content of Trump’s second-term doctrine taking shape [6], its central message became interstate competition between the United States and China. Since any conflicts throughout the remainder of Trump’s presidency will be considered and resolved in this context, the goals of U.S. involvement in this case are not limited by the region’s geographic boundaries or by military-political confrontation with Iran.

The Trump doctrine is an integrated structure in which foreign-policy goals are achieved primarily through aggressive economic war. The Trump doctrine cannot be divided into “foreign policy” and “economic policy.” It is a single strategy in which economic influence serves as the principal weapon of foreign policy. Instead of treating diplomacy, military action, and trade as separate spheres, the Trump doctrine explicitly uses individual elements of U.S. economic dominance, such as tariffs, financial sanctions, and supply-chain blockades, as instruments for preserving its own global hegemony and achieving renewed national security goals.

From the standpoint of the Energy Market Dominance Program, the goal of the regional conflict lay rather in developing the economic and financial component of the global strategy for containing the chief geopolitical competitor. The measured course of the conflict may suggest that the aim was not so much to swiftly inflict a military defeat on Iran and establish long-term, unilateral U.S. control over the Strait of Hormuz, as to block the supplies of Middle Eastern exporters for a sufficiently long period of time. The blockade became an instrument for building up two interrelated directions of economic influence within the framework of the Trump doctrine.

In the first of these, oil was used as a means of pressure on the PRC as the chief geopolitical competitor and ultimate consumer of Iranian exports. At the level of the regional armed conflict, the counter-blockade aimed specifically at maritime shipping entering and leaving Iranian ports was used as an instrument against Iran, with the operational objective of reducing its oil revenues, more than 80 percent of which came from supplies destined for China. The absence of the capabilities declared in the Program to ensure supplies of American oil to other countries means an energy-security risk for those, such as China, that depend heavily on oil and gas imports from the Middle East. In the second direction, oil as the objective, the double blockade set in motion, already at the level of regional economic competition, the process noted above: the suspension of the energy-supply routes of OPEC competitors alongside the destruction of their price barriers to the expansion of American exports. Increasing the competitiveness of the American oil and gas industry makes a significant contribution to the overall increase in the competitiveness of the national economy.

The United States also needed control of the market in order to acquire a new and effective lever, in addition to the military, trade, and financial levers already at its disposal, to intensify its pressure in the trade and economic confrontation with the PRC. If, in the words of China Forum expert Professor Zhao Minghao, the blockade of Iranian oil supplies to China is not a distant crisis for Beijing but a direct attack on its vital interests, then, in the words of Konstantin Simonov, general director of the National Energy Security Fund, it is a “transit noose for the dragon” [5]. Given that China obtains roughly half of its oil from the Persian Gulf, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz created an existential-level threat to the country’s energy security and economy. In this connection, one should emphasize the relevance of the statement by Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu at a meeting of senior BRICS security officials that “The blocking of the Strait of Hormuz has placed global food and energy security under attack: through it passes an export flow of energy resources and mineral fertilizers that is significant for many states.”

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The duration and inconsistency of the armed conflict, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and the negotiation process, accompanied by outward manifestations of pseudo-irrationality on the part of the most active political figure in this conflict, should not become an insurmountable obstacle to discovering its entirely rational foundations and driving forces. An analysis of the character of competition on the global oil market and the expansion of American oil exporters has revealed the latter’s objective interest in transforming the strategic energy model from the maintenance of neutral competitiveness to proactive expansion, which corresponds to the directive provisions of the U.S. Global Energy Market Dominance Program adopted in 2025. The relevance of the proposed model is confirmed by financial results, namely the significant growth of U.S. oil and gas exports amid the undermining of OPEC’s market power and of the logistical channels of export supplies used by Middle Eastern competitors.

It should also be emphasized that the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is being used as an instrument not only for developing the United States’ own oil and gas industry, but also for increasing the competitiveness of the U.S. national economy amid confrontation with China. In this connection, it would be very useful to examine the influence of Trump’s renewed doctrine on the transformation of its model of competitiveness. Structuring the processes now being observed would make it possible to present more deeply the connection between their manifestations in the economic and foreign-policy dimensions.

1. Michael Porter, a professor at Harvard Business School, was the first to approach multifactor models of the competitiveness of economic actors in the most systematic way. In particular, he used the concept of a pure competitive strategy based on the minimum level of cost. It was precisely this strategy that OPEC members from the Arabian Peninsula used to create barriers to entry for American exporters on global markets. For more detail, see: M. Porter, International Competition. Moscow: Alpina Publisher, 2016. 716 pp.

2. Strategic entrepreneurship entails behavior that combines the search for opportunity with the search for advantage and leads to improved firm performance. For more detail, see: Ireland, R.D., Hitt, M.A., Sirmon, D.G. “A Model of Strategic Entrepreneurship: The Construct and its Dimensions,” Journal of Management, 2003, 29(6), pp. 963-989.

3. M. Kozlov, “Heterogeneous Analyzer Typology Organization: The Role of Strategic Entrepreneurship.” Chapter 1 in The Power of Entrepreneurship, ed. Daan Dirksen, Nova Science Publishers, NY, 2019, pp. 1-43.

4. White Paper — Strategic Implications of U.S. LNG Exports, posted by American Security Project on Jan. 17, 2025.

5. K. Simonov, Global Energy War. Moscow: Algorithm, 2007, 270 pp.

6. By the “Trump doctrine” is meant a generalization of the relevant documents and statements, in particular the renewed U.S. National Security Strategy and the 2025 Global Energy Market Dominance Program.

The clash with Iran returns old-school diplomacy to the agenda.

Interim Results of the U.S. and Israeli War Against Iran: One Should Not Place Too Much Hope in the Current Peace Process

Prospects for a Peaceful Settlement of the Iranian Crisis: The Deep Crisis of Trust Between the Parties Rules Out a Long-Term Compromise

Y done · S save · G great · B bad · N not for me