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In the First World War, Britons and Ottomans Faced Each Other in the Middle East

The struggle for Gaza in 1917 turned a strategic gateway into the hinge of Britain’s conquest of Palestine, opening the way to Jerusalem and to political decisions whose consequences still shape the region.

As três batalhas que abalaram Gaza
La Storia e le Idee · By La Storia e le Idee · 10 July 2026 · read the original in Portuguese →

Na I Guerra, britânicos e otomanos se enfrentaram no Oriente Médio – e a tomada da cidade palestina era estratégica. Como foi o conflito? Por que ele abriu portas para o projeto sionista que, mais de cem anos depois, ainda abala a geopolítica e produz genocídios?

In the First World War, the British and the Ottomans faced one another in the Middle East, and the capture of the Palestinian city was strategic. What was the conflict like? Why did it open doors to the Zionist project that, more than a hundred years later, still unsettles geopolitics and produces genocides?

Published July 10, 2026, at 6:34 p.m.Publicado 10/07/2026 às 18:34

A text from La Storia e le Idee | Translation: Roney RodriguesUm texto do La Storia e le Idee | Tradução: Rôney Rodrigues

A entrada do Império Otomano no conflito, ocorrida em novembro de 1914, transformou o Oriente Médio em uma das frentes mais relevantes da disputa entre as grandes potências da Primeira Guerra Mundial.

The Ottoman Empire’s entry into the conflict, in November 1914, turned the Middle East into one of the most important fronts in the struggle among the great powers of the First World War.

The Ottoman Empire, led by the Young Turk faction, had chosen an alliance with Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in order to counter historic Russian influence and try to recover territories lost in the Balkans and the Caucasus.

Germany, for its part, saw in Constantinople an instrument for striking at British imperial interests. It sent military specialists and vast financing to modernize the Ottoman army and complete infrastructure such as the Berlin-Baghdad railway.

Britain’s priority was the defense of Egypt, since the Suez Canal was the essential passage between the metropole and its possessions in India, Australia, and New Zealand. In 1914, Egypt became a British protectorate, and the canal was turned into the axis of the defensive system against possible enemy incursions.

At the beginning of 1915, an Ottoman force crossed the Sinai desert and attempted an assault on the canal, which the British repelled with relative ease. This event convinced the British command of the need to abandon the canal’s passive defense and shift the protective line eastward across the Sinai Peninsula.

Under the leadership of General Archibald Murray, British forces began in 1916 a methodical advance that required a logistical effort of remarkable proportions. Since the desert had no roads or water resources, the British built a standard-gauge railway and installed a pipeline more than one hundred miles long to carry water from the Nile to the battlefront. Tens of thousands of camels from the Camel Transport Corps and thousands of Egyptian workers from the Egyptian Labour Corps were employed to dig trenches, lay tracks, and transport supplies, a task that allowed the army to advance despite the heat and the sandstorms. This infrastructural apparatus transformed the desert into an operational base that sustained the troops’ march to the frontier of Ottoman Palestine.

With the conquest of El-Arish and Rafah at the beginning of 1917, the British reached the border’s edge and found themselves facing the city of Gaza.

The locality occupied a dominant position on a hill about two miles from the coast and controlled the main lines of communication into the region’s interior. For millennia, the stronghold had been considered the natural gateway for an invasion of Palestine from Egypt, a role it had played several times over the course of history.

For the Ottomans, Gaza represented the axis of a defensive line that stretched roughly thirty kilometers inland, as far as Beersheba. The city was protected by cactus hedges several meters high and thick, forming obstacles almost impassable for infantry, as well as by a well-interlinked system of trenches and redoubts.

The political change in London brought by the rise of David Lloyd George gave the military campaign a sharp acceleration. The new prime minister sought an unequivocal victory that might restore the morale of the British people, worn down by the massacres on the Western Front. The choice fell on Palestine, with the order to capture Jerusalem before Christmas 1917.

This directive soon took on a profound ideal value, evoking the echo of a last crusade against an enemy of a different faith and culture.

The armies of the two empires, the British at the height of their global influence and the Ottoman in a progressive centuries-long decline, thus confronted one another in Gaza, transforming a rural center surrounded by olive groves into the epicenter of three clashes that marked the destiny of the Middle East.

General Archibald Murray, who commanded the Egyptian Expeditionary Force from his base in Cairo, and his field subordinate, General Charles Dobell, conceived the assault on Gaza as a swift and decisive blow.

The primary objective was to capture the city before sunset in order to secure access to the water wells, a vital necessity that conditioned the entire timetable of the operation.

The plan provided for General Philip Chetwode’s Desert Column to carry out a broad enveloping movement with the mounted divisions, isolating the stronghold from the north and east, while the 53rd (Welsh) Infantry Division would conduct the frontal attack against the enemy defenses, and the 54th (East Anglian) Division would support and protect the southern and eastern sector of the attack, accompanying the cavalry’s enveloping movement to ensure the maintenance of the encircling corridor.

The British command estimated that the urban garrison consisted of about two thousand men, but in reality the German major Tiller commanded roughly four thousand defenders. Colonel Kress von Kressenstein, coordinator of the Ottoman defense, had skillfully fortified the hill of Ali Muntar and the surrounding gardens, where dense, high cactus hedges formed a natural barrier almost impenetrable to infantry. While the city remained the defensive axis, Kress von Kressenstein kept the 3rd Cavalry Division and the 16th Infantry Division ready to intervene from the bases of Tell esh-Sheria and Beersheba in order to strike the attackers’ flank.

Operations began at 2:30 a.m. on March 26, 1917, when the mounted brigades left their camps to cross Wadi Ghazze, the river valley that divides the territory of Gaza in two. At sunrise, a dense and sudden fog enveloped the entire battlefield, reducing visibility to a few meters and preventing British officers from orienting themselves with precision. Despite the atmospheric phenomenon, the cavalry of the ANZAC Mounted Division and the Imperial Mounted Division advanced with determination and completed the encirclement of Gaza at around 10:30 a.m. By contrast, the mist paralyzed the 53rd Infantry Division, which remained motionless for about two hours, awaiting clear visibility for the artillery. This delay proved disastrous, for the frontal attack against Ali Muntar began only near noon, when the heat had already become oppressive and the sandy ground reflected a blinding glare. The 53rd Division advanced in the open under incessant machine-gun and shrapnel fire, while the soldiers tried to cut a path through the cacti using only bayonets. After hours of bloody fighting in the sector known as the “Labyrinth,” the British brigades finally managed to take the positions atop the hill of Ali Muntar shortly before nightfall.

At the very moment when the Welsh infantry occupied Ali Muntar and the New Zealand and Australian horsemen penetrated the city’s northern outskirts, victory seemed within reach. Major Tiller, seeing his defenses collapse, ordered the destruction of the radio station and the secret documents, resigning himself to defeat. Yet General Dobell and General Chetwode were watching the action from their rearward position at In Seirat, on the opposite bank of Wadi Ghazze, and receiving incomplete and often contradictory information about the course of the battle. Around 4 p.m., the British commands glimpsed in the distance the clouds of dust raised by Ottoman reinforcements converging on Gaza from the east. Fearing that the mounted units might be cut off in the darkness and concerned by the exhaustion of the horses’ water reserves, Dobell and Chetwode decided to order a general withdrawal precisely when Ottoman resistance was on the verge of collapse. The cavalry hastily abandoned the ground it had gained, leaving the infantry’s flank unprotected.

The order to retreat set off a series of catastrophic misunderstandings. General Dallas, commanding the 53rd Division, received instructions to fall back in order to link up with the 54th Division, but was not told that the latter had already moved to a new defensive line. Believing that he had to cover a much greater distance, Dallas ordered the total evacuation of Ali Muntar and the surrounding hills during the night. Many Welsh battalions, exhausted after thirty-six hours of wakefulness and fighting, received with disbelief and indignation the order to abandon the heights won at such cost. Only at 5 a.m. the following morning did Chetwode realize that the key positions had been left completely ungarrisoned. The British attempt to reoccupy Ali Muntar in the early hours of March 27 failed, for the Ottoman troops, on realizing the evacuation, had already retaken control of the hill and reinforced it with heavy artillery. The battle ended with the definitive withdrawal of all British forces beyond Wadi Ghazze, marking a tactical failure that Murray tried in vain to camouflage in his optimistic reports sent to London.

The Second Battle of GazaA Segunda Batalha de Gaza

The tactical failure of the first battle of Gaza was presented by General Archibald Murray to the War Office in London as a partial victory. In his reports, the commander-in-chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force omitted the details of the unjustified withdrawal and declared that the Turkish troops had suffered extremely high losses, estimated at between six and eight thousand men. This version of events convinced Prime Minister David Lloyd George and General William Robertson that the Ottoman forces were on the brink of collapse and that a new attack would definitively open the road to Jerusalem. Murray thus found himself the prisoner of his own optimism, forced by political expectations to order an immediate resumption of hostilities before the troops had been adequately rested or reinforced. Pressure from London imposed a tight timetable that drastically reduced the preparation time needed for a large-scale operation.

While the British reorganized, the German colonel Kress von Kressenstein understood that a second assault was imminent and transformed the defensive sector into a modern fortified system. The Turks abandoned the city’s passive defense in order to build a line of interconnected redoubts along the road to Beersheba, taking advantage of the dominant position of the ridges. The principal fortifications, named by the British Tank, Atawine, Hairpin, and Hureyra, were equipped with deep trenches and protected by barbed wire, with crossing fields of fire that made any surprise maneuver impossible. The Ottomans deployed about eighteen thousand men and increased the number of artillery batteries, pre-registering the ranges for all possible enemy avenues of approach. The three-week interval between the two clashes also allowed the Turkish 53rd Division to come down from Jaffa and reinforce the Gaza garrison, canceling out the numerical advantage the British had sought to accumulate.

General Charles Dobell, commander of Eastern Force, conceived a plan based on a massive frontal assault, reproducing the tactics of attrition already used on the Western Front in France. The operation began on April 17 with a preliminary advance by the 52nd, 53rd, and 54th Infantry Divisions, which established themselves along a line parallel to the Turkish defenses. The main attack was unleashed at dawn on April 19, after a one-hour bombardment that proved wholly insufficient to neutralize the enemy batteries or destroy the tangles of wire. For the first time in that theater, asphyxiating gases and Mark II tanks were employed, but both systems failed in their purpose. The three thousand gas shells, which evaporated quickly in the morning heat, had no effect on the defenders, while the eight available tanks, obsolete and worn models, became easy targets for the Austrian and German guns. Inside the tanks, temperatures reached levels unbearable for the crews, who fought bravely but were unable to break the enemy line.

The British infantry had to advance in the open under lethal machine-gun and shrapnel fire. The 54th Division was ordered to cover nearly two kilometers across perfectly flat terrain. Despite the warnings of Brigadier Sandilands, who described the attack as a veritable massacre, General Hare felt bound by higher orders and commanded the advance. Three battalions of the 163rd Brigade were decimated, losing fifteen hundred men and all their company commanders in a single stroke. In the central sector, the battalions of the King’s Own Scottish Borderers, of the 52nd Division, repeatedly tried to take Outpost Hill, suffering losses close to fifty percent of their strength. At nightfall, the Scottish troops held only precarious and isolated positions, surrounded by the dead and unable to receive supplies. The 53rd Division also managed to capture Samson Ridge, on the coast, but this was a local success that did not compromise the general solidity of the Ottoman defense.

The operation ended in total disaster and at an extremely high human cost. British losses amounted to 6,444 men, including six hundred confirmed dead and more than fifteen hundred missing, while the Turks counted about two thousand casualties. Murray, in an attempt to force a decision, initially ordered the assault to resume at dawn on April 20, but had to retreat in the face of the unanimous opinion of the divisional commanders, who reported the exhaustion of ammunition and the troops’ state of prostration. The defeat led to a rapid reshuffling of the military high command. On April 21, Murray removed Dobell from command of Eastern Force, officially for reasons of health, but in reality using him as a scapegoat for the failure of the frontal plan. Murray himself did not remain long in his post, for the government in London, disappointed by the results and by the lack of clarity in the reports, decided to replace him in June 1917 with General Edmund Allenby.

The second battle of Gaza marked the end of the first phase of the campaign in Palestine and transformed the front into a stalemate resembling the European trenches, awaiting a radical change in the strategy and leadership of the British army.

The Third Battle of GazaA Terceira Batalha de Gaza

General Sir Edmund Allenby assumed command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) on June 28, 1917, marking a profound change in the conduct of the campaign. His first significant decision was to move headquarters from the comfort of Cairo’s hotels to the dunes of Umm el Kelab, near Rafah, in order to remain in direct contact with the troops and share the hardships of the front. Allenby infused the ranks with new spirit, replacing staff officers considered insufficiently energetic with men he trusted from the Western Front. The soldiers soon began calling him “The Bull,” because of his imposing physical presence and the determination he showed during his frequent inspections of the lines. Under his leadership, the EEF was considerably reinforced and reorganized into three distinct army corps: XX Corps, under General Philip Chetwode; XXI Corps, led by Edward Bulfin; and the Desert Mounted Corps, under Harry Chauvel.

Allenby understood that a third frontal attack against the Gaza defenses would result in another bloody failure. He therefore adopted a plan based on surprise and strategic deception, with the aim of convincing the Ottoman command that the main target remained the coastal city. Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen orchestrated a complex disinformation operation, known as “the haversack ruse,” intentionally dropping a bloodstained satchel containing forged documents and misleading maps during a simulated chase with Turkish patrols. These documents suggested that the advance toward Beersheba was only a decoy and that the true war effort would still be concentrated on Gaza. To reinforce this illusion, the British kept the camps facing the city intact, maintaining fires through the night to simulate the presence of troops who, in reality, were secretly moving east.

The real enveloping maneuver began at the end of October 1917, when the units of XX Corps and the Desert Mounted Corps headed for Beersheba through the desert. The troops covered long distances by night, hiding in the wadis, or seasonal riverbeds, by day in order to escape enemy aerial reconnaissance. On October 31, British forces began the assault on the city, which represented the axis of the Ottoman left wing. The capture of the wells became an absolute necessity for the survival of horses and men, since reserves were nearly exhausted after days of marching. In the afternoon, after the infantry had captured the outer positions and the New Zealand division had taken the height of Tell es-Saba, the situation still remained uncertain.

At 4:30 p.m., General Chauvel, pressed by the imminent sunset, ordered the Australian 4th Light Horse Brigade to deliver a direct attack against Beersheba. Under the leadership of Brigadier William Grant, about eight hundred Australian horsemen charged at a gallop across the open plain. Since the riders were not armed with swords but served as mounted infantry, they held their long, sharpened bayonets as they raced under Ottoman artillery and machine-gun fire. The speed of the action surprised the defenders, who could not adjust their sights in time to halt the mass of horses. The Australians leapt the trenches and entered the urban center, capturing the wells before the Turks could blow them up.

The success at Beersheba opened a deep breach in the Ottoman defensive system, which began rapidly to disintegrate under the blows of XX Corps in the central sector. On November 6, the British divisions overran the enemy trenches at Tell esh-Sheria, cutting the link between the two Ottoman armies. At the same moment, XXI Corps launched a diversionary attack along the coast, capturing Sheikh Hasan and threatening to encircle the entire Gaza garrison. The Turks, led by Kress von Kressenstein and Refet Bey, understood that the position was now untenable and ordered the evacuation of the city during the night of November 6 to 7 in order to avoid annihilation. British patrols entered Gaza in the first hours of the following morning, finding it completely empty and reduced to a heap of rubble by weeks of naval and land bombardment.

The gate of Palestine had finally been broken down, allowing the British army to begin its pursuit northward and point itself directly toward Jerusalem.

ConclusionConclusão

The rupture of the Gaza-Beersheba line in the autumn of 1917 marked the turning point that transformed a grinding trench war into a rapid campaign of movement across southern Palestine. Under General Allenby’s leadership, British forces made use of their numerical superiority and the mobility of mounted troops to overrun Ottoman positions, despite the determination shown by the defenders in the rear guards. The fall of the redoubts of Tell esh-Sheria and Hureyra forced the Ottomans to retreat north, allowing the Egyptian Expeditionary Force to advance across the coastal plain and penetrate the hills of Judea. Although the Turks managed to avoid complete encirclement thanks to the resistance offered at Tell el-Khuweilfe, their withdrawal left the road to the region’s capital exposed. The occupation of Jerusalem, on December 9, 1917, represented the symbolic fulfillment of the mission entrusted to Allenby by Prime Minister Lloyd George, who had demanded an unequivocal success to offer the British nation as a Christmas present.

The loss of the holy city dealt an extremely harsh blow to the prestige of the Ottoman Empire, which during the conflict had already suffered the fall of Mecca and Baghdad. Allenby’s entry ceremony, held on December 11 through the Jaffa Gate, was planned with the utmost political caution in order to handle the different local sensibilities. The general entered on foot to demonstrate respect for the sacredness of the place and forbade the use of British flags so as not to irritate the Muslim population. Beyond its moral impact, the victory guaranteed Britain strategic control of the area, definitively securing the protection of the Suez Canal and the lines of communication with India. This physical occupation of the territory carried decisive weight at the diplomatic tables where the victorious powers began discussing the future partition of the Turkish domains.

While the secret Sykes-Picot agreements of 1916 had envisaged an international or divided administration of the zone, Allenby’s military success allowed London to consolidate its hegemony at the expense of French ambitions. The contemporaneous Balfour Declaration, although received favorably by Zionist movements, introduced a commitment to the creation of a Jewish home that soon proved difficult to reconcile with Arab nationalist aspirations. These political decisions laid the foundations for the birth of the British Mandate for Palestine, an administrative structure marked from the beginning by tensions among the population’s different components. The success of the 1917 campaign, which helped bring down an empire that had lasted four centuries, collided in the postwar period with the difficulty of managing the territorial claims of the peoples who had taken part in the struggle against the Ottoman Empire.

The city of Gaza emerged from the three battles of 1917 profoundly disfigured, reduced to a heap of rubble by the weeks of naval and land bombardment that preceded its evacuation. The British patrols that entered the urban center found a place devoid of living souls, where almost every building had been reduced to an empty shell or stripped by the retreating defenders of all useful material. Once a flourishing commercial center, the stronghold became a symbol of the destruction caused by modern industrialized war. Over the twentieth century, Gaza changed profoundly, shifting from its function as an imperial defensive axis to that of a gravitational center of new and persistent tensions. The British withdrawal in 1948 marked the end of a colonial era, leaving, however, as its legacy a series of territorial and religious disputes that continued to torment the region in the decades that followed. Allenby’s victory, though celebrated at the time as a liberation, produced long-term consequences that made stability in the Holy Land a difficult objective to consolidate.

BibliographyBibliografia

GRAINGER, John D. The Battle for Palestine 1917. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2006.

WOODWARD, David R. Hell in the Holy Land: World War I in the Middle East. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, n.d.

BRUCE, Anthony. The Last Crusade: The Palestine Campaign in the First World War. London: John Murray, 2002.

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