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Tunisia’s Intermediary Bodies Under Siege

Tunisia’s weekly protests expose a public sphere being remade by executive dominance, economic crisis, judicial pressure, and the systematic sidelining of the parties, unions, and civil society bodies that once mediated political conflict.

المعارضة تحت الترهيب... كيف تعيد السلطة صوغ الحياة السياسية في تونس؟

Raseef22 · By عيسى زيادية · 10 December 2025 · read the original in Arabic →

تعيش تونس في الآونة الأخيرة موجةً من الاحتجاجات الأسبوعية، التي تنطلق من شارع الحبيب بورقيبة خصوصاً، للمطالبة بإطلاق سراح السجناء السياسيين ووقف ما يصفه المحتجون بـ"القمع وتجريم المعارضة السياسية". وتأتي هذه التحرّكات في لحظة دقيقة تستند إلى ثلاثة مؤشرات مركزية: تراجع سيادة القانون، وتفاقم الأزمة الاقتصادية، وغياب شبه تام للأجسام الوسيطة عن الحياة السياسية.

Tunisia has recently been living through a wave of weekly protests, setting out in particular from Habib Bourguiba Avenue, to demand the release of political prisoners and an end to what protesters describe as “repression and the criminalization of political opposition.” These mobilizations come at a delicate moment, grounded in three central indicators: the erosion of the rule of law, the worsening economic crisis, and the near-total absence of intermediary bodies from political life.

Indicators of a Deteriorating Situation in 2025مؤشرات تدهور الوضع في 2025

وفق تقرير "مؤشر سيادة القانون 2025"، الصادر عن منظمة World Justice Project في تشرين الأول/ أكتوبر 2025، تراجعت تونس إلى المرتبة 85 عالمياً من أصل 142 دولة، وهو أدنى ترتيب لها منذ ثورة عام 2011. ويشير التقرير بوضوح إلى توسّع المحاكمات الاستثنائية، وضعف الرقابة القضائية، واعتماد السلطة التنفيذية على مراسيم واسعة لتقييد حرية التعبير وتقييد عمل المجتمع المدني.

According to the Rule of Law Index 2025 report, issued by the World Justice Project in October 2025, Tunisia fell to 85th place worldwide out of 142 countries, its lowest ranking since the 2011 revolution. The report points clearly to the expansion of exceptional trials, weak judicial oversight, and the executive authority’s reliance on broad decrees to restrict freedom of expression and constrain the work of civil society.

An unprecedented retreat in the political and democratic landscapes: Tunisia falls to 85th place in the Rule of Law Index and is classified as “not free” for 2025. How is Qais Saied’s authority re-engineering the public sphere through flawed trials and the use of Decree 54 to silence critical voices?

On the democratic front, Freedom House recorded, in its Freedom in the World 2025 report issued in March 2025, the continued classification of Tunisia as a “not free” country, with deterioration in indicators of judicial independence, press freedom, and political participation, reflecting the suffocation of the public sphere and the declining ability of citizens to exert influence through institutional mechanisms.

The situation is no better economically, as debate over the 2026 finance bill reveals a worsening financial crisis that limits the state’s capacity to respond to rising social demands concerning employment and wage increases, especially amid high unemployment rates reaching 24% among holders of higher degrees. By contrast, according to announced official figures, state revenues are estimated at 52.560 billion dinars, against expenditures exceeding 63.5 billion dinars, or about $22 billion, meaning a deficit of more than 11 billion dinars, or around $3.4 billion. These are indicators that restrict the state’s solutions for creating jobs and improving social conditions.

To cover this deficit, the Tunisian government revealed its intention to resort to external borrowing worth 6.8 billion dinars, or about $2.2 billion, in addition to domestic borrowing of 19.1 billion dinars, or about $6.3 billion. This deepens the dependence of public finances on the local market amid difficulties in accessing international financing and sharp criticism over the government’s continued borrowing from the Central Bank of Tunisia.

The draft financial budget for 2026 also showed the enormous pressure exerted on available resources by public debt servicing, the wage bill, and commitments to social negotiation, shrinking the margin for investment and widening the gap between citizens’ needs and the state’s actual capacities.

This fragile financial situation was directly reflected in parliamentary sessions, where the assembly witnessed altercations between MPs and the finance minister after the latter deemed demands for wage improvements and some proposed articles serving social demands to be “unrealistic” in the absence of the necessary resources. In return, MPs accused their colleagues of serving the interests of economic lobbies by obstructing proposed legal articles intended to protect consumers and ease tax burdens.

All this comes as the executive authority moves toward excluding the Tunisian General Labour Union from social negotiations, while putting forward a new vision under which the government would unilaterally determine annual wage-increase rates instead of opening the door to social negotiations, as has been the practice for decades between the Labour Union, the country’s largest union structure, and the government. This is happening at a time when MPs and trade unionists are demanding increases above 5% to confront the deterioration of purchasing power, a rate the government considers impossible under the “current financial situation.”

This general deterioration has been accompanied by the almost complete sidelining of intermediary bodies, including parties, professional organizations, and associations, which have been gradually neutralized since 2021. Political life has become confined between the presidency and the street, without mediators capable of framing the conflict or offering alternatives. Even the Tunisian General Labour Union, the last organized social force, has entered into direct tension with the authorities, reaching its peak when President Saied accused the European Union of “foreign interference” after a meeting between the union’s secretary-general, Noureddine Taboubi, and the EU ambassador to Tunisia.

A Systematic Tightening That Remakes the Public Sphereتضييق منهجي يعيد صوغ المجال العام

In this political vacuum, the parliament that emerged from the 2022/2023 elections and was formed through an individual-candidacy voting mechanism has become an arena for populist discourse, where the language of treason and accusations of “collaboration” prevail, in a scene that reflects the weakness of the legislative institution and its inability to play any real balancing or oversight role.

Between a suffocating economic crisis, institutional retreat, and the absence of mediation, the weekly protests appear to be the last remaining voice in the public sphere, in a country witnessing a profound reshaping of the maps of political power.

The year 2025 saw a striking escalation in the level of rights violations in Tunisia, as trials and heavy penalties became part of the daily political scene. With the expanded use of Decree 54, officially aimed at combating false news, the legal text turned into an instrument of silencing, used against journalists, bloggers, and civil society activists. Human Rights Watch documented in its annual report, issued in January 2025, that the Tunisian authorities “adopted a punitive approach against opponents based on swift trials, harsh sentences, and an attempt to criminalize human rights work.”

This trajectory was clearly reflected in the judgments issued in November 2025 in what is known as the “conspiracy against state security” case, in which around 34 defendants were tried and sentenced to terms ranging from 10 to 45 years, while charges were dropped against Hattab Salama after more than two years in prison without coherent evidence, and against Noureddine Boutar, the owner of Radio Mosaique, who had earlier been released on financial bail. Human rights organizations considered that the ruling exposed the fragility of the case and “the selective nature of the charges.”

Ben Omar tells Raseef22 that the tightening of restrictions on civil society in Tunisia is part of a broader global wave, since there is “a global context in which populism and the far right are growing, and this is finding its echo today in Tunisia. For civil society, this is a phase of resistance and of proving its existence.”

In the same context, the case of lawyer and media figure Sonia Dahmani confirmed the widening of the policy of deterrence. Her arrest under Decree 54 prompted a wave of local and international solidarity, while her release came moments after a plenary session of the European Parliament explicitly called for her immediate release, raising questions about the authorities’ susceptibility to external pressure.

Yet the deeper violations concern the deterioration of the civil society space, as explained by activist and spokesperson for the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights, Romdhane Ben Omar, who believes that organizations are now facing “an unprecedented phase of stigmatization and marginalization.”

He tells Raseef22: “Associations today live under many-sided pressure: smear campaigns on social networks, financial and tax prosecutions, and administrative decisions intended to exhaust them. The authorities are no longer content with political pressure; they have begun to target the very legitimacy of civil society’s existence.”

Ben Omar adds, explaining the pattern of restriction: “Whenever the authorities face a crisis, whether social, environmental, or political, they resort to attacking associations and holding them responsible for protests. We saw this during the environmental mobilizations in Gabes, where the discourse of treason was used to close down discussion of pollution.” He notes that the greatest danger threatens small local associations in particular, especially since “these associations work in narrow spaces and are the most vulnerable to targeting because they are closest to citizens. The authorities can isolate and pick them off easily because their resources are limited.”

Ben Omar stresses that the current phase has revealed divergences within civil society, since “civil society is not a single bloc. There are organizations that chose confrontation and the defense of public space, while a small part drifted along with the state’s narratives.” Ben Omar also sees the tightening around civil society as part of a broader global wave: “There is a global context in which populism and the far right are growing, and this is finding its echo today in Tunisia. For civil society, this is a phase of resistance and of proving its existence, and it requires the highest levels of coordination and networking to defend civic space.”

Ben Omar also recalls the fluctuating relationship between the authorities and civil society since July 25, 2021, explaining that “the president of the republic, Qais Saied, was hostile toward associations from the beginning, but when he needed them on July 26, 2021, he summoned professional and human rights organizations to send a message abroad that there was a participatory process. Once his interest had ended, he returned to his hostile discourse and repressed associations that contradicted his narrative.”

He offers the recent Gabes protests as an example: “The campaign that targeted environmental organizations after the Gabes mobilizations was not random. When the president found himself embarrassed before a discourse that contradicted his statements about the environment, he chose to divert the discussion by closing associations and accusing them of collaboration and corruption.”

Ben Omar emphasizes that this method has become systematic, since “whenever the authorities face social or political pressure, they resort to conspiracy theories and the criminalization of dissenters. Civil society is the first to pay the price.” Even so, he stresses that abolishing civic space or constricting it will not stop the movement: “Even if the authorities restore tutelage over civil society or restrict its legal space, we will continue the struggle as individuals and organizations, and by the means available, in defense of the values we have believed in since before the revolution.”

Ben Omar concludes his assessment by saying: “All scenarios are open. We may witness new campaigns of repression at any moment, but the legal and human rights confrontation will continue. Civil society was not created to surrender, but to stand in the front lines defending rights and freedoms.”

For its part, Amnesty International, in its November 2025 report, considers that “the current pattern of restriction represents a dramatic retreat in guarantees of freedom of association,” and that these developments reveal a coercive reshaping of the public sphere, as the authorities try to control every site capable of producing criticism, through the judiciary, administrative oversight, and organized campaigns in the digital sphere.

Re-engineering the Opposition Under Pressureإعادة هندسة المعارضة تحت الضغط

The weekly protest mobilizations began in conjunction with the exceptional sentences issued in the “conspiracy against state security” case; the most prominent were marches that set out from Habib Bourguiba Avenue to demand the release of detainees and an end to “the punitive course against the opposition.” These protests, in which lawyers, students, families of detainees, and political figures took part, reflected a striking shift in the public mood, as the circle of rejection widened compared with the situation in 2023 and 2024, when fear and repression were enough to weaken any attempt to gather.

In this context, political activist Hatem Nafti offers Raseef22 a precise reading of this transformation, stressing that what is happening today “is not a political alliance in the traditional sense,” but rather a convergence of awareness among different strands of the opposition that have realized they have become a shared target of an authoritarian approach based on “targeting all intermediary bodies,” foremost among them parties, unions, and civil organizations. Nafti considers that the sentencing of figures such as Ahmed Souab, Ahmed Nejib Chebbi, Chaima Issa, and Ayachi Hammami constituted a decisive moment that allowed segments of public opinion to see the punitive nature of the political process, after the measures reached figures who, until recently, had been considered “outside the circle of targeting.”

Nafti says that what unsettles the authorities today is the change in the positions of groups that had previously been reserved toward some opposition symbols. He cites the case of Chaima Issa, who faced reservations from feminist and political currents when she was arrested in 2023, before that position turned today into broad solidarity, “because the blows that come from an individual authority erase the traditional differences among opponents.”

He also points out that the judiciary, since 2021, has become “completely brought to its knees,” especially after the dismissal of judges in 2022 and the refusal to reinstate some of them despite a court ruling, which leaves the opposition “in the sights of a domesticated judiciary” issuing heavy sentences of a purely political character.

Despite these indicators, however, Nafti believes that the protests remain elite-driven and concentrated in the capital, and have not yet turned into a broad social wave. He considers their expansion to depend on the degree of economic and social deterioration in the coming weeks, as well as on the reaction of the Tunisian General Labour Union, which is also threatening escalation.

Families at the Forefront, and the Judiciary as an Instrument of Intimidationالعائلات في الواجهة… والقضاء أداة للترهيب

If the protests express a rising wave of political and social anger, the testimony of the families of detained men and women reveals another side no less important: the human and rights dimensions of exceptional rulings, and the severity of the measures taken against well-known figures. In this framework, Fidaa Hammami, daughter of detained lawyer and activist Ayachi Hammami, offers a close-up image of what families are living through today, stressing that the latest ruling with immediate enforcement “was not a normal judicial step, but a clear political message.”

Fidaa explains to Raseef22 that her father, who had been tried while at liberty since the case began, had never violated any procedure and was always present at every hearing, which makes his sudden arrest after the appellate ruling “a step that can only be understood in the context of intimidating opponents.”

She indicates that what the authorities today consider a “conspiracy case” is, according to the defense team, a conspiracy against the opposition, not against the state, because the acts attributed to her father and to the other detainees do not go beyond the bounds of legitimate political activity. She adds that “the case is entirely devoid of criminal acts,” and that all the documents it contains relate to “ordinary political activities: encounters, meetings, contacts between well-known figures and political actors,” practices she regards as “the essence of political work, not an entry point for terrorist descriptions.”

She goes further, saying that the so-called “terrorist agreement” of which her father is accused includes “civilian figures such as Khayam Turki, Ghazi Chaouachi, and Issam Chebbi,” emphasizing that they “met in a normal framework to discuss the general situation, not to plan any acts of violence or harm to the state.” She considers the inclusion of the terrorism charge to be nothing but “an attempt to confer an artificial criminal character on a case that is political par excellence.”

Despite this, Fidaa expresses her conviction that human rights solidarity is expanding, and that exposing the case’s abuses to public opinion is “part of a larger battle to defend the right to a fair trial.” Fidaa continues: “I still have hope that Tunisians will understand, with time, that the accused have nothing to do with terrorism, and that these ridiculous allegations will not stand. In the end, citizens will ask themselves: Will their lives improve by arresting these people? Will the economic situation change? Of course not. Everyone will realize that getting out of the crisis requires moving away from the discourse of hatred and political targeting.”

The siege of intermediary bodies in Tunisia: the authorities seek to neutralize parties, unions, and associations through campaigns of treason accusations and judicial prosecutions, as well as the “systematic sidelining” of civil society, leaving the street and the presidency face to face. What impact can the weekly protests have in the face of repression?

As for violations of the right to a fair trial, Fidaa stresses that they are “countless,” and that they began on the first day in 2023, when the case was opened. She explains that all the detainees, without exception, were denied the conditions of a fair trial, as documented by multiple human rights organizations and associations.

According to her, the violations include arbitrary arrests and the absence of a clear legal basis; reliance on reports built on anonymous witnesses; failure to enable the defense to review the full case file; holding trial sessions in the absence of the accused; and issuing exceptional, harsh judgments not based on serious evidence.

This human testimony places the escalating protests in a broader context: a society that sees the authorities using the judiciary as a political weapon, and that sees the aim as no longer merely punishing opponents, but redrawing the boundaries of what is permitted and forbidden in public work. With every heavy sentence or new arrest, civic space shrinks, and the conviction grows among citizens and human rights defenders that what is happening goes beyond a mere judicial dispute, becoming a “political engineering of a new reality,” in which the opposition is subjected to a systematic approach of subjugation.

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