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The declaration elevating Kazakhstan-Russia relations changes little in substance: it codifies an unequal status quo in which Kazakhstan signals loyalty while Russia affirms its neighbor’s sovereignty, a balance that may prove fragile over time.

Vlast · By Дмитрий Мазоренко · 15 April 2026 · read the original in Russian →

В середине ноября 2025 года, во время государственного визита Касым-Жомарта Токаева в Москву, Казахстан и Россия подписали декларацию о переходе отношений на уровень «всеобъемлющего стратегического партнерства и союзничества».

In mid-November 2025, during Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s state visit to Moscow, Kazakhstan and Russia signed a declaration upgrading their relations to the level of a “comprehensive strategic partnership and alliance.”

Эксперты, опрошенные «Властью», сходятся в том, что декларация не меняет сути отношений между двумя странами. В их основе лежит вовсе не равное партнёрство. Новый документ закрепляет сложившийся статус-кво, в котором Казахстан демонстрирует лояльность, а Россия подтверждает суверенитет соседа. Однако этот статус-кво вряд ли будет устойчивым в долгосрочной перспективе.

The experts interviewed by Vlast agree that the declaration does not alter the substance of relations between the two countries. Those relations are not founded on an equal partnership at all. The new document formalizes the existing status quo, in which Kazakhstan demonstrates loyalty and Russia confirms its neighbor’s sovereignty. Yet this status quo is unlikely to be stable in the long term.

A Declaration Without NoveltyДекларация без новизны

The declaration signed in November contains 42 clauses and concerns cooperation in trade, energy, transport, and security. Among the specific agreements are a reaffirmation of Rosatom’s obligations to build Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant, an economic cooperation program for 2026-2030, and an agreement on transit shipments.

Tokayev said the document would “open a new era in bilateral ties and confirm an unprecedented level of mutual trust.”

Experts, however, view the document more critically. Bhavna Dave, a senior lecturer in Central Asian politics at SOAS University of London, notes that there have been many such “comprehensive” agreements between Russia and Kazakhstan. Documents of this kind are prepared whenever a summit meeting takes place.

“I think it is Russia that insists on documents of this sort. Though it is entirely possible that this is Kazakhstan’s own initiative, as a prelude to some ‘difficult’ negotiations with Russia or as a way of securing favorable terms. If relations were truly solid and built on consensus, why would yet another broad declaration be needed?” she notes.

Temur Umarov, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin, also sees this declaration as part of a ritual display of the seriousness of each side’s intentions. Its text and logic are in keeping with previous joint statements. But symbolically, it is the first document of this scale since the start of the war in Ukraine.

Umarov considers the clause on a “Eurasian security architecture” the most interesting. The political scientist interprets it as Russia’s position on the war in Ukraine, since it speaks of “restoring the balance of security systems across Europe.” Yet the wording of the clause is highly vague and, in essence, does not commit Kazakhstan to anything concrete.

Political scientist Ilya Matveev, co-author of a book on Russian imperialism, regards the central point of the document as the enshrining of the construction of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant by Russia’s Rosatom.

“Kazakhstan is highly dependent on oil pipelines that run through Russian territory. But if, in that sphere, there are at least hypothetical alternatives for redirecting oil supplies, then after the nuclear power plant is built it will be difficult to distance itself from Russia. Even once the plant is completed, its maintenance will require Russian nuclear fuel and expertise,” he notes.

The Continuation of an Imperialist LogicПродолжение империалистической логики

Taking the declaration’s clause on the construction of the nuclear power plant as his starting point, Matveev characterizes Russia’s policy toward Kazakhstan as imperialist. Moreover, he says, it became imperialist as early as the late 1990s.

By imperialism, Matveev means a policy of coercion pursued by a country with greater resources against a country with fewer. The object of this policy is not a people or a territory, but the country as a sovereign unit of international law.

In the case of Russia and Kazakhstan, economic imperialism has historically predominated. This imperialism acquired a distinctly capitalist character in the 2000s.

“At that time, Russian business had real economic interests in post-Soviet countries: Soviet production chains, growing markets, expertise. Russia sought friendly or manageable relations with its neighbors in order to expand its capital there,” Matveev notes.

Coercion existed at this stage, the political scientist notes, but it remained within a political and economic logic, without an open break with the West. The turn of Russian imperialism toward geopolitical confrontation came with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, even though Russian business had no interest in spoiling relations with Europe and the United States.

In 2022, this turn became irreversible, and economic motives ceased to be the defining principle of Russian imperialism. More than that, Matveev believes its weakening began from the moment of the invasion of Ukraine.

“Russia lost diplomatic levers because of its partial international isolation. Negative attitudes toward Russia began to grow. Post-Soviet countries became convinced that it has only one real channel of influence: war,” the political scientist says.

In Kazakhstan, however, the capitalist line of Russian imperialism persists because of the country’s high economic dependence on Russia.

Roughly 90 percent of Kazakh oil is exported through Russian territory, primarily via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, while oil revenues account for 40-50 percent of the state budget. For that reason, artificial obstruction of the CPC’s operations, or actual attacks on it, have a negative effect on Kazakhstan’s economy.

Rapprochement Under DuressСближение поневоле

Since 2022, Kazakh-Russian economic relations have not weakened but deepened. Trade between the two countries rose from about $19 billion in 2021 to $27.4 billion in 2025. Russian goods continue to dominate Kazakhstan’s import structure: in 2025, their share was 29.7 percent.

In 2024, Russia for the first time became the largest foreign investor in Kazakhstan’s economy, directing a record $4 billion into the country, or 23.6 percent of all foreign capital that year. The accumulated volume of Russian investment exceeded $27 billion.

Umarov explains this dynamic across several dimensions. First, Kazakhstan became a key transit hub for parallel imports into Russia.

“Trade statistics show a distortion: demand for certain goods in Kazakhstan did not increase, but their export from third countries to Kazakhstan rose sharply. This is most likely a gray-import scheme,” he explains.

Second, the energy dimension has undergone structural changes. The gas pipeline from Central Asia to Russia has begun operating in reverse: Russia is preparing to take up the gasification of Kazakhstan’s northern regions, and an energy bridge between Russia and China is taking shape, including through Kazakh territory.

Until 2023, however, when this economic expansion began, Kazakhstan had actively signaled disagreement with Russia on issues of the war and territorial integrity. But then that rhetoric all but disappeared, Umarov observes. Today, Kazakh officials say virtually nothing about the inadmissibility of the war in Ukraine or about sanctions.

In Umarov’s view, this tendency was significantly reinforced by the degradation of international relations, in which the rules are increasingly set not by the UN Charter but by leading nuclear-armed powers. In addition, the administration of the current U.S. president, Donald Trump, does not encourage the public defense of countries that have come under pressure from stronger states.

“Kazakhstan and Central Asia now have a different set of incentives for developing relations with America. The war in Ukraine is no longer the argument that Central Asian countries can produce in order to be useful to the United States on that front. Tokayev has completely changed his rhetoric and is trying to repeat some of Trump’s statements so that Trump personally hears it and somehow remembers his loyalty,” the political scientist says.

Balancing Against IdeologyБалансирование против идеологии

At the same time, Umarov does not rule out that Kazakhstan remains susceptible to the ideology of Russian foreign policy. Matveev, for his part, says that ideology is precisely the driving force of Russian imperialism today.

Its core, according to the experts interviewed by Vlast, consists of Russian nationalism, conservatism, territorial expansion, and fear of revolutions and changes of political regime. It is reinforced by the threat of military invasion.

Matveev notes that as long as the threat of intervention remains hypothetical for many post-Soviet countries, their common position is to distance themselves from Russia as much as possible.

Yet the political scientist does not believe Kazakhstan’s president has specifically anti-Russian or pro-Russian convictions. Tokayev balances pragmatically, taking external circumstances into account, and tries to meet with both Putin and Trump. Economically, however, he sees Russia more as a destabilizing factor.

Russia, the political scientist adds, deliberately supports authoritarian regimes in neighboring states, understanding that their democratization would inevitably turn into an anti-Russian course.

In these circumstances, Umarov says, Kazakhstan’s leadership maintains a fragile balance: before Russia, it demonstrates respect for the Russian language and for the idea of a post-Soviet space; before its own society, it shows commitment to Kazakh identity. He regards the recent constitutional change, the renaming of parliament, and the shifting language policy as elements of this balancing act.

Kazakhstan, Dave says, is deeply worried by the situation in world politics. For that reason, she sees the signing of the declaration in November as a gesture of loyalty. At the same time, the expert does not believe Kazakhstan is trying to follow Russia along its ideological course.

“Putin still has no consistent ideology. There is anti-Western Eurasianism, but it quickly adapts to the extent to which the West, in the person of Trump, shows interest in Russia. In other words, this is opportunism and an effort to ensure the survival of the current regime headed by Putin,” she concludes.

In these circumstances, Umarov emphasizes, Tokayev is developing a “middle power” strategy that fits within the Putin-Trump paradigm. It recognizes the domination of large states over small ones, but allows for the existence of “middle powers.” They cannot behave like great powers, yet they possess “underestimated potential.”

It is with the help of this concept that Kazakhstan will try to keep maneuvering in its relations with Russia, Umarov sums up.

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