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War Keynesianism and Inequality in Russia

The war has not overcome Russia’s long-standing inequality; behind the facade of military spending and rising nominal incomes, the regime’s regressive system of redistribution continues to protect assets, privilege, and unearned income.

Неравенство в воюющей России
Riddle Russia · By Джем Морроу · 14 January 2026 · read the original in Russian →

Большинство экономических исследований, посвященных России в условиях войны, сосредоточены на перераспределении производственных мощностей в пользу предприятий ВПК и на выплатах социально маргинализированным мужчинам, подписывающим контракты с Минобороны. Это понятно: способность государства перенаправлять ресурсы (прежде всего рабочую силу) в военный сектор является важным тестом устойчивости режима, который сделал ставку на возможность поддерживать и даже расширять конфликт. Как показывают исследования крупных войн, для этого недостаточно одной лишь патриотической мобилизации или даже репрессий. Рабочим и военным, как и их семьям, нужна ощутимая материальная мотивация. Помимо призывов «работать» — на фронте или на заводе — им необходимы представления о более справедливом послевоенном устройстве, а также уверенность в том, что у их детей будут возможности для социальной мобильности и социального воспроизводства.

Most economic studies of Russia under wartime conditions have focused on the reallocation of productive capacity toward the enterprises of the military-industrial complex, and on payments to socially marginalized men who sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense. This is understandable: the state’s capacity to redirect resources, above all labor, into the military sector is an important test of the durability of a regime that has staked itself on the ability to sustain, and even expand, the conflict. As studies of major wars show, patriotic mobilization alone, or even repression, is not enough. Workers and soldiers, like their families, need tangible material incentives. Beyond calls to “work,” whether at the front or in the factory, they need visions of a more just postwar order, as well as confidence that their children will have opportunities for social mobility and social reproduction.

Однако в современной России экономическое неравенство, фиксируемое статистикой, а также видимые и невидимые разрывы между экономически защищенными и уязвимыми группами остаются столь же резкими, как и прежде. Что это говорит об экономике военного времени? Казалось бы, государство должно было частично сгладить эти разрывы за счет так называемого «военного кейнсианства». Масштабные расходы на военные нужды, выплаты военнослужащим и социальные трансферты дают «мультипликативный эффект», который в первую очередь ощущают люди с низкими доходами.

Yet in contemporary Russia, the economic inequality captured by statistics, as well as the visible and invisible divides between economically secure and vulnerable groups, remain as sharp as before. What does this tell us about the wartime economy? One might have thought that the state would have partly smoothed these divides through so-called “war Keynesianism.” Large-scale military spending, payments to servicemen, and social transfers create a “multiplier effect” felt first of all by people on low incomes.

In reality, behind the facade of “war Keynesianism,” inequality in Russia is growing, and in the future it will turn into political problems. To a large extent, these problems are the result of the regime’s economic policy over the past twenty-five years, including decisions such as raising the retirement age and narrowing access to social benefits. To ignore this angle is a serious analytical omission. The visible social injustice and the deliberate division of society into winners and losers are already making themselves felt, and they will play an important role both immediately after the war ends and over the longer term.

Let us return to the question of how military spending affects the economy and the so-called “majority” of Russian workers: those who live from paycheck to paycheck, have almost no savings apart from an apartment inherited from Soviet times, and, crucially, simultaneously regard themselves as the country’s backbone and express dissatisfaction with the general economic course chosen after 1991. After 2022, an excessive amount of money appeared in the economy. This meant that, at least in theory, workers should have come out ahead. Real incomes rose, albeit from a very low base, and reached a peak in 2024.

“War Keynesianism” is above all a redistribution of income and a transformation of society, in this case toward “peripheral Russia,” where direct or indirect participation in the war can serve as a kind of “social elevator.” Yet even supporters of this logic in its starkest formulation acknowledge that it has generated serious imbalances, including in these peripheral regions themselves. They also acknowledge that the groups benefiting from military spending and linked to the defense industry are relatively small and geographically limited. Thus, in the vast Ural region, only certain areas benefit from military production, while farther south, in the coal and chemical industrial zones, a recession has already begun.

Other researchers reach the opposite conclusion: households are not becoming better off but, on the contrary, worse off, because military spending has accelerated inflation. As is well known, before the war began, tight fiscal policy generally suppressed demand in the Russian economy, while Moscow’s real-estate market and consumer sector seemed to exist in a separate world. The war narrowed the differences somewhat. Yet, as Nick Trickett noted more than two years ago, fiscal stimulus rather quickly ran into the real constraints of the Russian economy: demographic and geographic constraints, including logistical problems and weak population mobility, as well as constraints connected to a long history of underinvestment and poor automation. Put simply, the economy was not prepared to digest such a volume of spending.

GDP per capita, or GDP in any other form, is poorly suited to assessing the real economic consequences of the changes under way. Measures of inequality allow us to look at the situation from another angle. Economic inequality in Russia remains high. Even compared with the peak of inequality in 1999, when the Gini coefficient stood at about 50, the official figure for 2023, around 40, still looks high by European standards. As Ilya Matveev notes, the extremely contradictory estimates of Russia’s Gini coefficient make such comparisons partly meaningless, but they most likely confirm that the real level of inequality is higher than the official data suggest and, overall, closer to the indicators of BRICS countries than to those of developed economies. For this reason, researchers regard neither the Gini coefficient nor median income figures as sufficiently reliable indicators of inequality. Moreover, the relatively sharp decline in the Gini coefficient compared with a selectively chosen starting point, 1999, is often used for propaganda purposes, as proof of the successes of social policy, a claim that plainly diverges from reality.

So what is happening to wages? We often hear about a sharp rise in real wages in certain industrial sectors after 2022. Yet the picture looks far less favorable if one takes a longer view. Growth in real wages remains sluggish. According to data from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey of the Higher School of Economics, RLMS-HSE, which, however, is often criticized for sampling distortions, real incomes rose by almost 5 percent in 2023. But this growth was preceded by a long period of stagnation and a sharp fall in 2022. We have already described this effect, and Natalia Zubarevich calls it the “law of small numbers”: growth can look quite impressive when it begins from a very low level.

There are other signs that the situation is far more complicated than it appears. Since 2020, the number of working pensioners has risen sharply: despite indexation, pensions are still insufficient even for physical survival. In 2025, the average pension in Russia is about $290. Formally, the share of state transfers in household income has risen slightly. Yet if we look back from the present at the past two years, it becomes clear that the rise in real incomes was short-lived and is already being eroded by persistently high inflation in basic consumer goods. It is also important to register a longer-term trend: in constant 2023 rubles, median income in the private sector was 20,610 rubles in 2008 and 21,762 rubles in 2023, an increase of less than 5 percent over fifteen years. Converting these sums into dollars makes no sense because of the high volatility of the exchange rate over this period. The income situation in the public sector looks still less favorable. State cash transfers are only 2 percent above their 2014 level, reflecting a long period in which family and social payments were effectively not indexed after the annexation of Crimea. As Thomas Remington notes, Russia is not in fact trying to combat inequality: most measures are aimed only at preventing absolute destitution, for instance through old-age pensions. It is telling that even within the United Russia party, proposals can be heard to abolish this benefit altogether.

Of course, inequality and poverty cannot be analyzed separately from the tax burden borne by workers and low-income groups. By any measure, this burden in Russia is high, above all because VAT has been raised from 18 percent to 22 percent over several years, beginning in 2019. Today VAT accounts for almost half of all federal budget tax revenues. For poor households, this is effectively a double tax, since it restricts consumption. The flat income-tax scale, often praised by neoliberal economists, is regressive in practice. Unlike in many European countries, even the lowest-paid workers in Russia pay income tax: there is no tax-free threshold. Only in 2024 did elements of progressivity appear for high incomes, but the maximum rate of 25 percent applies only to incomes of around $630,000 a year. Incomes up to $250,000 are taxed at 18 percent. Against this background, the absence of a wealth tax and the comparatively low taxation of income from capital and property are striking. Inheritance tax was abolished back in 2006. The dividend tax, currently 15 percent, makes it relatively easy to avoid even a moderate income tax. Overall, the system of compulsory taxes and levies is arranged so as to favor those who already possess assets, whether financial or property-based.

Inequality in Russia is most starkly manifested precisely in the distribution of wealth, that is, of assets. In terms of wealth concentration, Russia surpasses even the United States: the richest 1 percent of citizens control around 70 percent of all assets, and the top 5 percent around 80 percent. By Vladimir Putin’s second presidential term, Russia had already become a country where 10 percent of the population received half of all income. Moreover, as early as Putin’s first term, Russia became a resource-rich country with a predominantly poor population lacking significant assets apart from inherited Soviet apartments and, at best, domestically produced cars. The structure of cash savings is equally revealing. It is often claimed that Russians are “cash-rich” and use high interest rates to build savings. Yet around 90 percent of all bank deposits are concentrated among 1 percent of the population, while 96 percent of depositors have less than $12,000 in their accounts.

Using this perspective gives a different picture from an approach based on rapid surveys about “support for the war.” Political polls often record reactions to an imposed agenda and say nothing about respondents’ real everyday concerns. This is especially clear in long-term studies of values, which reflect society’s priorities far more accurately than one-off measurements of current opinion. The Russian Academy of Sciences regularly publishes data showing a high and growing demand in society for “social justice,” around 60 percent before the war. By comparison, only one third of respondents supported the idea of a future based on turning Russia into a “great power.” Support for “national traditions” remained the preference of a minority, about 27 percent, and declined over time.

In other work, the same researchers at the Russian Academy of Sciences record a deeper shift in attitudes: after 2018, a majority of respondents began moving away from an orientation toward “stability” and supporting the need for substantial political and economic change. Alongside individual hardships, poverty and destitution remain among the chief fears of most Russians. Outwardly, the war appears to be a factor in the “consolidation” of society, yet a significant majority still names “inequality,” “class stratification,” and the confrontation between “the people and the authorities” as the three main sources of tension in the country. When asked on what principles Russia’s “rebirth” should be built, respondents most often named “justice” at 32 percent, “peace” at 29 percent, and “order” at 21 percent. Among the least popular answers were “autocracy,” “Orthodoxy,” “the Russian Empire,” and “great-power status.”

By any measure, Russian society remains an anomaly among wealthy and educated countries. The contrast between those who possess resources and those deprived of them is extraordinarily sharp and serves as a source of social discontent. It also inhibits economic growth and the diversification of an economy still dependent on raw-material exports. More active income redistribution would have a far higher multiplier effect in the economy, stimulate the development of small and medium-sized businesses, and increase employment. In the present situation, beyond conspicuous consumption of goods and services in Moscow, affluent groups mostly either accumulate funds or move them abroad, and this money scarcely returns to economic circulation or contributes to growth.

Of course, the complete elimination of inequality is impossible. Yet even if the war ends and the current regime remains in power, the authorities have all the tools necessary to reduce excessive social stratification, above all through the introduction of progressive taxation. The point, however, lies elsewhere. For more than twenty-five years, the priority of the authorities in Russia has been not so much the imposition of a national-conservative ideology as the protection of privileges and unearned income. And this is precisely what both the current and future elites are unlikely to want to change, as is a significant part even of the critically minded middle class, since all of them, to one degree or another, are beneficiaries of the system of regressive redistribution formed back in the 1990s.

Y done · S save · G great · B bad · N not for me