阶层变迁，被乌克兰危机重塑的俄罗斯社会
As the Ukraine crisis drags on, Russia’s wartime economy, altered patterns of mobilization, and reshaped social hierarchy have stabilized public sentiment while pushing society toward a more conservative, security-centered order.
乌克兰危机已延宕三年多，深刻改变了俄罗斯社会的方方面面。近期俄罗斯一项民调显示，该国民众对乌克兰危机的态度已经发生转变，大部分俄罗斯人逐渐适应了战时状态下的生活。与此同时，俄实施的“战时经济”政策保证了经济增长，较为有效地抵御了西方国家对俄施加全方位制裁造成的负面影响。高薪征召志愿兵的方式缓解了民众对于全民动员的焦虑，并形成了使社会底层、边缘群体获得收入增加、财富增长的“机会经济”。来自军事和安全部门的人员因财富水平和社会声望的提升成为新的中产阶级。
The Ukraine crisis has now dragged on for more than three years, profoundly altering every aspect of Russian society. A recent Russian opinion poll shows that public attitudes toward the crisis have shifted: most Russians have gradually adapted to life under wartime conditions. At the same time, Russia’s policy of a “wartime economy” has ensured economic growth and proved relatively effective in withstanding the negative effects of the sweeping sanctions imposed by Western countries. The recruitment of volunteer soldiers at high salaries has eased public anxiety over general mobilization, while giving rise to an “economy of opportunity” in which the lower and marginal strata of society can increase their income and accumulate wealth. Personnel from the military and security sectors, whose wealth and social prestige have risen, are becoming a new middle class.
乌克兰危机的延宕、“战时经济”政策的施行以及社会结构的改变也推动了当前俄罗斯保守主义思潮兴起，即与西方国家进行意识形态对抗、推崇俄罗斯传统精神道德价值观。
The protraction of the Ukraine crisis, the implementation of “wartime economy” policies, and changes in the social structure have also propelled the rise of conservatism in Russia today: ideological confrontation with Western countries, and the exaltation of Russia’s traditional spiritual, moral values.
Social feeling has moved from “fluctuation” to “stability.”
社会情绪已从“波动”到“稳定”
At the beginning of this year, the Russian polling organization the Russian Public Opinion Research Center released a study systematically summarizing shifts in Russian social sentiment over more than three years of the Ukraine crisis. The report noted that public support for the president had increased, rising from 64 percent in January 2022 to 76 percent in December 2024. Russian society has not been divided by the Ukraine crisis: more than half of respondents, 58 percent, believe that the “special military operation” has united Russian society. The overwhelming majority of respondents, 92 percent, consider themselves patriots, and 81 percent say they “feel proud of the country.” The share of respondents who wish to leave Russia has fallen to 5 percent, the lowest figure recorded in this survey by the organization in thirty years. Yet some dissenting voices remain.
今年初，俄罗斯民意调查机构全俄社会舆论调查中心发布了一份研究报告，系统总结了乌克兰危机延宕三年多以来俄社会情绪的变化。该报告指出，俄民众对总统的支持率增加，从2022年1月的64%升至2024年12月的76％。俄社会并没有因乌克兰危机而分裂，一半以上的受访者（58％）认为“特别军事行动”团结了俄社会。绝大多数受访者（92％）认为自己是爱国者，81％的受访者表示“对国家感到骄傲”，想离开俄罗斯的受访者占比下降到5％——这是该机构此项调查数据30年来的最小值。但是也存在一些不同声音。
On this basis, Fyodorov, the sociologist who drafted the report, argues that Western countries have failed on the military, economic, informational, and psychological “battlefields” alike. The picture presented by the report stands in sharp contrast to the antiwar wave and the wave of emigration that appeared at the start of the “special military operation” and during the implementation of the “partial mobilization order.” To a great extent, this is related to the Russian authorities’ rapid adjustment of social-governance strategies and their changes to methods of recruitment and mobilization in response to shifts in the social situation, measures that have effectively managed public opinion and social emotions.
基于此，上述报告的执笔人、社会学家费多罗夫认为，无论在军事、经济、信息还是心理的“战场”上，西方国家都未取得成功。该报告展现的态势，与“特别军事行动”开始阶段和“部分动员令”实施过程中出现的反战浪潮和移民潮形成鲜明对比。在很大程度上，这与俄官方为应对社会形势变化迅速调整社会治理策略、改变征兵动员方式等有关，有效管控了社会舆论和社会情绪。
In fact, at the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, Russian society became divided over differing understandings of, and positions toward, the “special military operation.” In December 2022, Yevgeny Minchenko, chairman of the Russian consulting firm Minchenko Consulting, proposed the concept of the “four Russias” in an interview with TV channel 360: “Russia at war,” “Russia that has left,” “urban Russia,” and “deep Russia.” “Russia at war” refers to the army drawn into the war and everyone living along the border, who have truly felt the harshness of reality. “Russia that has left” includes those who fled Russia after the “special military operation” began and after the “partial mobilization order” was issued in September 2022; ideologically and politically, they do not accept the “special military operation.” “Urban Russia” represents some people in the big cities, who enjoy a relatively high standard of living, possess professional and technical skills, abundant social resources, and high social status, and do not want to accept present realities. “Deep Russia” refers to Russians living in the countryside, who are more concerned with questions of survival, chiefly obtain information from television, and are highly loyal to the president and the state. To date, except for “Russia that has left,” the social emotions of the other three “Russias” have gradually converged. Yet it cannot be denied that voices opposing the “special military operation” still exist inside Russia. In July 2025, polling by the Russian polling organization the Levada Center showed that 16 percent of respondents still did not support the “special military operation.” This group consists mainly of young people who ordinarily obtain their information from the internet.
事实上，乌克兰危机爆发之初，俄社会因对“特别军事行动”的不同认知和立场而出现分化。2022年12月，俄罗斯明琴科咨询公司主席叶甫根尼·明琴科在接受360电视台采访时，曾提出“四个俄罗斯”的概念，即“战争的俄罗斯”“离开的俄罗斯”“都市的俄罗斯”“深层的俄罗斯”。“战争的俄罗斯”是指卷入战争的军队以及生活在边境的每个人，他们确实感受到了严酷的现实；“离开的俄罗斯”包括那些在“特别军事行动”发生后、“部分动员令”出台（2022年9月）之后逃离俄罗斯的人，其在意识形态和政治观念上不接受“特别军事行动”；“都市的俄罗斯”则代表大城市中的一些人，他们的生活水平较高，具有专业技术技能、丰富社会资源和较高社会地位，不想接受现在的现实；“深层的俄罗斯”是指生活在乡村的俄罗斯人，他们更关心的是生存问题，主要通过电视获取信息，对总统和国家十分忠诚。至今，除“离开的俄罗斯”之外的其他的三个“俄罗斯”的社会情绪逐渐趋同。但不可否认的是，俄国内仍有反对“特别军事行动“的声音。2025年7月，俄民调机构列瓦达中心的民调结果显示，仍有16%的受访者并不支持“特别军事行动”。这一群体主要为平时从互联网获得信息的青年人。
It is worth noting that the number of Russians who support resolving the Ukraine crisis through negotiations is now increasing. Polling released by the Levada Center in May 2024 showed that half of respondents supported negotiations. The center’s latest poll, from May 2025, showed that 64 percent of respondents supported negotiations. Psychological fatigue caused by the war, together with doubts about a new military mobilization, are the main reasons Russian citizens support a negotiated resolution to the crisis. But the overwhelming majority of respondents, 73 percent, support the negotiating conditions put forward by the Russian authorities: that “the causes of the conflict must first be eliminated, and only then can negotiations proceed.” It is precisely out of expectations for a peaceful resolution of the Ukraine crisis that Russian citizens have placed great hopes in U.S. President Donald Trump, who has stated his intention to resolve the crisis; positive evaluations of the United States have risen sharply, from 15 percent in September 2024 to 37 percent in May of this year. This is the first time in more than twenty years that Russian public approval of the United States has surpassed that of European countries.
值得注意的是，当前支持谈判解决乌克兰危机的俄罗斯人正在增加。列瓦达中心2024年5月出炉的民调结果显示，有一半的受访者支持谈判。该中心2025年5月的最新民调结果显示，有64%的受访者支持谈判。战事造成的心理疲劳、对新的军事动员的疑虑是俄民众支持谈判解决危机的主要原因。但绝大多数（73%）的受访者支持俄官方提出的谈判条件，即“先消除冲突的原因，再进行谈判”。正是源自对和平解决乌克兰危机的期盼，俄民众对表态解决危机的美国总统特朗普充满期待，对美国的正面评价大幅度提升，从2024年9月的15%提升至今年5月的37%，这是20多年来俄民众对美国的正面评价指数首次超过欧洲国家。
The remaking of everyday life.民众生活重塑
At the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, many economists predicted that the Russian economy would suffer a comprehensive recession, with gross domestic product falling by 8 to 15 percent, household incomes declining severely, and unemployment possibly surging to 10 percent. In fact, the Russian economy did not collapse under the shock of the crisis and the sweeping sanctions imposed by Western countries; instead, it displayed a degree of resilience. Russia’s GDP fell by 1.4 percent in 2022, while GDP growth exceeded 4 percent in both 2023 and 2024. According to polling by the Levada Center, in the first five months of this year the share of low-income Russians fell to 15 percent, while the share of those whose livelihoods are secure rose to 41 percent.
乌克兰危机爆发之初，许多经济学家都预测，俄罗斯经济将遭遇全面衰退，国内生产总值（GDP）将下降8%到15%，居民家庭收入也将严重下降，失业率可能激增至10%。事实上，俄经济并没有在危机的冲击和西方国家施加的全方位制裁下崩溃，而是展现出一定韧性。2022年俄罗斯GDP下降了1.4%，2023年和2024年GDP增速均超过4%。根据列瓦达中心的民调结果，今年前五个月，俄低收入者的比例已降至15%，生活有保障群体的比例增加至41%。
Russia’s economic growth is due chiefly to its implementation of a “wartime economy” policy marked by the characteristics of “military Keynesianism.” This policy is manifested above all in the state’s large-scale allocation of fiscal revenues to military-related industries, and in substantial fiscal support for the hundreds of thousands of personnel at the front; in the development of a “military-industrial complex” to meet battlefield needs, with industry and manufacturing continuing to exert force, thereby driving growth in GDP and household incomes. In his government work report in March, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin disclosed that in 2024 Russians’ real incomes rose by 8.5 percent year on year, while the unemployment rate was 2.9 percent. According to a March report on the website of Sputnik News, among Russian jobs, software developers, drilling workers, construction-site supervisors, and long-haul truck drivers ranked near the top in monthly wages, at 235,000 rubles, 193,000 rubles, 180,000 rubles, and 175,000 rubles respectively, with 1 ruble equal to about 0.09 yuan. The website commented: “Amid an increasingly acute labor shortage, wage competition among employers continues.”
俄罗斯经济实现增长，主要得益于其实施的具有“军事凯恩斯主义”特征的“战时经济”政策。这一政策主要表现为：国家将财政收入大规模分配给与军事相关的行业，为前线的数十万人员提供大量的财政支持；发展“军工综合体”满足战场需求，工业、制造业持续发力，从而带动了GDP和居民收入增长。俄总理米舒斯京3月在政府工作报告中披露，2024年俄居民实际收入同比增长8.5%,失业率为2.9%。根据俄罗斯卫星通讯社网站3月的报道，俄各个工作岗位中，程序开发者、钻探工、建筑工地负责人和长途卡车司机的月工资位居前列，分别为23.5万卢布（1卢布约合0.09元人民币）、19.3万卢布、18万卢布和17.5万卢布。该网站在评论中说：“在劳动力市场人员日益短缺的情况下，雇主之间的工资竞争仍在继续。”
Since 2023, Russia has replaced formal mobilization with the recruitment of contract volunteers through high pay. Budgets at all levels have provided enlisted personnel with salaries several times the average annual wage, with annual income for enlisted personnel reaching roughly 5 million rubles; according to data from the Eurasian Economic Commission, Russia’s average monthly nominal wage from January to September 2024 was 83,700 rubles. They also receive generous disability subsidies, while various localities have introduced preferential policies for enlisted personnel, including loan reductions and increased social benefits. Russian officials say that sources of contract volunteers are currently sufficient and that full mobilization will not be implemented. This has effectively eased the social anxiety brought about by general conscription and mobilization. At the same time, the “economy of opportunity” has to some extent balanced the enormous gaps in wealth, consumption levels, and social prestige among Russian social classes, and has narrowed the economic gap between the central regions and the frontier regions.
自2023年起，俄以提供高额薪资招募合同志愿兵的方式替代正式动员，各级财政预算为应征入伍的人员提供了数倍于平均年工资的薪资（应征入伍人员年收入约达500万卢布，据欧亚经济委员数据，2024年1～9月俄罗斯月均名义工资为8.37万卢布），以及丰厚的伤残补贴，各地还针对应征入伍人员推出减免贷款、增加社会福利等优惠政策。俄官方称，目前合同志愿兵兵源充足，不会实施全面动员。这有效缓解了因全面征兵动员带来的社会焦虑。与此同时，“机会经济”一定程度上平衡了俄社会阶层在财富、消费水平和社会声望方面的巨大差距，也弥合了中心地区和边疆地区的经济差距。
Nevertheless, Russian academic circles have long been debating the sustainability of growth under a “wartime economy.” Since entering 2025, Russia’s economic growth has been weak; coupled with high inflation, an expanded defense budget crowding out social resources, and the diminishing attractiveness of high-paid recruitment, a series of new problems has kept emerging. The results of a recent opinion poll show that, because inflation in Russia is currently severe, both consumers and producers have fallen into pessimism.
不过，俄罗斯学界一直在讨论“战时经济”增长的可持续性。进入2025年以来，俄经济增长乏力，加之通货膨胀高企，国防预算扩大挤占社会资源，高薪征兵吸引力也日趋减弱，一系列新的问题不断出现。一项最新民意调查结果显示，由于当前俄通货膨胀严重，消费者和生产者都陷入了悲观情绪。
The formation of a new middle class.新的中产阶级形成
Before the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, Russian society had a “pyramid” structure. At the top was an elite class, a minority within Russian society with close ties to Western countries. The middle layer consisted of a middle class that had received higher education, possessed professional competence, pursued liberal ideas, and identified with Western-style democratic values. At the bottom were the numerous low-income groups.
在乌克兰危机爆发前，俄罗斯社会呈现“金字塔”结构，最上层的是占俄社会少数、与西方国家有着紧密往来的精英阶层群体，中间层是接受高等教育、具有专业素养，追求自由思想、认同西式民主价值观的中产阶级，底层是为数众多的低收入群体。
After the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, Russia and Western countries fell into comprehensive confrontation. As for the business elite, because of Western sanctions, they either chose to flee Russia or cut off business dealings with Western countries, turning instead to embrace Asian markets and resources and actively strengthening economic and trade relations with countries of the Global South. In fact, some members of the elite have also reaped handsome profits under the wartime economic system. As for the middle class, some left Russia because of their close ties with Western countries, while others chose to remain in the country. As for low-income groups, after the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the Russian government paid them greater attention, providing more employment opportunities and raising wages and pensions. The “economy of opportunity” created by the recruitment of contract volunteers has also caused the incomes of some people at the bottom of society to soar.
乌克兰危机爆发之后，俄罗斯和西方国家陷入全面对抗。就商业精英来说，因西方制裁，他们或选择逃离俄罗斯，或与西方国家切断了生意往来，转而拥抱亚洲市场和资源，积极加强与全球南方国家的经贸往来。事实上，一些精英阶层在战时的经济体制下也获得了丰厚利润。就中产阶级来说，一部分人因与西方国家密切的关系离开了俄罗斯，另一部分人则选择留在国内。就低收入群体而言，乌克兰危机爆发以后，俄政府给予其更多的关注，如提供更多的就业机会及提高工资和退休金。征召合同志愿兵带来的“机会经济”也使得部分社会底层群体收入激增。
Overall, participants in the “special military operation” have risen in both income level and social prestige, and many have climbed from the bottom of society into a new middle class. Russian officials have promised to make proper arrangements for soldiers returning from the battlefield, and have established a talent-training program for them called “Time of Heroes.” “Time of Heroes” has become a political springboard for many servicemen who have taken part in the fighting; through this program, they enter governments at various levels or take posts in organizations at various levels of United Russia, the party of power. In addition, these servicemen can receive priority admission to Russia’s top universities, and within the military system they also enjoy priority opportunities for promotion. It is foreseeable that in the future, participants in the “special military operation” will continually enter the power system and important social sectors. In this way, within the new social structure, the new middle class will generally have backgrounds in the security and military sectors. They are loyal patriots, firm supporters of the regime, and advocates of traditional spiritual and moral values; this, too, will make Russian social sentiment still more conservative.
总体而言，“特别军事行动”的参与者在收入水平和社会声望上都有所提高，很多人从社会底层跃升为新的中产阶级。俄官方承诺将妥善安置战场上归来的军人，并为其设立了名为“英雄时代”的人才培养计划。“英雄时代”成为很多参战军人的政治跳板，他们通过该项目进入各级政府或俄政权党“统一俄罗斯”党的各级机构任职。此外，这些参战军人还能优先进入俄顶尖高校就读，在军队系统内也享有优先晋升的机会。可以预见，在未来，“特别军事行动”的参与者会不断地进入政权体系、重要的社会部门。这样一来，在新的社会结构中，新的中产阶级普遍具有安全和军事部门背景，他们是忠诚的爱国主义者、政权的坚定拥护者，推崇传统精神道德价值观，这也会使得俄罗斯社会情绪更趋保守。
Of course, changes in the social structure also bring hidden worries. An excessively high defense budget has already crowded out portions of the budgets for people’s livelihoods and social security. The social security system is tilting more resources toward participants in the “special military operation” and their families, reducing support for other vulnerable groups, and social tensions have already appeared in some regions with insufficient budgets. In addition, if participants in the “special military operation,” especially the wounded and disabled, do not receive strong social protections, new conflicts may be produced; those returning from the front also face the complex problem of resocialization.
当然，社会结构变化也带来隐忧。过高的国防预算已经挤占了民生事业和社会保障预算的份额，社会保障体系将更多的资源向“特别军事行动”参与者及其家庭倾斜，减少了对其他弱势群体的支持，部分预算不足的地区已出现社会矛盾。另外，如果“特别军事行动”的参与者（特别是伤残者）得不到有力的社会保障，可能催生新的矛盾，而且从前线回来的人也面临着重新社会化的复杂问题。