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“Waiters” Are Everywhere, Trench EW and Mortars Are Dying Out: How the War Has Changed in a Year

In a year, the front has moved deeper into a drone-dominated technological war in which ambush UAVs, expanding kill zones, underground positions, robotic logistics, and long-range strikes have displaced many familiar tools of trench warfare.

«Ждуни» всюди, окопний РЕБ і міномети відмирають: як змінилася війна за рік
Fragmenty · 19 June 2026 · read the original in Ukrainian →

FragmentsФрагменти

“Waiters” are everywhere, trench EW and mortars are dying out: how the war has changed in a year

A year ago, Captain Ihor Shutyi, commander of an electronic-warfare company in the 56th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade, described a trend: electronic-warfare systems at the front were rapidly losing ground, meaning the Ukrainian army needed immediate and operational adaptation to new realities (you can read it here). Exactly a year has passed, and the officer decided to make a detailed review of which of his forecasts came true and which did not, while also outlining the new trends and challenges of technological warfare.

Fiber optics, “waiters,” and the disappearance of trench EWОптоволокно, «ждуни» та зникнення окопного РЕБ

“Fiber optics are being used more and more, flying farther and farther, but fortunately, even at ‘medium’ distances (10 km and more), they are not the main strike quadcopter,” Ihor Shutyi notes.

According to him, the main reason is that the Russian Federation still lacks sufficient production capacity to manufacture the necessary number of fiber-optic kits, given the front’s enormous daily demand.

At the same time, the enemy already has mass production of radio-controlled FPVs: primitive and technically obsolete, perhaps, but fully functional and fit for constantly “terrorizing” the forward edge and the near rear, distracting EW units and complicating logistics.

An important factor at the front has been the shutdown of Starlink for the Russians. As the officer explains, this also neutralized the threat posed by strike Molniyas and other enemy UAVs controlled through Starlink.

A serious challenge has been the growing number of “waiters”: strike UAVs that operate from ambush, lying in wait for enemy equipment or soldiers. “They are everywhere: along field roads, at their intersections, on the roofs of buildings,” the captain says. Such drones can remain in standby mode for a full day, since their battery drains very slowly when the motors are not running.

At the same time, strike ranges, the so-called “kill zone,” are constantly increasing. Burned-out vehicles in Kramatorsk, 15-20 km from the line of combat contact, are already an entirely routine sight.

All of this is making logistics increasingly difficult. “It has long been a rule of good form to check the route with a Mavic before setting out, to look for ‘waiters,’” the officer emphasizes. According to him, every logistical trip now turns almost into a special operation, and in non-infantry units most losses occur precisely during movements into and out of positions.

In these conditions, ground robotic systems have gone from being exotic to almost the main means of supplying positions. Where they cannot reach, something can perhaps be delivered by a Vampire. Ground robotic systems are controlled primarily through Starlink. Besides logistics platforms, Shutyi says, evacuation and sapper platforms are also widely used, while combat platforms have fairly limited application despite regular wow-factor presentations.

The requirements for small arms have changed as well. As the officer notes, the assault rifle as an individual weapon remains relevant only at the forward edge; farther back, it is increasingly being displaced by the shotgun, which is used to destroy both “waiters” and FPVs in flight.

“Of course, the enemy, trying to avoid the effects of EW, is shifting UAV radio control, for both fixed-wing and multirotor types, into new ‘exotic’ frequency bands. But, as with fiber optics, the Russians do not have enough of this ‘exotica,’ so even old-timers such as Sudny den are still being used en masse,” Shutyi says, describing the trend.

At the same time, UAVs with AI terminal guidance are present, but for strike depths of 20-30 km they are still used purely episodically, more for testing under combat conditions, he adds.

The main consequence of these processes has been that trench EW is definitively dead, the officer states. “It is extremely difficult to move people in and out, let alone EW systems and replacement batteries for them,” the company commander says, describing the realities.

Therefore, he says, it must be accepted as a fact that the forward edge is not covered at all, since large EW systems are being pulled ever farther into the rear because of the constant expansion of the “kill zone” and the growing difficulty of logistics; besides, generators for powerful EW systems are extremely “voracious” when it comes to gasoline and diesel.

In these conditions, vehicle-mounted EW and anti-drone cages organically complement each other, though the main hope is still placed in the cage. The cages themselves are becoming ever more complex and monstrous, with “hedgehogs” made of steel wire and rubber “aprons” against “waiters” on the road.

As for equipment, Shutyi writes that although the Mavic 4 Pro and Matrice 4T are a major step forward compared with the Mavic 3/3T, they have not become some revolutionary innovation. Pilots say that a jammed drone sometimes automatically returns to its launch point. The main change over the year is that EW is now practically no longer fighting them: as noted, trench EW has disappeared, while “large” EW simply cannot reach their flight areas. On the other hand, the battery capacity of the Mavic 4 Pro and Matrice 4T does not allow them to fly far into the depth of the “kill zone.” Thus, the main method of countering “Mavics” now is to identify and destroy the pilots’ own positions.

Underground war, the dying out of mortars, and hunting in the skyПідземна війна, відмирання мінометів та полювання в небі

The dominance of drones in the sky for dozens of kilometers into the depth from the front line has definitively cemented the transition to underground war. “Infantry, pilots, artillerymen, EW operators, air-defense crews: everyone sits in carefully camouflaged holes or dugouts, minimizing the time and traces of their presence on the surface,” the captain describes the situation.

Increasingly, infantry at the forward edge are instructed simply to observe and transmit information about enemy movements, rather than reveal themselves by entering close combat. Assaults now consist of destroying holes and basements, mostly with drones, and then clearing and “settling” them with one’s own infantry. All movement on foot is carried out exclusively in small groups and as covertly as possible, taking advantage of favorable weather conditions.

“There are no longer any enemy trenches or firing positions under observation; there is an area we do not control, in which enemy personnel are believed to be located in holes and hideouts that still have to be found on the ground,” Ihor Shutyi explains. At the same time, a discovered infantry position means, in 99 percent of cases, a destroyed position.

Because of the difficulty of rotating fighters in and out and the realities of “underground war,” stories of infantrymen spending several months, even up to half a year, at forward positions have become commonplace.

Against this background, mortars are practically dying out. The 120 mm caliber is still sometimes used, but the 82 mm, the officer states, has already passed definitively into history.

By contrast, interceptor UAVs are being used more and more. If in 2024 their main targets were fixed-wing reconnaissance drones, they are now actively hunting Molniyas, Italmases, Shaheds, and even fiber-optic multirotors. At night, the air sometimes hums with several interceptors at once, like a swarm of mosquitoes. They work in close coordination with EW: “They jammed some strike wing and ‘put it into a circle,’ and the interceptor finishes it off.”

Anti-drone nets, too, have become an absolutely ordinary part of the landscape of city streets and roads near the front. It is expensive, highly labor-intensive, and not always effective, but still necessary, Shutyi explains.

There have been positive shifts on a strategic scale. Ukraine’s Defense Forces have begun doing what the Russians, using Gerberas, Shaheds, and Italmases, tried to do to us in previous years: inflicting mass strikes with attack UAVs on concentrations of equipment and personnel, command posts, and fuel, lubricant, and ammunition storage sites hundreds of kilometers deep inside enemy territory.

Y done · S save · G great · B bad · N not for me