translated from Turkish

More Weapons May Bring More Deterrence, but They Can Also Deepen the Security Dilemma

Turkey’s growing defense-industrial capacity gives it a new role within NATO, but it must turn that leverage toward strategic autonomy and regional stability rather than becoming a subcontractor for the alliance’s military economy.

“Türkiye Ne NATO’nun Otomatik Aparatı Olmalı Ne de Rusya’yla Stratejik Körlük Yaşamalı”

Fokus Plus · By Naman Bakaç · 9 July 2026 · read the original in Turkish →

“NATO’s transformation into an alliance of defense economies, the growth of the defense industry, and rising military expenditures do not automatically produce peace. More weapons may provide greater deterrence; but they may also deepen the security dilemma. What one side sees as defense capacity may be perceived by the other as preparation for attack.”

Interview: Naman BakaçMülakat: Naman Bakaç

The NATO Ankara Summit is of vital importance for the transformation of the Transatlantic Alliance. Behind this importance lies not only the collective defense strategy to be determined against the rising Russian threat amid the Russia-Ukraine war, but also the need to close NATO’s gap in the defense industry that will sustain that defense. This picture, linked to NATO’s post-Cold War inadequacy in the realm of military deterrence, has led the alliance to place a common defense economy at its center alongside a shared perception of threat. That, in turn, will bring with it the use of Turkey’s defense industry, or the closing of NATO’s defense-industrial shortfall through Turkey.

NATO’s inadequacy in the defense industry, or America’s reflex of shifting the burden onto Europe, carries certain risks as it moves Turkey from the position of a frontline country to that of a central country. More military production does not mean only greater deterrence, nor does it mean a safer and more stable world. On the contrary, it may mean the emergence of wars, crises, and military and cyberattacks that push the world toward a still less livable point. For this reason, Turkey should not become NATO’s apparatus of military production; it should focus on transforming its defense industry, through strategic autonomy, into a point from which the world can be made more secure and more stable.

We discussed all these opportunities and risks for NATO, how Turkey should position itself within the alliance, and the dynamics behind NATO elites’ praise for Turkey’s defense industry with Mehmet Özkan, professor of international relations at the Joint Warfare Institute of the National Defense University.

EUROPE CAN NEITHER BECOME A FULLY INDEPENDENT STRATEGIC ACTOR NOR LEAN ON THE UNITED STATES AS IT ONCE DID

Both EU elites inside Europe and experts outside it frequently say that Europe is in a state of “strategic uncertainty.” How did Europe fall into this strategic uncertainty? What global and regional factors produced it?

Europe’s strategic uncertainty is the result of three ruptures. First, after the Cold War it leaned too heavily on the American security umbrella and failed to develop its own geopolitical capacity. Second, the war in Ukraine reminded Europe once again of the Russian threat, but it also showed that Europe is not a deterrent power on its own. Third, the United States’ shift under Trump toward a more transactional line, one that calculates costs, made the question “How far will the United States protect us?” a permanent one for Europe.

Europe’s problem today is not only Russia. Energy security, migration, the inadequacy of the defense industry, dependence on the United States, economic vulnerability vis-à-vis China, and crises in the Middle East are all pressing on Europe at once. For this reason, Europe can neither become a fully independent strategic actor nor lean on the United States with the old ease. The uncertainty arises from this.

NATO’S FUTURE WILL BE DETERMINED MORE BY INTERNAL DISCORD THAN BY EXTERNAL THREATS

NATO’s future seems likely to be shaped less by the threats it assigns to itself than by fractures in political cooperation among allies, strategic incompatibility, disputes over burden-sharing, and weakness of political will. In your view, will internal problems or external threats shape NATO’s future in the near and medium term?

In the near and medium term, NATO’s future will be determined more by internal discord than by external threats. Russia, China, cyberattacks, and hybrid threats are, of course, important. Yet NATO’s real issue is no longer the question “Who is the enemy?” but rather “Do the allies see the same threats in the same way?”

During the Cold War, the Soviet threat united all members around a common fear. Today, threats are fragmented: for Eastern Europe, Russia is the foremost threat; for the United States, China; for Southern Europe, migration and the Mediterranean; for Turkey, terrorism, Syria, the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and regional instabilities come to the fore. For this reason, NATO’s future will be a matter less of military capacity than of political cohesion, burden-sharing, speed of decision-making, and strategic will. Thus NATO is now trying to redefine itself not only through a common enemy, but through a common defense economy.

IF THE WEST PRAISES TURKEY TODAY, THE REASON IS TURKEY’S PRODUCTION OF USEFUL DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY

What is the significance of praise-filled statements by NATO elites such as the NATO secretary general’s “Turkey is experiencing a defense-industry revolution” and the Belgian defense minister’s “We have much to learn from Turkey’s technology”? Is this the United States’ desperate attempt to reduce its military and financial burden in NATO by filling the gap with Turkey? If so, can it be said that NATO acts not on principle but along imperial lines? Why does the West praise Turkey?

Behind this praise lies not a romantic love of Turkey, but a hard geopolitical reality. Turkey is no longer, within NATO, merely a country that sends troops, holds the border, and serves as a buffer in crisis zones; it is a country that produces technology, exports it, and develops systems tested on the battlefield. The Russia-Ukraine war, which began in 2022, was a very clear geopolitical rupture through which Europe once again understood Turkey’s importance.

The statements you mention by NATO Secretary General Rutte and Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken show the transformation we have reached in the West’s view of Turkey. Europe’s defense-production capacity is weak, its dependence on the United States is high, and the Ukraine war has shown the importance of ammunition, UAVs, air defense, electronic warfare, and continuity of production. Turkey comes to the fore precisely in this gap. This is also a kind of pragmatism and a repositioning according to geopolitical realities. If the West praises Turkey today, the reason is that Turkey produces useful, scalable, and cost-effective capacity in the defense industry.

TURKEY SHOULD REMAIN INSIDE NATO, BUT WITHIN NATO IT MUST BE NOT ONLY A CONSUMER, BUT A PRODUCER AND RULE-SETTING ACTOR

If Turkey’s capacity in defense-industry production and the war in Ukraine have increased Turkey’s geopolitical importance, where should Turkey stand between NATO’s pragmatic and imperial move and Russia’s imperial aims, such as expanding into Eastern Europe, with the possibility of a test attack on Poland being anticipated? What kind of military strategy should it pursue?

What Turkey must do is neither become NATO’s automatic apparatus nor suffer strategic blindness in the name of a romantic balancing act toward Russia. Turkey is a NATO member, and this membership provides Turkey with deterrence, technology, intelligence, military standards, and diplomatic weight. But Turkey’s position within NATO should not be unconditional alignment; it should be selective engagement centered on the national interest.

Russia’s pressure on Europe, Black Sea security, and the war in Ukraine are serious matters for Turkey. But Turkey is also one of the rare NATO countries able to talk with Russia through the balance of energy, Syria, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea. This capacity must be preserved.

In terms of military strategy, Turkey should focus on three things: strong deterrence, fully independent defense production, and a multi-geography security architecture. It should remain inside NATO, but it should participate in NATO not merely as a consumer, but as a producer and rule-setting actor. To avoid becoming an instrument in the struggle for hegemony, it should reduce external dependence in the defense industry, preserve the Montreux-centered balance in the Black Sea, and develop its own security networks with the Middle East and the Turkic world.

MORE WEAPONS MAY PROVIDE GREATER DETERRENCE; BUT THEY MAY ALSO DEEPEN THE SECURITY DILEMMA

As you know, NATO 3.0 is very much on the agenda. What should we understand by NATO 3.0? Why was 3.0 needed in NATO’s transformation? What kinds of decisions are expected on this at the Ankara Summit?

NATO 1.0 was the NATO of the Cold War: collective defense against the Soviet threat. NATO 2.0 was the post-Cold War NATO: the Balkans, Afghanistan, counterterrorism, crisis management, and out-of-area operations. NATO 3.0 is the new NATO shaped around the defense industry, technology, production capacity, artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, cybersecurity, space, and supply chains.

In this new NATO, the issue is not only who the threat is. The issue is who produces, who develops technology, who sets standards, and who directs the defense market. The significance of the Ankara Summit lies here as well. At the summit, headings such as increased defense spending, joint production, drone technologies, air defense, critical raw materials, supply chains, and NATO defense-industry integration come to the fore. Rutte’s announcement in Ankara of headings such as multinational defense projects, drone training, a critical raw materials group, and the “NATO front door” procurement platform can be read as a practical indicator of this transformation.

TURKEY WINS IF IT USES ITS DEFENSE INDUSTRY FOR STRATEGIC AUTONOMY; IT LOSES IF IT BECOMES MERELY A SUBCONTRACTOR FOR THE NATO MARKET

In one of your articles in Fokusplus, you wrote: “For a long time in NATO’s history, Turkey was a country that provided security but remained outside technological decision-making mechanisms. It had a large army, but its defense industry was limited. It had strategic importance, but its economic weight was low. This picture is now changing. Turkey is moving into the position of an actor that develops and exports technology.” Does this observation not mean that NATO needs new markets, that more military production will bring more war, and that more war will not make the world more secure and stable?

This risk exists and must be taken seriously. NATO’s transformation into an alliance of defense economies, the growth of the defense industry, and rising military expenditures do not automatically produce peace. More weapons may provide greater deterrence; but they may also deepen the security dilemma. What one side sees as defense capacity may be perceived by the other as preparation for attack.

But the critical distinction here is this: for Turkey, the growth of the defense industry does not have to mean aggression. If Turkey uses this for deterrence, strategic autonomy, and the production of regional stability, it wins. If it becomes merely a subcontractor for the NATO market, it loses. NATO is now rebuilding itself not only through a common threat, but also through a common economic ecosystem; Turkey, meanwhile, is moving within this structure from being a “protected country” to being a “value-producing country.” This is a very important opportunity, but also a risk that must be managed with care.

WITH THIS SUMMIT, TURKEY IS SEEN NOT ONLY AS A FRONTLINE COUNTRY, BUT AS A COUNTRY OF TECHNOLOGICAL PRODUCTION

We see many statements from NATO elites saying that the Ankara Summit “is more important even than The Hague” and that “Turkey is very important.” Why is such importance attributed to this summit for NATO’s future? What do you foresee Turkey’s position in the Atlantic security architecture becoming through this summit?

The importance of the Ankara Summit does not stem only from Turkey’s role as host. This summit makes visible NATO’s new security logic, its defense economy, and Turkey’s new role within the alliance. For a long time, Turkey was NATO’s border country, an ally with a large army but one that remained outside the processes of technological decision-making. Today the picture is changing. Baykar, TUSAŞ, Roketsan, Aselsan, and other companies are making Turkey part of NATO’s production capacity.

With this summit, Turkey’s role in the Atlantic security architecture may be transformed on three levels. First, Turkey will be seen no longer only as a frontline country, but as a country of technology and production. Second, Turkey will become a bridge actor capable of establishing a security link between NATO and the Middle East, the Turkic world, and the Islamic world. Third, Turkey may rise to a more central position in joint production, export, and standard-setting processes in the defense industry. For this reason, the Ankara Summit is not merely a matter of diplomatic prestige for Turkey, but a strategic updating of position. If Turkey manages this process correctly, it can become not a passive ally within NATO, but one of the founding actors of the new security architecture.