learning · Portuguese — bilingual opening

An Iranian Scholar Speaks Amid Signs of a U.S. Strategic Defeat

Mohammad Marandi argues that the war has left Iran battered but strategically strengthened, while U.S. and Israeli aims have failed and any settlement remains fragile.

A guerra e a paz, vistas de Teerã

Outras Palavras · By Mohammad Marandi, Chris Hedges · 15 June 2026 · read the original in Portuguese →

Em meio a sinais de uma derrota estratégica dos EUA, fala um pesquisador iraniano. As raízes históricas da resistência persa. A provável sabotagem de Israel. O papel da China e da Rússia. O que muda no Oriente Médio, após o fiasco de Trump

Amid signs of a strategic defeat for the United States, an Iranian scholar speaks. The historical roots of Persian resistance. Israel’s likely sabotage. The role of China and Russia. What changes in the Middle East after Trump’s fiasco.

Publicado 15/06/2026 às 20:23 - Atualizado 15/06/2026 às 20:54

Published 06/15/2026 at 8:23 p.m. - Updated 06/15/2026 at 8:54 p.m.

Mohammad Marandi, in an interview with Chris Hedges | Translation: Antonio Martins

As Washington and Tehran appear to be moving toward a preliminary agreement to end the devastating war against Iran, fundamental questions remain unanswered: has the conflict truly ended, or is the region entering a new and more dangerous phase of instability?

In the following interview, journalist Chris Hedges speaks with Iranian political analyst Mohammad Marandi, who was born in the United States, educated at the University of Birmingham, and formerly advised Tehran on nuclear negotiations. They discuss the state of the talks, Iran’s situation after months of war, the future of Lebanon and Gaza, and the broader geopolitical consequences of a conflict that has already reshaped the Middle East and shaken the global economy.

Marandi argues that, despite immense destruction and economic hardship, Iran has emerged from the conflict politically intact and strategically strengthened, while the United States and Israel have failed to achieve their principal objectives. He also warns that any agreement remains fragile, pointing to Israel’s continuing military operations in Lebanon, Iran’s longstanding distrust of U.S. commitments, and the risk that a renewed conflict could again threaten global energy markets and economic stability.

The interview offers a rare opportunity to hear directly from a prominent Iranian voice about how the war is understood inside the country, what Tehran is demanding in the negotiations, and why many in the region believe the conflict is far from over.

Pakistan’s prime minister, Shehbaz Sharif, announced on Friday that a peace agreement between the United States and Iran should be finalized within 24 hours. Iran’s Foreign Ministry, however, says formalizing the agreement may take a few more days.

Despite Iranian losses and the economic crisis triggered by the war, with damages estimated at $270 billion, none of the main objectives of the United States and Israel has been achieved. The Iranian state has not collapsed. Iran’s new leadership, centered on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), remains defiant.

Iran continues to control the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 percent of the world’s supply of oil and natural gas passes. According to reports, the country charges up to $2 million, often paid in Chinese currency, for oil tankers to cross the strait.

If the Strait of Hormuz is not reopened soon, the global economy may be heading toward a major crisis. Strategic petroleum reserves in countries such as Japan and the United States, which have been used to offset oil shortages, are being rapidly depleted. Gasoline prices in the United States are now 34 percent higher than a year ago, while diesel prices have risen by more than 50 percent. These increases are compounded by shortages of essential goods, including nitrogen fertilizers, aluminum, and helium.

Trump and his Israeli allies are well aware that, whether they like it or not, Iran currently holds significant leverage.

Tehran’s principal demands include:

- The immediate and permanent suspension of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon.

- A U.S. commitment not to interfere in Iran’s internal affairs and to respect Iranian sovereignty.

- The lifting of the U.S. naval blockade within 30 days.

- The withdrawal of American forces from the areas surrounding Iran.

- The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz under agreement with Iran.

- The suspension of sanctions on Iranian oil, petrochemicals, and related industries.

- Reconstruction assistance estimated at $300 billion, provided by the United States and its allies.

- A 60-day negotiation period to address nuclear issues, sanctions relief, and the relevant UN Security Council and IAEA resolutions.

- A renewed commitment by Iran, under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, not to pursue the development of nuclear weapons.

- The release of $24 billion in frozen Iranian assets before the start of negotiations, with additional funds released as the talks advance.

President Trump has announced some version of a peace agreement dozens of times. Perhaps we should not yet call this a peace agreement, but rather an agreement to begin negotiations. Pakistani officials seem optimistic, while Iran’s Foreign Ministry says a final agreement may still take several days. From your perspective in Tehran, what is the current situation?

Mohammad Marandi: There is still no final agreement. Significant differences remain. When Iranian officials said a signing on Sunday was unlikely, it was because those differences had not been resolved. Even if both sides sign a memorandum of understanding, that does not mean peace is guaranteed. Many things can happen in the coming days and weeks.

It is already clear that the Israeli regime is trying to prevent any normalization of the situation in the region. The attack on Lebanon has intensified. Villages and cities in the south and center of the country are being bombed daily. Men, women, and children are being killed. The aim appears to be the destruction of southern Lebanon, so that it resembles Gaza. In many places, that is already happening.

Even if an agreement is signed, Israel’s actions and the pressure of the Israeli lobby may undermine progress. And if we move beyond an initial agreement, we enter a second phase that becomes even more complicated.

There are sanctions that must be suspended, many of them written into U.S. law. Iran’s nuclear program is also nonnegotiable in certain respects. Iran will not abandon uranium enrichment because it regards it as a sovereign right.

So there is a minefield ahead. The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed, and the global economy is moving toward crisis. Even if an agreement is signed, any disruption could result in the strait being closed again.

Nothing is certain.

I would like to ask about Lebanon. From the moment the ceasefire was announced, everything indicated that both the United States and Israel would violate it immediately. We saw violent attacks almost at once. We also saw what happened in Gaza, where nearly a thousand Palestinians have reportedly been killed since the so-called ceasefire was implemented.

Are we heading toward a situation in which agreements exist on paper, but in practice there are violations, periodic attacks, and an Israeli refusal to comply with one of Iran’s main demands, namely, an end to hostilities in Lebanon? The understanding seems to be that Iran will refrain from attacking U.S. allies, but that Israel and the United States, likewise, would refrain from attacking Iranian allies such as Hezbollah.

Mohammad Marandi: The question also includes Gaza, although Gaza is not specifically mentioned in the proposed agreement. Lebanon is mentioned directly because of the constant airstrikes against villages, towns, and cities.

What you are describing is certainly possible, and it is precisely what Iranian officials say could cause the agreement to fail.

Iran’s main advantage is the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has the capacity to restrict access to the strait for countries aligned with the United States. It is important to understand that Iran has never completely closed the Strait of Hormuz. Countries that remained friendly to Tehran during the war, or that did not take part in the campaign, continued to sail through the passage.

There were brief periods when the Americans effectively imposed a total closure, but, in general, vessels associated with countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar faced restrictions because those governments took part in the U.S. war effort. Under the proposed agreement, those countries would again be permitted to use the strait. However, if Israel violates the agreement, from Iran’s perspective the United States will have violated it as well.

We saw this after the 39-day war. There was an agreement to end hostilities in Lebanon, and the Strait of Hormuz was expected to be reopened to shipping bound for those countries. But when Netanyahu resumed bombing Lebanon, Iran responded by preventing those ships from leaving. Trump then imposed a blockade on Iranian ports.

Consequently, the strait remains largely closed to countries allied with the United States. The important point is that this will not be another agreement like the 2015 JCPOA. On that occasion, Iran fulfilled its commitments under the nuclear agreement. The Americans, in many cases, did not. President Obama was supposed to meet a series of obligations, but failed to implement many of them. That experience left a deep scar in Iran and is one reason the JCPOA is now viewed unfavorably by many Iranians.

This time, Iran is insisting on a different sequence. The United States must first release Iranian assets and help end the slaughter in Lebanon. Only then can the process move forward.

The sequence is fundamentally different from that of the JCPOA, in which Iran acted first and then waited to see whether the Americans would fulfill their obligations. In some areas, Washington will have to act first. In others, implementation will occur simultaneously.

The United States has a long history of failing to honor agreements with Iran. This goes back to the Algiers Accords and to countless other understandings in which Washington promised not to interfere in Iranian affairs.

Mohammad Marandi: Exactly. And this goes beyond the nuclear agreement. Over the years, there have been understandings involving Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and other issues. In every case, from the Iranian point of view, it was the Americans who violated the agreement. That history explains the skepticism in Tehran.

I do not know anyone who believes that an agreement will be signed, that Washington will voluntarily fulfill all its commitments, and that the two sides will then move smoothly into a second phase leading to a comprehensive agreement. Personally, I think that is highly unlikely.

Even now, I am not absolutely certain that an agreement will be signed. The chances are relatively high because Trump is under enormous pressure, but there are still substantial disagreements over issues Iran considers impassable. The Americans do not want Israel’s hands tied in Lebanon. The Iranians say there must be a genuine ceasefire. Israel cannot simply retain the ability to attack Lebanon whenever it pleases.

Israel clearly has a direct interest in sabotaging any agreement. This seems to expose a growing divide between Washington and Tel Aviv. Trump is under pressure because he appears to be on the verge of a global economic crisis. Strategic oil reserves are being depleted. Time is not on his side.

Mohammad Marandi: Exactly. Iran’s leverage comes from both the battlefield and the economy. Iranians believe they performed very well during the 39 days of fighting. They do not merely believe they survived. They believe they won. They successfully struck Israeli targets, American installations, and allied assets in response to attacks on Iranian infrastructure and civilian sites.

As a result, confidence inside Iran is very high. When the war began, there was concern. Some people believed Iran would emerge victorious, while others feared the worst. But what was striking was the calm. Even after it became clear that important leaders had been assassinated, people did not panic. There was no rush on supermarkets, no widespread stockpiling. Gas stations remained relatively quiet.

Gradually, public confidence grew. After two weeks, many people believed Iran was winning the war. When Iran finally accepted the ceasefire, after Trump shifted from demanding unconditional surrender to accepting Iran’s ten-point proposal for negotiations, many Iranians argued that the war should continue.

Even today, there are many people who believe that if the Americans reject the demands, Iran should resume fighting. I do not know whether they are a majority. But what is certain is that confidence today is much higher than it was before. That confidence leads many Iranians to believe that their position is stronger than Washington’s. And if the Americans or the Israelis violate an agreement, I do not think Iran will simply accept it. We saw that in Lebanon. When Israel intensified its attacks on Beirut and threatened vast civilian populations, Iran responded directly. From the Iranian point of view, that demonstrated both capability and determination.

Where do you think the economic situation is heading? Trump is flirting with what could become a global depression if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed. At the same time, Iran has suffered significant damage because of the war. Inflation is high, especially for basic necessities. It is clear that Iran has paid a high price for this conflict.

Mohammad Marandi: Undoubtedly. The 39 days of war caused significant damage. The attacks targeted pharmaceutical factories, steel-production facilities, petrochemical plants, and Iran’s main gas field. Schools, hospitals, and residential buildings were hit. The destruction was substantial. If you come to Tehran today, you will not necessarily see devastation everywhere, because it is a very large city. But if you know where to look, the damage is evident.

The blockade imposed on Iranian ports has created additional problems. The United States restricted Iran’s ability to export and import goods. Oil exports fell significantly, and its capacity to import food, medicine, and medical supplies through its ports in the south of the country was severely affected. Iran is trying to replace these trade routes through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus, Pakistan, and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan. But these alternatives are not sufficient.

There is no denying that the situation is difficult. Despite these pressures, Iranians have shown extraordinary resilience. Many people see this as a war for national survival. They believe they won the war, and that belief has strengthened public confidence. Iranians are also resilient by nature. More broadly, Shiite communities throughout the region have a deeply rooted tradition of resistance.

The story of Imam Hussein and the Battle of Karbala, the willingness to stand against oppression regardless of the odds, is deeply embedded in the worldview across the region. That tradition helps explain the resilience we see in Iran, in Lebanon, and in groups such as Hezbollah. It is one reason many refer to what exists as the “Axis of Resistance.”

In my opinion, Iran will outlast the United States in this economic confrontation. The siege imposed by Washington is a double-edged sword. The United States is trying to destroy the Iranian economy. At the same time, it is doing serious damage to the global economy and pushing its own economy toward crisis. The difference is psychological as much as economic. Iranians see themselves as victims of aggression. They believe they are defending their country and therefore must endure hardship.

By contrast, most Americans do not see themselves as engaged in a war of survival. They see the conflict as a war of choice. And many people around the world increasingly see this war as a struggle being waged on behalf of Netanyahu and the Israeli government, rather than a war driven by their own national interests.

Anyone who wants to understand Iranian resilience should study the eight-year war against Iraq. As I understand it, you yourself fought in that war.

I volunteered when I was sixteen. During the war, I was exposed to chemical weapons twice. I survived attacks with mustard gas and nerve agents. A mutual friend of ours, Alastair Crooke, wrote a book many years ago called Resistance and the Essence of the Islamic Revolution. It is an old book, but I still think it offers useful insights. There is not much high-quality material available in English on Iran, but that is a book I often recommend. Another is Going to Tehran. For anyone seeking to understand the concept of resistance and how it shapes Iranian thought, these works provide valuable context. A Ground War

Recently, we heard Trump threaten to seize Kharg Island. With the president, it is often difficult to know whether such statements represent actual policy or simply late-night improvisations. But if the negotiations fail, what would such a move mean?

Mohammad Marandi: It would be difficult, but not impossible. The United States has moved a substantial number of troops and large quantities of equipment to Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and other locations around the Persian Gulf. Maintaining these deployments is a challenge. It is summer in the Gulf, and conditions are extremely hot and humid.

If an attack occurred, my understanding is that Iran would probably allow American forces to take some territory initially and would then begin attacking them with drones, rockets, and missiles. In fact, during the war, Iranian military officers told me they almost wished the United States would launch a ground invasion. Their view was that Iran’s strengths would become far more significant once American forces were physically present on Iranian territory or occupying islands and fixed positions. At that point, those forces become vulnerable.

Iran’s military strategy has always focused on making the cost of an invasion unbearable. The aim is not necessarily to defeat the United States in the conventional sense. The aim is to inflict enough suffering that future American leaders decide such a war will never again be worth attempting.

People often underestimate the scale of Iran’s preparations. For decades, the country has built extensive underground facilities. Underground cities house missile systems, drone infrastructure, factories, air-defense networks, and even components of the Iranian air force. These facilities were not built overnight.

Those preparations paid off. Iran also spent decades preparing for the possibility of a ground war. The results surprised many observers. Based on conversations I have had with people in China, Russia, and elsewhere, there is genuine astonishment at how effectively Iran handled the conflict. If the United States launched a major ground invasion, I believe many people would be similarly surprised by the result. Personally, I do not believe Trump wants such a war. But given the influence of the Israeli lobby and the unpredictability of political events, I would never say that anything is impossible.

How has the war altered the regional balance of power?

Iran’s position has been significantly strengthened. This is especially true in relation to Russia and China. Officials from both countries have expressed admiration for the way Iran handled the war. They may not use the word “surprised,” but I believe surprise was part of what they felt. Many people predicted Iran’s collapse. They thought the country would give way during the initial twelve-day phase of the conflict. Then, after American intervention, they believed Iran would collapse within a few days. Instead, Iran held firm. There was destruction, loss of life, and suffering. But there was never a sense that the country was disintegrating.

I always believed Iran would survive, but even I was surprised by the resilience shown by ordinary people. Public Resilience, Gaza, and the Future of the Region

One of the remarkable things during the war was the public response. When there were threats to bomb bridges and critical infrastructure, we saw ordinary Iranians gathering around those sites, almost spontaneously, to protect them.

Mohammad Marandi: Yes. My own students contacted me constantly in those first days. They asked: “What can we do? Where should we go? How can we help?” Often I did not know what to tell them. I was spending so much time giving media interviews that, ironically, I sometimes knew less about what was happening on the ground than ordinary people did. But I had students, eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds, calling me constantly.

What impressed me most was that some of those students had taken part in protests and riots only a few months earlier. Several contacted me privately and said: “We made a mistake. How can we make up for it?” Some of those conversations were moving. I would suggest doing volunteer work with the Red Cross, helping at local mosques, or finding ways to assist their communities. People wanted to contribute. Throughout the 39 days of war, there was an extraordinary spirit among ordinary Iranians. But for me, those first weeks were unlike anything I had ever experienced.

Let us assume the memorandum of understanding is eventually signed. You mentioned earlier that major obstacles remain, especially Israel’s determination to sabotage any agreement. What do you think happens next? Are we moving toward a future of periodic attacks, intermittent escalations, and an endless low-intensity conflict, similar to what we have seen in Gaza and Lebanon?

Mohammad Marandi: Thank God I am not a gambler. But I believe the Iranians will not allow what they consider a genocide to continue indefinitely. In Lebanon, I believe Iran will be extremely firm both at the negotiating table and in enforcing any agreement that may be reached.

Gaza presents a different challenge. In my opinion, many governments in the region have abandoned the Palestinians. Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and others accepted what Iran regards as a fundamentally unjust ceasefire agreement. In practice, they endorsed it. Since then, Israel has continued its military operations beyond the agreed limits, and a large number of Palestinians have been killed.

The problem for Iran is that Washington can simply respond by saying that an agreement is already in force. That limits Iran’s leverage with regard to Gaza. Lebanon is different. In that context, Iran has direct leverage through the Strait of Hormuz and through its ability to impose sanctions if agreements are violated. For that reason, I do not believe Iran will allow the United States to behave the same way it behaved after the JCPOA was signed in 2015.

What effect has this war had on the broader project of what many call Greater Israel? One of the troubling developments was the recent discussion between Tucker Carlson and the U.S. ambassador to Israel, in which the ambassador suggested that if Israel dominated the region, that would be acceptable. Many people see this as reflecting an unofficial but real element of American policy.

Mohammad Marandi: What is extraordinary is that Iran and Yemen are among the countries least directly threatened by a Greater Israel project. Countries such as Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt would face far more immediate consequences. In Lebanon, for example, I believe the current government was installed with strong American backing and has actively worked against the resistance. The authorities have restricted humanitarian aid, limited movement, and made life harder for displaced communities. Iranian aid has often been blocked. Aid from Iraq has been obstructed. The borders have been closed.

Despite these pressures, Hezbollah has continued to function. If Greater Israel ever becomes reality, it will be the neighboring Arab states that face the gravest consequences. But I do not think that project will succeed. I believe Netanyahu has failed, and this war against Iran represents an important turning point.

The conflict between the United States and Iran will be remembered as one of the defining events of this era. Many people assumed Iran would collapse. Instead, it survived. More than that, Iran forced negotiations under conditions that many had considered impossible only a few months earlier. When prominent American strategists and longtime advocates of intervention describe this as one of the greatest defeats in modern U.S. foreign policy, it shows the scale of what happened.

I do not believe Netanyahu can achieve his long-term objectives after this, nor that the State of Israel can continue indefinitely on its current path. Since October 7, Israel’s actions have transformed global opinion. The war against Iran, combined with the destruction in Gaza and Lebanon, has intensified international opposition. At the same time, the conflict has affected the global economy and produced consequences that go far beyond the Middle East. Militarily, Israel can inflict enormous suffering. It can kill large numbers of Palestinians and Lebanese civilians. But ultimately, I do not believe military force alone will secure its future. I think this will end badly for the Israeli regime.

Outras Palavras is made by many hands. If you value our work, become a supporter and strengthen critical journalism: apoia.se/outraspalavras