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From Imbalance to Rebalancing: The Middle East’s New Configuration and New Crises

As outside powers retreat and regional powers gain agency, the Middle East is moving from a phase of open conflict into one of adjustment, but its new multipolar balance is also incubating new crises.

孙德刚：《中东地缘政治演进与地区秩序重构》

Arab World Studies · By Sun Degang · 31 January 2026 · read the original in Chinese →

原文链接：【专家笔谈：中东地缘政治演进与地区秩序重构】从“失衡”到“再平衡”：中东新格局与新危机文章来源《阿拉伯世界研究》2026年第1期作者简介孙德刚，博士，复旦大学中东研究中心研究员正文

Original link: [Expert Forum: The Evolution of Middle Eastern Geopolitics and the Reconstruction of Regional Order] From “Imbalance” to “Rebalancing”: The Middle East’s New Configuration and New Crises. Source: Arab World Studies, No. 1, 2026. Author bio: Sun Degang, Ph.D., research fellow at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Fudan University. Text follows.

中东地区博弈彼此联动。21世纪第三个十年以来，中东地区先后经历了和解期、冲突期和休整期三个阶段:第一阶段始于2021年。伊朗、土耳其和以色列三个非阿拉伯国家与阿拉伯国家纷纷改善关系，掀起了复交、建交与和解的浪潮;卡塔尔与沙特、阿联酋和埃及等阿拉伯国家内部也实现了关系正常化。第二阶段始于2023年10月7日。哈马斯发动“阿克萨洪水”行动后，中东地区进入冲突期。以色列“七线作战”，对加沙地区哈马斯、约旦河西岸反以武装、黎巴嫩真主党、也门胡塞武装、叙利亚巴沙尔政府、伊朗和卡塔尔等采取了军事行动。2024年4月、10月和2025年6月，以色列与伊朗三次大规模直接交火，加沙危机升级和外溢。第三阶段始于2025年11月。联合国安理会通过了第2803号决议，美国提出结束加沙冲突的“20点和平计划”，以色列与伊朗休战，也门胡塞武装宣布停止袭击红海的过往商船，以色列与黎巴嫩非军方代表40余年来首次直接会谈，叙利亚局势也趋稳，中东地区进入全面休整期。从冲突期到休整期的转变过程中，美、欧、俄罗斯和亚洲大国对中东事务的介入能力与意愿下降，投入的军事与外交资源明显减少;中东地区大国塑造中东格局的意志与能力上升，推动了中东地区多极化，新格局酝酿新危机。

The games being played across the Middle East are interlinked. Since the third decade of the twenty-first century began, the region has passed through three successive phases: reconciliation, conflict, and recuperation. The first phase began in 2021. Iran, Turkey, and Israel, the three non-Arab states, all moved to improve relations with Arab countries, setting off a wave of restored diplomatic ties, new diplomatic relations, and reconciliation; within the Arab world, Qatar also normalized relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and others. The second phase began on October 7, 2023. After Hamas launched Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, the Middle East entered a phase of conflict. Israel fought on “seven fronts,” taking military action against Hamas in Gaza, anti-Israel armed groups in the West Bank, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria, Iran, and Qatar, among others. In April and October 2024 and June 2025, Israel and Iran engaged in three large-scale direct exchanges of fire, as the Gaza crisis escalated and spilled over. The third phase began in November 2025. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2803; the United States proposed a “20-point peace plan” to end the Gaza conflict; Israel and Iran entered a truce; Yemen’s Houthi forces announced that they would cease attacks on commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea; Israeli and Lebanese nonmilitary representatives held their first direct talks in more than forty years; and the situation in Syria also moved toward stability. The Middle East thus entered a comprehensive period of recuperation. In the transition from conflict to recuperation, the ability and willingness of the United States, Europe, Russia, and major Asian powers to intervene in Middle Eastern affairs declined, and the military and diplomatic resources they invested were markedly reduced. The will and capacity of major regional powers to shape the Middle Eastern order rose, propelling the region toward multipolarity: a new configuration is fermenting new crises.

I. The Four Centers of Power in the Middle East’s New Configuration(一)中东新格局下的四大力量中心

Since the Gaza “20-point peace plan” was put forward, the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” and Israel have been poised between war and nonwar; the Turkey-led pro-Muslim Brotherhood alliance and Israel have been in a state of “neither war nor peace”; and relations between the Saudi-led “moderate alliance” and Israel have remained lukewarm. The Middle Eastern powers represented by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, and Iran have become the region’s four centers of power, driving a rebalancing of Middle Eastern power.

First is the “moderate alliance” represented by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, and other countries place relations with the United States first in security terms, while economically they actively “look east.” They have formed a hedging strategy that relies on the United States for security and on Asian countries for development, building a “moderate alliance” characterized by Westernized security, economic diversification, and social secularization. These countries have introduced programs such as “Vision 2025” in Jordan, “Vision 2030” in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Bahrain, and others, “Vision 2035” in Kuwait, and “Vision 2040” in Oman. The “moderate alliance” strengthens geopolitical partnerships with the United States and Europe and geoeconomic partnerships with Asian countries. It supports an independent Palestinian state in moral terms, but avoids raising high the banner of “opposition to Israeli hegemony.” These countries treat domestic development as their foremost priority. At home, they actively promote a shift in growth models from energy exports to high-tech leadership, using high technology to empower industrial upgrading. In foreign relations, they use economic aid and overseas investment as levers to enhance their influence in conflict zones across the Middle East.

Second is the “pro-Muslim Brotherhood alliance” represented by Turkey. In recent years, Turkey has actively expanded its strategic depth. To the east, it has worked to build the Organization of Turkic States and mediate the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan; to the south, it has actively expanded its say in hot-button issues involving Syria, Gaza, Libya, and others. Turkey, Qatar, and Syria have formed a “pro-Muslim Brotherhood alliance,” supporting the just cause of Palestine and defending the Palestinians’ right to establish an independent state. The three countries hold high the banner of opposition to Israel and oppose Israel’s creation of a humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Turkey, Qatar, and Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government in Syria accuse Israel of ethnic cleansing against Palestinians in Gaza; condemn Israel’s September 2025 attack on Qatar; and oppose Israel’s occupation of Syria’s Golan Heights and its repeated airstrikes on Syria.

Third are the pro-Western forces represented by Israel. Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, launched by Hamas in October 2023, shocked both the Israeli government and opposition. With American help, Israel used high-tech methods to strike the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” in salami-slicing fashion. It achieved tactical victories in the course of its “seven-front war,” shifting from “strategic defense” to “strategic offense” and seeking to establish a “Greater Israel” by expanding its strategic depth. In Gaza, the Israel Defense Forces control the area beyond the yellow line, amounting to 53 percent of Gaza’s land. IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir stated, “The yellow line is Israel’s new border.” In Lebanon, Israel has created a buffer zone south of the Litani River; in Syria, Israel has pushed northward from the Golan Heights, forming a buffer zone on the grounds of protecting the Druze. Yet Israel’s tactical victories do not amount to strategic success; formidable hard power cannot purchase soft power. In fact, as many as 158 countries have now recognized the State of Palestine, including Western countries such as Britain, France, and Australia. Although Israel has won militarily, its international image has been badly damaged.

Fourth is the “Axis of Resistance” represented by Iran. The Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” — Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi forces in Yemen, Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, and Iraqi Shiite militias — has suffered severe blows and been forced to shift from “strategic offense” to “strategic defense,” but it has not been completely crushed. Iran is actively preparing for war, stepping up purchases of advanced weapons, accelerating the development of more advanced ballistic missiles, ending its policy of contact with the United States and the West on the nuclear issue, and dismantling Israel’s intelligence network inside Iran. Some Israeli scholars have pointed out that Hamas in Gaza refuses to be disarmed; Yemen’s Houthi forces remain in a period of recuperation; Hezbollah in Lebanon is also actively restoring its combat capability; Iran is covertly supplying arms to the Houthis and has provided new aid funds to Hezbollah since the end of 2025. The “Axis of Resistance” is reorganizing and may even be waiting for an opportunity to return.

II. Four Characteristics of the Middle East’s New Configuration(二)中东新格局的四大特点

After a “wave of conflict” lasting two years, all the warring parties in the Middle East are looking for a chance to recuperate. Middle Eastern international relations are in a state of imbalance, and the new regional configuration contains both opportunities to promote peace through dialogue and the hidden danger that conflict may flare up again.

First, the contradiction between Israel and the “pro-Muslim Brotherhood alliance” is rising. After the new round of Israeli-Palestinian conflict broke out in 2023, the principal contradiction in the Middle East was that between Israel and the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.” As Iran shifted from strategic offense to strategic defense, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi Shiite militias all sought to preserve their strength by going to ground, preventing themselves from being subjected to dual pressure from Israel and the United States. Compared with the low-profile style of the “Axis of Resistance,” however, the pro-Muslim Brotherhood alliance has opposed Israel in a high-profile manner. In September 2025, Israel attacked Hamas negotiators inside Qatar, causing multiple deaths, including Qatari citizens, and provoking an uproar. Arab and Islamic countries held an emergency summit in Doha, and the pro-Muslim Brotherhood alliance formed by Turkey, Qatar, and Syria stood at the forefront of opposition to Israel. In December 2025, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan received the visiting Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi; the two agreed that Israel’s regional expansionism was the foremost threat to regional security. In early December, Syrian President al-Sharaa, while attending the Doha Forum in Qatar, condemned Israel for committing “horrific massacres” in the Gaza Strip and for attempting to divert attention by “exporting crisis” to Syria. The game between Israel and the pro-Muslim Brotherhood alliance has escalated.

Second, an offensive strategic culture has become mainstream. After the Cold War ended, promoting peace through negotiation became a regional consensus in the Middle East. The 1991 Madrid Peace Conference opened the curtain on Middle East peace talks; the 1993 Oslo Accords established the principle of “land for peace.” Under the new circumstances, however, confrontation has intensified between Israel, the “Axis of Resistance,” and the “pro-Muslim Brotherhood alliance.” The Middle East’s strong states have fallen into a “zero-sum game trap.” Middle Eastern countries, especially Israel and Iran, have each developed a complete set of hostile discourses, stimulating and driving escalation and even military confrontation between the two. The logic of confrontation has replaced the logic of dialogue; seeking peace through force has replaced seeking peace through negotiation; offensive realism has replaced defensive realism. In February 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited the United States and discussed with President Donald Trump how to use force to strike the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” in order to implement “peace through strength.” In June 2025, after the United States dispatched B-2 bombers to destroy Iran’s Fordow nuclear facility, the Israeli government expressed its gratitude. Since the new round of Israeli-Palestinian conflict erupted, the law of the jungle and the rule of the strong devouring the weak have prevailed; international law and international order have been damaged; and the abuse of force has become a “new normal.” This offensive strategic culture has accelerated the weaponization of artificial intelligence. Countries are racing to develop sophisticated weapons, using the new revolution in military affairs to drive defense transformation and strengthen cyber warfare, information warfare, intelligence warfare, cognitive warfare, and drone operations.

Third, the Middle East has divided into “three worlds.” The Middle East includes West Asia and North Africa, but under the new circumstances it has already split into three worlds. On the basis of regime stability and degree of economic prosperity, today’s Middle East can be divided into three major regions: the “arc of prosperity,” the “arc of stability,” and the “arc of turbulence.” The six Gulf Cooperation Council states belong to the “arc of prosperity.” These countries take development as their first priority; internationally, they keep a low profile, seek advantage and avoid harm, try to “subtract” wherever possible, and avoid “carrying the banner.” They support the Palestinian cause morally and economically, but in practice put their own national interests first and avoid a head-on collision with Israel. Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and other countries lie within the “arc of stability.” They actively safeguard domestic stability, become politically involved in Middle Eastern security affairs, and oppose Israel’s creation of a humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Countries represented by Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Israel, and Yemen fall within the “arc of turbulence,” deeply involved in regional conflict in security terms.

Fourth, interaction between extra-regional powers and regional powers has become more frequent. Since 2025, Trump has successively visited Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Israel, and Egypt; he has also introduced the “20-point peace plan” on Gaza in an effort to enhance diplomatic soft power. By contrast, Russia, India, and other non-Western powers have limited influence and agenda-setting capacity in the Middle East, where a new trend of “America advancing and Russia retreating” has appeared. Trump talks at length about deals. With attracting greater Gulf investment in the United States as his principal task, and tariffs and arms sales as bargaining chips, his Middle East policy is flexible and pragmatic. He keeps the Gulf Arab states and Israel firmly in his own hands and prevents their relations with non-Western powers from growing still closer. The United States uses its institutional power in international organizations and plays the transaction card vigorously, urging Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar to join the “Abraham process” and normalize relations with Israel. It seeks to bind together America’s Gulf allies — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman — with its Eastern Mediterranean allies — Israel, Egypt, and Jordan — while isolating countries such as Iran and Turkey. In November 2025, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman visited the United States; the United States granted Saudi Arabia the treatment of a “non-NATO ally,” and the two countries signed multiple agreements covering defense, artificial intelligence, civilian nuclear energy, and other areas. At the same time, Islamic countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran are huddling together for warmth under the framework of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Iran is looking east with still greater resolve, strengthening cooperation with China, Russia, and other non-Western powers and integrating deeply into BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In May 2025, ASEAN, China, and the GCC held their first trilateral summit in Malaysia.

III. New Crises Hidden in the Middle East’s New Configuration(三)中东新格局隐藏新危机

Under the Middle East’s new configuration, regional powers such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Iran have become “chess players”; non-state armed actors have become “chess pieces”; and turbulent states have been reduced to “chessboards.” As regional powers actively compete for the “middle ground” in unstable countries, new crises may be triggered.

First, Gaza has become a focal point in great-power competition. Under a multipolar pattern, the game among Middle Eastern powers over the second-stage Gaza ceasefire agreement continues to develop. In November 2025, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2803, supporting the formation of an International Stabilization Force (ISF), and Gaza is expected to begin negotiations over the second stage of a peace agreement. Yet Israel demands that Hamas be disarmed, while Iran, Turkey, Qatar, and others demand that Israel withdraw from Gaza. Peaceful reconstruction in Gaza therefore faces uncertainty. Whether Hamas can be disarmed, who will administer Gaza, and how Gaza will be governed all remain unresolved. Israel has already conducted dozens of rounds of military operations in Gaza. Hamas firmly opposes Israel turning Palestinian Gaza into Israeli Gaza, and the fragile Gaza ceasefire agreement could be torn up at any moment. Among the major Middle Eastern powers, countries such as Saudi Arabia oppose Israel’s annexation of Gaza diplomatically; countries such as Turkey oppose it politically; and Iran opposes it in security terms.

Second, Syria has become a battlefield in great-power competition. Located at the crossroads of the Middle East, Syria has become a stage for proxy wars among major powers. The Alawite issue, the Kurdish issue, and the Druze issue constitute the three major obstacles to Syrian national reconciliation; economic reconstruction, political reconstruction, and social reconstruction are the three major challenges. Turkey has established a buffer zone in northern Syria; Israel has established one in the south; the United States has deployed military bases in the Kurdish areas of the east; and Russia maintains military bases at Tartus and Latakia in the west. The partitioning of Syria by extra-regional powers and regional strong states has damaged Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE have used participation in Syria’s economic reconstruction as a lever to break the monopoly of great powers over Syrian affairs. In May 2025, the UAE’s DP World signed a thirty-year, $800 million contract with Syria’s General Authority for Land and Sea Ports to help Syria build the Port of Tartus, an industrial park, and a free-trade zone. This strategic project will not only contribute to Syria’s postwar reconstruction and restore Syria’s position as a shipping hub in the Eastern Mediterranean; it will also directly weaken Russia’s influence in Tartus. How the al-Sharaa transitional government maintains a balance before extra-regional powers and Middle Eastern strong states will test its diplomatic wisdom.

Third, Lebanon has become a stage for competition among regional powers. In September 2024, Israeli intelligence agencies remotely triggered explosions in pagers, causing thousands of Hezbollah casualties. By deploying ground forces, Israel drove Hezbollah out of the area south of Lebanon’s Litani River. The United States, using international aid as bait, urged the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah. In July 2025, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun publicly called on Hezbollah to lay down its weapons. In August, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said the cabinet had approved the U.S.-proposed goal of “ensuring that weapons are held only by the state,” a move firmly opposed by Hezbollah. Hezbollah and others oppose negotiations between the Lebanese government and Israel on disengagement, and they also oppose Israel’s establishment of a sphere of influence south of the Litani River in Lebanon and its infringement of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Finally, Iraq, Yemen, and Sudan have also become focal points of competition among all sides. In November 2025, Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission announced the final results of the new parliamentary elections. The “Reconstruction and Development Alliance” led by incumbent Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani won 46 of the 329 seats in parliament, ranking first. The “State of Law Coalition” led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki won 29 seats, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian immediately congratulated Iraq’s Shiite parties on winning the parliamentary elections. Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel, and others are actively intervening in Yemen’s affairs. In November, the Houthi forces announced that they had destroyed a joint intelligence network operated by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel in Yemen; in December, Saudi Arabia launched multiple rounds of airstrikes against Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council. Yemen’s government, the Southern Transitional Council, and the Houthi forces divide the country into three, while regional powers cultivate proxies one after another. In Sudan, armed conflict between government forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has produced a grave humanitarian disaster, with more than 10 million people displaced. Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman al-Burhan, chairman of Sudan’s Sovereignty Council and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, rejected a mediation proposal put forward by the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. For this reason, the Sudanese government announced in May 2025 that it was severing diplomatic relations with the UAE and closing Sudan’s embassy and consulates there.

In sum, the Middle East is moving from a period of conflict into a period of adjustment. The United States lacks the will to intervene comprehensively in Middle Eastern affairs; the major European powers, Russia, and emerging powers lack the capacity to become deeply involved; and regional powers have seized the opportunity to actively shape the Middle East’s new configuration. After two years of conflict, the Middle East stands at the crossroads of war and peace and has entered a period of adjustment. Yet the region’s hot-button issues are tangled and entrenched; the games among regional powers are surging beneath the surface; separatism and terrorism are making a comeback. For the Middle East to move from disorder to order, from war toward peace, there is still a very long road ahead.